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FIRST  PRIiiTCiiFLES 


ETHICS. 


DESIGNED    AS    A    BASIS    FOR    INSTRUCTION 
IN    ETHICAL    SCIENCE 


IN 


SCHOOLS  AND   COLLEGES, 


J.   T.   CHAMPLIN, 

PRKSIDENT  OF  COLBY  UNIVBR8ITT. 


NEW  EDITION,  REVISED. 


A..   S.   BARNES  AND   COMPANY, 

NRW   YORK    AND   CHICAGO. 


G5 


/e 


-^^.^  vo 


Matured,  accorlhig  to  Act  of  Ooncroiw,  in  tbe  remr  1801,  vf 
J.   T.   CHAMPLIN 
la  the  aerk'i  Office  of  the  DiBtrict  Court  of  the  DUtrkt  of 


PREFACE 


The  favor  with  whicli  my  text-book  on 
Intellectual  Philosophy  has  been  received, 
and  the  need  which  I  have  felt  in  my 
own  classes  of  a  similar  book  on  Ethics, 
have  inuuced  me  to  add  this  to  the  many 
excellent  treatises  on  that  subject  already 
in  existence.  The  great  enlargement  of 
the  list  of  studies  in  our  schools  and  col- 
leges, of  late  years,  renders  it  more  de- 
sirable than  ever  that  text-books  should 
be  brief,  presenting  only  essential  princi- 
ples, to  the  neglect  of  details,  which  may 
be  supplied  by  the  teacher,  or  by  general 
reading.  These  considerations  have  de- 
termined the  form  of  the  present  treatise. 

8691)31 


4  PREFACE. 

At  the  same  time,  I  have  hoped  to  pre- 
sent a  more  orderly  outline  of  the  princi- 
ples of  the  science,  and  supply  a  more 
rational  foundation  for  them,  than  has 
usually  been  done  in  treatises  on  Ethics. 
The  doctrine  that  right  is  conformity  in 
conduct  to  the  nature  and  reason  of 
things,  is  not,  indeed,  a  new  doctrine,  but 
it  has  been  a  good  deal  overlooked  of  late, 
and  has  never,  perhaps,  been  fully  and 
consistently  carried  out.  Whether  i^  has 
bee::^  in  the  present  instance  or  nui,  »^aiers 
must  judge. 

Aiming  at  an  orderly  and  consecutive 
development  of  the  principles  of  the 
science,  I  have  introduced  the  opinions 
of  others  but  sparingly  into  the  text. 
These  have  generally  been  reserved  to 
the  end,  where  they  have  been  presented 
too^ether,  in  the  form  of  an  Historical  Ab- 
retract,  which,  it  is  hoped,  will  be  found 
both  interesting  and  profitable. 

Waterville  College,  July  1,  1861. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAOl 

A.CT10N    A.S    THE    SuHJECT   OF   EtHICAI.    ScIENCK.        ,  7 


CHAPTER   II. 
Action  ruEc.uprosEs  Acxivs  Peinctplks     ....       It 

CHAPTER    III. 
ViuTuous    Action    FREsrrpo9EB    the    Fkevijou    -^r 

THE  Will 30 

CHAPTER   IV. 
iiiGHT  Acts  must  be  dictated  uy  Intelligexce.     .       3f 

CHAPTER  V. 
Right  Acts  must  le  cuorxDED  ix  the  Natlue  ok 

Tmixos 53 

CHAPTER  yi. 
Just  Acts  aur  always  Right 7o 

CHAPTER  VII. 

VHHACITY     IS    ALWAYS    TllGHT 102 

1  *  ^^^ 


6  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    VIII. 
Benevolent  Acts  are  Right,  if  Just  and  Trde  .     115 

CHAPTER    IX. 
Prudent  Acts  are  Right,  if  Just,  True,  and  Kind.     129 

CHAPTER   X. 
Acts  of  Piety   are  Right,   if  directi  d  to  the 

True  God 140 

CHAPTER-  XI. 
Envious  AND  Malicious  Acts  ARE  always  Wrong.     152 

CHAPTER   XII. 
Obligation  to  do  Right 1G3 

CHAPTER    XIII. 
The  Right,  the  True,  and  the  Good 173 

CHAPTER   XIV. 
The  N\tuke  of  VinTUt: 179 

SUPPLEMENT. 
Historical  Abstract  of  Opinions  on  the  Ground 

of  Right  and  Wrong 185 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES:  OF.  ETJIICS. . 


CHAPTER    I. 

ACTION  AS  THE  SUBJECT  OF  ETHICAL  SCIENCE. 

1.  Ethics  a  practical  science., —  Etiiics,  or 
moral  philosophy,  —  the  one  designation  t:cin<,' 
of  Greek  and  the  other  of  Latin  origin,  and, 
as  now  used,  meaning  precisely  the  same  thing, 
—  is  a  practical  science.  Not  that  ethics  is 
any  less  theoretical  than  otliw  sciences,  —  for 
every  science  is  necessarily  a  tlieory, —  bnt  it 
is  a  theory  pertaining  to  practice,  and  for  the 
sake  of  practice.  The  term  prac/ica/,  there- 
fore, refers  wholly  to  the  object-matter  and  end 
of  the  science.  Ethics,  then,  even  in  theory, 
ifc-  entiicly  i)ru(:tical  in   its  scope,  since  it   sup- 


8  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

plies  US  with  principles  by  whicli  we  may  deter 
mine  the  right  in  each  case.  Hence  what  is 
commonly  called  practical  ethics  deserves  :liis 
namfc,  by  way  of  distinction,  only  because  it 
.'li'ctually  .a]5[|Hfc^„Jlhese  principles  to  tlie  various 
ri?lfiti(;>iis '  9f  l^fe.;.a'nci  deduces  hence  a  general 
code'  6i  morals  for  the  benefit  of  those  who 
have  not  the  intelligence  or  tlic  leisure  to  de- 
duce, in  each  case,  their  duty  for  tliemselves. 

2.  //  is  the  science  of  the  laws  of  right  action 
in  the  individual.  —  Ethics,  then,  treats  of  ac- 
tion. It  does  not,  however,  treat  of  actior.  in 
all  its  aspects,  nor  under  all  relations.  It 
treats  only  of  the  acts  of  intelligent  brings, 
and,  indeed,  as  it  is  a  luiman  science,  only  of 
human  acts.  Its  principles  may,  or  may  not, 
apply  to  the  acts  of  otlier  intelligent  beings^ 
it  is  enough  for  us  to  know  that  they  apply 
to  ours.  And  of  human  acts,  in  strictness,  it 
treats  only  of  those  belonging  to  man  as  an 
individual,  unclianged  by  any  of  the  artificial 
arrangements  of  society,  and  personally  respon- 
sible to  the  riglit  from  the  very  nature  which 


ACTION   AS   THE   SUBJECT   OF   ETHICS.  U 

God  has  given  him,  and  the  circumstances 
and  relations  under  whicli  he  has  placed  him. 
Ethics  is  thus  the  science  of  tlie  conditions  or 
laws  of  riglit  action  in  man  as  a  moral  agent. 
The  science  of  right  conduct  in  man,  as  a 
member  of  civil  society,  and  as  far  as  his  duties 
are  modified  by  the  special  arrangements  of 
such  society,  constitutes  what  in  propriety  is 
called  political  philosophy. 

3.  It  views  acts  only  as  right  or  ivrong.  — 
Acts  present  themselves  to  us  under  various 
aspects,  as  awkward  or  graceful,  agreeable  or 
disagreeable,  civil  or  uncivil,  proper  or  improper, 
wise  or  unwise,  and  the  like ;  but  moral  philos- 
ophy treats  of  them  only  as  rif^ht  or  vjvong.  It 
is  true  that  some  of  the  other  distinctions  of 
acts  here  named,  or  which  might  be  named, 
approach  in  significance  the  distinction  of  them 
into  right  and  wrong,  and  may  in  certain  cases 
be  substituted  for  that,  lint  not  generally.  They 
are  none  of  them  equivalent  to  it,  nor  neces- 
sarily even  of  a  moral  nature.  Tluis,  a  riglil 
act  i:>,  in  one  sense,  always  a  proper  act;  i.  c.. 


10  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

it  is  proper  or  suitable  to  the  situation  and 
nature  of  the  agent ;  but  an  act  may  be  proper 
according  to  various  other  standards  which 
liave  nothing  moral  in  them.  So  a  right  act 
is  always  a  wise  act ;  but  every  wise  act  is  not 
necessarily  right,  as  it  may  be  deficient  in  the 
end  to  which  it  is  directed ;  it  may  bo  wise  for 
its  end,  but  that  end  a  bad  one.  And  so  in 
other  cases.  The  distinction  of  right  and  wrong, 
then,  is  peculiar,  if  it  is  not  ijidced  wholly 
independent  of  all  others. 

4.  Right  and  lorong-  defined.  —  The  words 
right  and  ivrong  are  terms  in  general  use,  as 
applicable  not  only  to  action,  but  equally  to 
other  things ;  as  in  the  expressions,  "  All  is 
right,"  *■'  Every  thing  goes  wrong,"  and  the 
like.  Now,  we  are  warranted  by  the  general 
principles  of  association,  upon  which  the  vari- 
ations in  the  sense  of  words  depend,  in  assum- 
ing that  there  is  a  common  meaning  running 
through  these  terms  in  all  their  different,  ap- 
plications. What,  then,  is  the  fuiidamenta] 
idea  expressed  by  each  of  them  ?      Wrong-^  as 


ACTION    AS   THE   SUBJECT   OF    ETHICS.  11 

is  well  known,  is  only  another  form  of  tlic  word 
wrung-,  and  lienco  denotes  what  is  "  twisted," 
"deflected,"  "turned  out  of  tlie  way."  In 
like  manner,  rig-lU  (from  the  Latin  rec/ns) 
means  "  straight,"  "without  deviation."  Here, 
then,  we  have  the  fundamental  meanings  of 
the  words ;  and  tliese  meanings,  in  substance, 
they  must  retain,  whatever  the  objects  to  whicli 
they  are  applied.  Hence  ivromj^  always  implies 
a  departure  from  some  assumed  standard,  and 
riii'lU  conformity  to  it  —  which  standard,  in 
the  case  of  actions,  as  we  shall  presently  see, 
is  the  nature  of  things.* 

5.  Moral  right  and  ivrong.  —  Natural  right 
and  wrong,  then,  form  the  basis  of  moral  right 
and  wrong;  or,  more  properly,  rigiit  and  wrong 
in  their  nature  are  fundamentally  the  same  in 
all  cases  —  moral  right  and  wrong  being  dis- 
tinguislied   from    right   and   wrong    in    general 

•  This  ])aragraph  and  a  few  others  have  been  trans- 
ferred from  an  article  on  Moral  Philosophy  furnished  hy 
the  author  for  the  April  number  of  the  Christian  l{e\i(  w 
for  1800. 


12  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

only  by  the  object-matter  to  which  they  pertain. 
The  term  7noral  is  derived  from  the  Latin  mo- 
res^ meaning  "  conduct,"  ''  character,"  etc 
Moral  right  and  wrong,  therefore,  are  simply 
natural  right  and  wrong  as  exhibited  in  con- 
duct. But  as  right  and  wrong  in  conduct  are 
praiseworthy  or  blameworthy,  —  since  we  are 
always  liable  to  temptations  to  depart  from  tlic 
right,  —  moral  right  or  wrong,  when  attributed 
to  an  agent,  implies  innocence  or  guilt.  Hence 
we  say  of  one  who  acts  according  to  the  best 
light  which  he  can  obtain,  that  he  is  morally 
right,  (i.  e.,  innocent,)  even  wlien  the  act  which 
he  performs  is  in  itself  wrong.  But  the  right 
and  the  wrong  of  acts  in  themselves  arc  the 
same  in  nature  as  the  right  and  the  wrong  in 
any  tiling  else. 

6.  Action  defined.  —  An  action,  as  far  as  it 
is  external,  consists  of  certain  outward  signs 
or  motions,  varying  in  different  cases  according 
to  the  nat'jre  of  Ihe  act.  And  as  every  event 
has  its  relations  to  other  things,  so  Qxary  act 
has  its  bearings  uoon  other  things.     It  stands 


ACTION    AS   THE   SUBJECT    OF    ETHICS.  13 

related  to  nature,  to  the  actor,  and  to  otlior 
beings.  As  an  expression  of  the  internal  prin 
ciples  and  state  of  tke  agent,  —  and  only  in  so 
far  as  it  is  such  an  expression  is  it  his  real 
act,  —  it  shows  his  character,  while  it  lias  its 
bearings  upon  the  interests  and  rights  of  othois, 
as  well  as  upon  tlie  truth  of  nature  and  liihtory. 
All  this  is  included  in  an  act  as  an  object  of 
moral  approbation  or  disapprobation.  Th;,'  act 
is  considered  not  merely  in  itself,  as  an  isolated 
event,  but  in  its  totality  of  elements  and  sur- 
roundings—  in  its  bearings  upon  the  actor  and 
other  beings  and  tilings. 

7.  The  motive^  intention^  or  purpoi^e  of  an 
act.  —  But,  it  may  be  said,  we  form  oui- judg- 
ment of  the  moral  character  of  an  action,  not 
from  the  act  as  a  whole,  nor  from  this  in  con- 
junction with  its  bearings,  but  from  the  motive, 
intention,  or  purpose  apparent  in  the  act.  Very 
true.  But  what  is  tbe  motive,  intention,  o;" 
purpose  of  an  act  ?  Every  act  commences 
from  within,  and  is  wholly  determined  in  its 
character  by  the  internal  element.     The  agent 


14  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

desires  a  certain  thing,  which  he  contemplates 
in  his  mind,  and  resolves  to  effect  by  a  certain 
external  act.  When  this  external  act  is  the 
natural  and  usual  expression  of  the  internal 
state  of  the  agent,  we  gain  from  it  a  correct 
notion  of  his  real  act.  But  the  external  act 
may  be  resorted  to  only  to  deceive  —  to  indi- 
cate one  thing  v.hile  the  actor  really  means 
another.  When  tliis  becomes  apparent  to  us, 
we  no  longer  regard  the  outward  act  as  liis 
real  act,  since  tliis  is  not  wliat  lie  had  in  his 
mind  and  wished  to  accomplish ;  i.  e.,  it  is  not 
what  he  intended^  purposed^  or  what  really 
moved  him  to  action.  The  motive,  intention, 
and  purpose,  tlierefore,  are  all  the  same  thiiiu.', 
regarded  from  different  points  of  view,  and  in- 
dicate the  real  action — indeed,  are  the  real 
action.  Tiie  external  act.  when  not  the  nat- 
ural expression  of  the  internal  state  of  the 
agent,  is  merely  a  blind;  the  real  act  is  un- 
derstood only  as  we  learn  the  motive.  Of 
course,  then,  we  judge  of  an  act  according  to 
its   motive    or    intention,   for    this   is   the   act. 


ACTION   AS   THE   SUBJECT   OF    ETHICS.  15 

Hence  the  motive,  intention,  or  purpose  has 
no  significance  except  as  showing  what  tlie 
real  act  is.  The  motive  is  not  a  mere  qual- 
ity of  an  act ;  it  is  the  act,  or  at  least  shows 
what  it  is. 

8.  Illustrations.  —  Suppose  a  man  wishes  to 
go  to  Congress,  and  sits  down  to  consider  what 
he  sliall  do  to  gain  his  object.  His  purpose  in 
single,  viz.,  to  go  to  Congress ;  but  the  means  of 
compassing  it  are  various.  He  may  cither  be- 
take himself  directly  to  electioneering,  in  wliich 
case  his  acts  interpret  Ids  purpose,  or  he  may 
resort  to  some  indirect  moans  to  make  himself 
popular,  and  secure  the  votes  of  his  fellow- 
citizens —  as  to  deeds,  of  charity  to  the  poor, 
or  to  the  advocacy  of  religion  or  learning,  or 
some  other  great  public  interest  which  will  be 
likely  to  secure  him  the  favor  of  tlie  people. 
Now,  in  all  such  cases,  his  purpose  remaining 
the  same,  the  act  is  really  the  same.  He  re- 
sorts to  these  indirect  means  only  because  he 
thinks  them  likely  to  be  more  successful;  but 
they   are  none  the  less  electioneering  acts  on 


16  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF    ETHICS. 

tliis  account.  Of  course,  tlieii,  \s'licii  his  purpose 
once  becomes  evident,  we  judge  of  his  nets 
accordingly,  and  as  all  the  more  unworthy  he- 
cause  accompanied  witli  deception,  and  deccp- 
lion,  too,  at  the  expense  of  virtue  itself.  «So, 
if  one  should  kill  a  mad  dog  at  large  in  the 
streets,  he  would  seem  to  have  done  a  good 
deed ;  but  should  we  ascertain  tliat  wliat  ho 
really  intended,  or  what  in  fact  moved  him  to 
diFcliargc  the  missile  or  gun  by  wliicli  the  dog 
was  killed,  was  that  he  might,  under  this  pre- 
text, kill  some  other  animal  belonging  to  a 
neighbor,  wliich  the  dog  was  passing  by,  wc 
should  condemn  the  act  as  wrong. 

9.  Intentions  and  intended  acts.  —  We  thus 
see  that  the  real  act  is  internal,  and  that  tlie 
external  act,  whetlier  tlie  natural  expression 
of  the  internal  purpose  or  not,  is  none  the  less 
the  carrying  out  of  tliat  purpose,  *and  hence 
is  to  be  wholly  interpreted  by  it.  So,  too,  if 
there  be  only  the  purpose  of  some  act,  pro- 
vided tliat  purpose  be  settled  and  deliberate, 
and  no  external  act ;  as  where  ojic  lies  in  wail 


ACTION  AS  THE  SUBJECT  OF  ETHICS.     17 

to  murder  or  rob  another,  and  finds  no  oppor- 
tunity of  doing  the  deed,  we  hold  him  as  guilty 
as  though  ho  had  accomplished  liis  purpose. 
The  actual  performance  of  the  act  does,  in« 
deed,  bring  it  home  to  us  with  greater  vivid- 
ness, and  make  us  realize  it  more  fully ;  but, 
wlien  we  calmly  consider  the  case,  we  are  un- 
able to  distinguish  between  the  guilt  of  an 
evil  act  deliberately  purposed,  but  accidentally 
prevented,  and  the  same  act  carried  into  effect. 
But  if  the  evil  purpose  be  but  half  entertained, 
or  only  a  transient  thought  passing  ^through 
the  mind,  we  hold  tlie  individual  guilty  only 
as  ho  voluntarily  retains  and  cherishes  it.  The 
least  dallying  with  evil  thoughts  is  reprehensi- 
ble, and  always  tends  to  become  habitual. 

10.  Character  as  rip^ht  or  wrong.  —  Char- 
acter, meaning  literally  an  engraved  outhnc, 
is,  if  I  may  so  speak,  the  particular  form  of 
each  individual  mind,  the  state  and  attitude 
of  its  active  principles  at  any  given  time.  A 
principle  of  action  is  that  which  prompts  us 
to  act ;  and  the  particular  relation  and  subor- 
2* 


18  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

dination  of  such  principles  in  each  niiud  con- 
stitute the  individual's  character.  Knowing 
any  one's  controlling  principles,  we  know  his 
character ;  and  knowing  his  character,  we  know 
how  he  will  act  under  given  circumstances. 
Principles  of  action,  then,  considered  as  ten 
dencies  to  certain  kinds  of  conduct,  are  natu- 
rally judged  of  as  right  or  wrong,  wliile  the 
sum  of  them  in  any  individual  (i.  e.,  his  char- 
acter) leads  us  to  approve  or  disapprove  him 
as  a  moral  agent.  We  consider  every  one  a 
good  or  a  bad  man  according  to  his  cliaracter, 
not  only  as  shown  in  his  acts,  but  as  embracing 
certain  principles  of  action.  Hence  the  com- 
plete object-matter  of  ethics  is  action,  including 
the  intention  or  motive,  as  sliowing  the  real 
nature  of  an  act,  and  active  principles  or 
chaj-acter,  as  leading  to  such  and  such  acts. 


ACTION   PKESUPPOSES   ACTIVE  PRINCIPLES. 


CHAPTER   II. 

ACTION   PRESUPPOSES  ACTIVE   PllINClPLES. 

1.  Human  acts  are  conscious  ads.  —  Action, 
as  wc  liavc  seen,  proceeds  from  within,  and 
hence  presupposes  active  principles.  Our  acts 
are  our  own,  self-caused  and  independent,  and 
not  merely  the  result  of  action  in  other  tilings. 
Human  acts  are  conscious  acts,  springing  from 
and  guided  by  internal  principles.  A  machine 
acts  blindly,  from  the  influence  of  some  im- 
pulse external  to  itself;  but  man  acts  only  as 
ho  thinks,  and  feels,  and  wills,  and  in  conse- 
(luence  of  his  thoughts,  and  feelings,  and  vo- 
litions. For  each  of  these  classes  of  mental 
energies,  as  we  shall  see,  is  concerned  in  action. 

2.  How   our  powers  of   knowing   arc   con' 


20  FIRST   PRINCIPLKS   OP   ETHICS, 

cerned  in  action.  —  By  experience  we  learn 
what  is  agreeable,  wholesome,  good,  and  are 
so  constituted  tliat  we  can  but  desire  and  strive 
after  what  we  have  found  to  be  such.  But,  at 
tlie  same  time,  we  are  capable  of  experience 
at  all  only  through  knowledge.  We  move 
among  objects,  and  test  or  try  their  qualities 
only  as  we  know  tliem.  We  are  pleased  or 
displeased  with  objects  only  as  our  senses  are 
employed  in  perceiving  them,  or  our  tliouglits 
in  dwelling  upon  them.  Gratification  is  but 
the  reflex  of  the  natural  and  healthy  action 
of  our  various  conscious  powers.  The  first 
impulse  to  action,  therefore,  presupposes  knowl- 
edge. At  the  same  time,  the  whole  conception 
of  an  act,  as  well  as  of  its  bearings,  and  of 
the  probable  conditions  of  its  success,  is  en 
tirely  a  matter  of  knowledge.  It  is  only 
through  knowledge,  also,  that  we  understand 
the  acts  of  others.  Hence  knowledge,  though 
not  the  moving  impulse  to  action,  is  an  indis- 
pensable condition  to  tliat  impulse,  and  plays 
a  prime  uart  in  every  act. 


ACTION   PKESUPPOSES   ACTIVE   PRINCIPLES.       21 

3.  Feeling  as  concerned  in  action.  —  As  just 
observed,  what  we  have  learned  through  our 
ditferent  faculties  of  knowledge  to  be  agree- 
able, we  naturally  desire  and  strive  to  obtain, 
while  we  as  naturally  avoid  what  we  know  to 
be  disagreeable.  And  the  reason  of  our  desire 
or  aversion  is,  that  the  one  object  is  agreeable 
to  us,  and  the  other  disagreeable.  That  is  to 
say,  we  are  moved  to  the  various  acts  of  life 
by  something  pleasurable  or  disagreeable,  some- 
thing desirable  or  undesirable,  supposed  to  lie 
in  different  objects  and  pursuits.  What  we 
desire,  or  have  an  inward  tendency  towards, 
seems  to  us  desirable ;  the  mind  feels  some 
complacency  or  interest  in  it,  and  is  moved 
towards  it  by  this  interest.  Thus,  feeling, — 
which,  in  its  various  forms,  constitutes  the 
agreeable  and  the  disagreeable,  pleasure  and 
pain,  —  being  the  ground  of  desire,  is  always 
the  first  impulse  to  action.  Mere  knowledge 
leaves  us  cold  and  indifferent;  it  is  only  as 
the  warmth  and  impulse  of  feeling  are  added 
that  we  are   moved   to   action.     Foelini?  aloiio 


22  FiRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

gives  US  such  a  sense  of  things  as  to  draw  \u 
out  after  them. 

4.  Connection  of  feeling'  and  knoiv/edg-e.  — 
Thus,  while  knowledge  is  the  necessary  basis 
and  guide  of  action,  feeling  is  the  moving 
power  to  it.  They  are  both  indispensable  to 
action,  and,  furthermore,  are  indissolubly  con- 
nected with  each  other  in  our  constitution. 
Feeling  of  some  sort  is  the  invariable  concom- 
itant of  the  exertion  of  all  our  conscious  pow- 
ers —  pleasurable  feeling  of  their  normal  and 
unimpeded  exertion,  and  pain  of  their  over- 
stimulated  or  restrained  exertion.  Not  only 
is  feeling  connected  with  the  exercise  of  our 
different  senses,  but  with  our  various  mental 
perceptions  or  thoughts.  We  have  pleasurable 
and  painful  emotions,  not  only  in  seeing,  hear- 
ing, tasting,  and  touching  objects,  but  also  in 
the  recollection  or  thought  of  objects.  Wo. 
are  affected  almost  as  much  by  the  recollec- 
tion of  comely  or  frightful  objects,  or  acts  of 
cruelty  or  charity,  as  we  are  by  the  perception 
of  them.     Our  covictions  of  truth  and  duty, 


ACTION    PRESUPPOSES   ACTIVE   PRINCIPLES.      28 

also,  are  merely  feelings  connected  with  the 
perceptions  of  truth  and  duty.  The  eureka 
of  Archimedes  was  but  the  spontaneous  out- 
burst of  the  thrill  of  joy  which  he  felt  at  the 
solution  of  his  problem ;  while  the  calm  de- 
lights of  an  approving  conscience,  and  the 
bitter  agonies  of  remorse,  are  only  the  feelings 
connected  with  the  consciousness  of  having 
done  right  or  wrong.  But  our  feelings  may 
be  discriminated  into  different  classes. 

5.  The  selfish  feelings.  —  Self-love,  according 
to  the  form  of  the  expression,  means  the  love 
of  self.  But  self,  as  distinct  from  the  conscious 
acts  of  self,  is  something  of  which  we  have  no 
direct  knowledge  whatever.  The  self,  then, 
referred  to  in  the  expression,  can  be  nothing 
else  than  the  conscious  states  of  self.  But  of 
these  conscious  states,  some  are  agreeable  and 
some  disagreeable.  And,  as  we  cannot  love 
the  disagreeable,  the  reference  must  be  exclu- 
sively to  our  agreeable  states  of  consciousness. 
Hence  self-love  is  merely  the  love  of  the  well- 
being  or  linppiness  of  self.     Certain    states  of 


24  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

consciousness  seem  agreeable  to  us ;  we  feel 
complacency  and  delight  in  them,  and  hence 
desire  their  continuance.  At  the  same  time, 
as  we  have  ah-eady  seen,  we  feel  an  interest 
in  those  objects  or  pursuits  wliich  we  have 
found  by  experience  tend  to  promote  our  liap- 
piness.  We  love  our  own  happiness  because 
it  is  agreeable,  and  other  objects  because  they 
produce  those  states  of  consciousness  which 
constitute  the  agreeable.  The  feelings  thus 
arising,  whether  from  the  direct  complacency 
which  we  have  in  our  own  liappiness,  or  from 
that  which  we  have  in  the  objects  or  pursuits 
which  we  suppose  calculated  to  promote  our 
happiness,  may  be  called  selfish  feeling's,  since 
they  all  spring  from  self-love.  But  what  is 
commonly  called  selfishness  is  a  faulty  excess 
of  self-love,  leading  one  to  a  positive  disregard 
of  the  rights  and  interests  of  others  for  the 
sake  of  self. 

6.  The  sympathetic  feelings,  —  We  are  not 
only  interested  in  our  own  happiness,  but  the 
possession  of  a  common  nature  witli  our  fellows 


ACTION   PRESUPPOSES   ACTIYE   PRINCIPLES.      25 

gives  US  an  interest  in  their  welfare.  Knowing 
from  our  own  experience  something  how  they 
must  feel  in  different  cases,  we  naturally'  enter 
into  their  feelings  in  some  degree.  Thus  we 
"  rejoice  with  those  that  do  rejoice,  and  weep 
with  those  that  weep."  We  also  feel  for  others 
shame,  danger,  honor,  resentment,  and  other 
sentiments,  wliich  we  are  conscious  of  ourselves 
under  similar  circumstances.  And  in  general 
there  is,  accidental  circumstances  being  out 
of  the  way,  a  kindly  and  sympathetic  feeling 
among  the  different  members  of  the  race, 
wliich  grows  stronger  the  more  nearly  they 
are  brought  together  by  acquaintance,  de- 
pendence, natural  relation,  etc.  Prizing  our 
own  happiness  above  every  thing  else,  we  can 
but  be  affected  in  some  measure  by  tliat  of 
others.  Nay,  we  cannot  be  wholly  indifferent 
to  the  feelings  of  any  creature  which  has  but 
the  lower  elements  of  the  nature  which  we 
have.  "  A  merciful  man  is  merciful  to  his 
beast."  The  sensitive  nature,  which  the  lower 
orders  of  animals  have  in  common  with  our- 
8 


26  FIRST  PUINCIPLBS   OP   ETHICS. 

selves,  gives  tliem  a  hold  upon  our  sympathiea 
These  sympathetic  feelings,  wliich  draw  men 
towards  each  other,  and  unite  tliem  in  frater- 
nities, nations,  societies,  are  not  selfish,  since 
they  have  no  reference  to  our  own  happiness, 
but  to  the  happiness  of  others.  Tliey  and  the 
acts  to  which  tliey  lead  may  and  do  tend  to 
our  own  happiness  as  much,  if  not  more,  than 
any  other  feelings  and  acts;  but  our  own  hap- 
piness is  not  their  prompting  cause  or  aim. 
The  sympathy  which  leads  one,  at  the  risk  of 
his  life,  to  rescue  a  drowning  man,  does  not 
surely  spring  from  a  regard  to  his  own  hap- 
piness, but  from  fellow-feeling  with  another. 
That  men  often  pretend  to  act  from  such  feel- 
ings, when  they  do  not,  is  very  true ;  but  that 
men  may,  and  frequently  do,  act  from  disinter- 
ested motives,  is  clear. 

7.  Organic  or  vital  feelings.  —  Tliere  is  also 
a  large  class  of  feelings,  which,  from  being  lo- 
calized in  different  organs  of  the  body,  may 
be  called  organic  or  vital  feelings.  Such  are 
the  various  sensations  determined  in  our  organs 


ACTION   PRESUPPOSES   ACTIVE   PRINCK*LE8.      27 

by  the  influence  or  contact  of  external  objects. 
Such,  also,  are  the  feelings  arising  from  dis- 
ease, disorganization,  pressure,  or  the  exertion 
of  the  muscles.  Under  this  class  of  feelings, 
too,  though  of  a  somewhat  different  nature, 
belong  the  appetites,  as  hunger  and  thirst, 
since  they  consist  in,  or  are  accompanied  by, 
certain  organic  feelings.  In  hunger,  there  is 
an  uneasy  feeling  in  the  stomach,  independ- 
ently of  the  presence  or  thought  of  any  appe- 
tizing object.  Our  hunger  may  suggest  such 
objects,  but  they  are  not  necessarily  the  cause 
of  it. 

8.  Sentiments,  —  The  feelings  determined 
more  strictly  by  mental  perceptions  are  usually 
denominated  sentiments.  Tliese  are  such  as 
curiosity  or  wonder,  awakened  by  what  we 
perceive  around  us,  and  leading,  iii  turn,  to  a 
closer  scrutiny  and  study  of  these  objects ; 
the  convictions  of  truth  and  duty,  connected 
with  the  perceptions  of  the  true  and  the  right ; 
the  feeling  of  shame  from  the  consciousness 
of  having  done  a  shameful   thing,  and    of  in- 


28  FIRST    PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

digiuitioii  at  the  wicked  acts  of  anotlier ;  also, 
the  sense  of  beauty  and  deformity  arising  froiu 
the  perception  or  thought  of  comely  or  iu> 
comely  objects.  In  general,  all  the  moral  and 
aesthetic  feelings,  and  all  the  more  ennobling 
and  rational  feelings  of  our  nature,  belong  to 
this  class. 

9.  Desire  and  will.  —  As  we  have  already 
seen,  what  we  feel  a  delight  or  complacency 
in  we  necessarily  desire  —  i.  e.,  feel  the  want 
of,  crave,  or  tend  towards.  Desire  is  thus  a 
blind  tendency  towards  something  which  seems 
to  us  desirable,  and  hence  a  tendency  towards 
an  act.  But  there  may  be  many  such  desires 
soliciting  us  at  the  same  time  to  different 
acts.  Hence  there  may  be  before  the  mind 
the  question  simply  of  action  or  non-action, 
or  of  action  in  this,  that,  or  the  other  way. 
In  either  case,  a  choice  must  be  made.  We 
may  be  determined  in  our  choice  either  by 
the  strongest  impulse  for  the  moment,  by  a 
simple  regard  to  our  own  interest,  or  by  a 
regard  to  what  is  right  in  view  of  all  the  con 


ACTION   PRESUPPOSES    ACTIVE   PRINCIPLES.      29 

sideratioiis  in  the  case.  But,  however  deter- 
mined, when  we  have  made  our  choice,  tho 
question  is  settled,  and  the  final  impulse  to 
the  execution  is  given  by  the  will.  Tlius  our 
feelings  of  interest  in  something  produce  a 
tendency  towards  an  act,  tlie  tcndei  cy  is  al- 
lowed by  the  reason,  and  is  carried  nto  exe- 
cution by  the  will. 


30  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   P]TUICS. 


CHAPTER    III. 

VUITUOUS  ACTION  PRESUPPOSES  THE  FREEDOM 
OF  THE  WILL. 

1.  We  hold  men  responsible  for  their  con- 
duct, —  We  all  ascribe  virtue  and  vice  to  each 
other.  In  like  manner  the  Scriptures  charge 
sin  upon  men,  and  address  them  as  responsi- 
ble to  God  for  their  conduct.  "  For  we  have 
before  proved,"  says  the  apostle  Paul,  "  both 
Jews  and  Gentiles,  that  they  are  all  under 
sin.^^  We  daily  commend  or  condemn  men  for 
their  acts,  and  assign  them  a  place  of  respecta- 
bility or  of  infamy  in  society  according  as  we 
regard  their  conduct  and  character  as  right  or 
wrong.  And  we  do  the  same  with  ourselves 
also.  We  approve  or  disapprove  our  own  con- 
duct and  character,  according  as  we  are  con- 
scious to   ourselves  that  wc   are   actuated  by 


ACTION  PRESUPPOSES  FREEDOM  OF  WILL.   31 

right  or  wrong  principles.  So,  also,  we  find 
our  courts  of  justice  hold  men  responsible  for 
bad  conduct,  and  regard  any  plea  of  tempta- 
tion, at  most,  as  but  mitigating  the  offence,  not 
at  all  as  excusing  it.  Thus  there  is  in  society 
an  all-pervading  sense  of  human  responsibility. 
2.  Yet  acts  seem  necessitated. — That  we  act 
as  we  please,  no  one  can  doubt.  The  question 
is  not,  whether  we  can  or  not  always  do  what 
it  pleases  us  to  do ;  we  obviously  never  do  any 
tiling  else  than  this.  The  question,  rather,  is, 
Can  we  choose  what  does  not  please  us  ?  Is 
not  our  choice  and  volition  necessarily  deter- 
mined by  what  at  the  time  seems  to  us  the 
most  desirable  ?  In  other  words.  Are  we  not 
always  determined  to  action  by  what  is  to  us 
tlie  strongest  motive  for  the  time  being  ?  And 
by  the  strongest  motive  is  meant,  the  prepon- 
derating influence  in  favor  of  the  act  over 
those  against  it,  or  in  favor  of  a  different  act, 
arising  from  the  inclinations,  dispositions,  con- 
victions, and  whatever  else  goes  to  make  up 
the  present  state  of  the  mind.  Now,  can  the 
mind  avoid  choosing  in   accordance  with   this 


32  FIRST   PRLNCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

preponderating  influence  ?  Perhaps  one  would 
say,  Yes,  I  am  not  necessitated,  in  any  case,  to 
choose  what  seems  to  me  the  most  desirable. 
I  can  choose  directly  the  opposite  of  that  in 
any  case.  But  does  not  that  opposite,  in  such 
a  case,  become  tlie  most  desirable  to  you  from 
your  point  of  view  ?  Does  it  not  seem  to  you 
better  to  choose  it  than  to  choose  any  thing 
else  ?  And  do  you  not  choose  it  on  that  ac- 
count? You  wanted  to  show  that  you  could 
choose  the  opposite,  and  that  at  once  became 
the  preponderating  motive  with  you  for  the 
choice.  Whichever  way  we  turn  the  matter, 
tliereforc,  we  seem  to  be  necessarily  determined 
in  our  conduct  by  tlie  strongest  motive  ;  we 
cannot,  in  thought  at  least,  escape  the  circle 
of  necessity.  , 

3.  It  is,  hotoever,  but  a  moral  necessity. — 
Willie  we  have  no  direct  consciousness  of  any 
necessity  in  our  acts,  yet  when  we  attempt  to 
reason  upon  the  nature  of  causation  in  a  ra- 
tional agent,  we  can  but  conceive  such  an 
agent  as  necessarily  determined  by  the  reason, 


ACTION  PRESUPPOSES  FREEDOM  OF  WILL.   33 

thought,  or  feeling  which  has  the  most  ii,flii- 
ence  with  the  mind.  There  is,  however,  this 
peculiarity  in  tlie  case :  no  thought  conies  into 
the  mind,  or  can  exist  there,  alone,  but  is  al- 
ways associated  with,  and  hence  awakens,  other 
related  thoughts,  thus  presenting  the  different 
aspects  of  a  case  to  the  mind.  There  is  a  dis- 
cursive power  in  the  human  mind,  through  which 
the  part  suggests  the  whole,  the  premise  the  con- 
clusion, tlie  cause  the  effect,  the  wrong  the  right ; 
and  in  general,  ideas  related  by  similarity,  con- 
trast, or  other  ties,  suggest  each  other.  Each 
thought  brings  its  related  thought  with  it. 
Consequently,  we  need  not  be  determined  by 
any  single  view  of  a  case,  and  hence  not  by  tlie 
wrong  view,  unless  our  character  is  such  as  to 
give  that  view  the  greatest  injSuence  with  us. 
But  our  characters  being  what  they  arc,  it  may 
be  said  that  practically  the  necessity  remains. 
Let  us  see,  then,  what  may  be  said  to  mitigate 
or  obviate  the  objection  drawn  from  this  fact 
against  human  responsibility. 

4.    Nor    is    it    a    very    hard    necessUij.    - 


M  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

Now,  sii]>posing  the  case  to  be  just  as  it  pre- 
sents itself  to  our  limited  powers,  and  as  we 
are  compelled  to  think  it,  there  are  some  con 
siderations  which  go  to  show  that  the  neces- 
sity is  not  a  very  hard  one.  In  the  first  place, 
it  is  obvious  that  we  always  do  just  as  we 
please.  This  no  one  denies,  or  can  deny. 
Even  though  the  choice  be  necessitated,  yet  it 
is  none  the  less  our  choice.  We  have  no 
consciousness  of  laboring  under  any  necessity 
in  the  case,  and  are  only  convinced  of  it 
when  we  attempt  to  conceive  and  comprehend 
the  nature  of  causation  in  a  rational  agent. 
Again,  since  we  do  as  we  please,  it  follows 
that  our  characters  are  such  as  we  have  will- 
ingly formed.  They  are  the  result  of  our  pre- 
vious acting,  and  this  acting  has  been  such,  in 
each  case,  as  we  chose.  We  have  made  all 
the  improvements  which,  under  the  circum- 
stances, we  thought  best  to  make,  and  have 
fallen  into  only  such  faults  or  vices  as  we 
willingly  accepted.  What  hardship,  then,  have 
we  to  complain  of  in   this  matter  ?     "  When 


ACTION  PRESUPPOSES  FREEDOM  OF  WILL.   85 

God  visiteth  us,  [for  our  iniquities,]  what  shall 
we  answer  him?"  Nay,  we  even  condemn  our- 
selves. However  much  we  may  be  determined 
to  action  by  passion,  prejudice,  wrong  views,  or 
wrong  feelings,  we  really  approve  of  only  those 
acts  which  are  dictated  by  the  best  light  and 
the  best  feelings  in  our  nature.  Whatever 
temporizing,  or  conforming  to  mcmentary  im- 
pulse or  interest,  false  views  or  wrong  feelings, 
there  may  be  in  our  individual  acts,  on  re- 
flection we  condemn  all  acts  that  are  not 
justified  by  a  true  and  rational  view  of  all 
the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Thus  we  find, 
as  set  forth  so  vividly  by  the  apostle  Paul, 
"  a  law  in  our  members  warring  against  the 
law  of  our  mind,  and  bringing  us  into  caj> 
tivity  to  the  law  of  sin  which  is  in  our  mem- 
bers," and  see  our  need  of  that  spiritual 
regeneration  which  comes  "  through  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ,"  that  our  nature  may  be  brought 
into  harmony  with  our  conscience. 

6.    The  necessitarian  solution  of  the  difficul- 
ty>— It  tl^us  appears,  that  however  recklessly 


3(5  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

men  act,  they  all  feel  that  they  ottglit  to  acl 
on  rational  principles ;  i.  e.,  that  they  owe  it 
to  the  nature  which  God  has  given  them 
thus  to  act.  And  as  thoughts  do  not  come 
into  the  mind  or  exist  there  alone,  the  right 
view  of  every  case  is  always  accessible  to 
one,  and  is  generally  of  itself  suggested  to  the 
mind.  Hence,  to  act  from  impulse,  whicli  is 
wholly  blind,  or  from  self-love,  which  is  blind 
to  every  thing  except  self,  against  conscience, 
which  surveys  the  wliole  case,  is  to  act  upon 
a  wrong  principle,  and  cannot  be  justified  by 
any  necessity  of  thus  acting  which  one  may 
have  brought  upon  himself  by  indulgence.  The 
wrong  is  antecedent  to  tlie  act.  Such  is  the 
necessitarian  solution  of  the  difficulty. 

6.  The  free-will  solutian.  —  As  we  have 
seen,  we  have  no  direct  consciousness  of  any 
necessity  in  our  actions;  it  is  disclosed  to  our 
view  only  by  a  subtle  reasoning  upon  the  na- 
ture of  causation,  and  hence  is  wholly  a  logical 
result.  May  not  the  necessity,  then,  be  only 
iu  appearance— a  false  conclusion  reached  b^ 


ACTION  PRESUPPOSES  FREEDOM  OF  WILL.   37 

attempting  to  employ  our  powers  in  reasoning 
upon  a  subject  beyond  their  scope  ?  This  is 
certainly  possible,  and  must  appear  probable, 
when  we  consider  some  other  cases  of  a  like 
nature.  Thus,  although  no  one  can  ever  doubt 
the  existence  of  motion  in  objects,  yet  we  may, 
by  a  subtle  reasoning  on  tlic  nature  of  motion, 
seem  to  prove  it  to  be  impossible  —  since  a 
body  moving  must,  at  every  conceivable  instant 
of  time,  occupy,  or  rest  in,  some  portion  of 
space,  and  hence  its  apparent  motion  is  only 
a  succession  of  rests ;  there  has  really  been  no 
instant  when  it  was  not  at  rest.  There  are 
many  other  fallacies  of  a  like  nature,  especially 
in  regard  to  our  conceptions  of  space  and  time, 
which  seem  to  arise  from  our  attempts  to  rea- 
son on  subjects  beyond  the  scope  of  our  pow- 
ers ;  and  it  is  probable  that  our  reasonings 
against  the  freedom  of  the  will  are  of  the 
same  nature.  At  all  events,  the  fact  of  our 
condemning  both  ourselves  and  others  for  wrong 
conduct  is  evidence  of  our  consciousness  that 
we  are  at  least  practically  free. 
4  '  '" 


38  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

RIGHT  ACTS    MUST  BE  DICTATED    BY   INTELU- 
GENCE. 

1.  Thought  and  feeling  the  real  sources  of 
action.  —  Whatever  may  be  the  fact  in  regard 
to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  the  will  must 
somehow  come  to  its  determinations  from  what 
is  before  the  mind.  The  only  original  sources 
of  action,  therefore,  are  thought  and  feeling  — 
the  will  merely  opening  the  way,  and  furnish- 
ing the  final  impulse  by  which  acts  are  carried 
out.  A  tendency,  to  be  sure,  is  not  an  act 
until  it  is  approved  or  allowed  by  the  will ; 
but  this  allowance  or  choice  is  only  a  decision 
made  up  from  data  found  in  existing  states 
of  the  mind.  Acts,  then,  spring  either  from 
thoughts  or  feelings.     In  reality,  thought  and 


RIGHT   ACTS   DICTATED   BY   INTELLIGENCE.      39 

feeling  always  go  together ;  but  intelligence 
and  feeling  exist  in  such  different  proportions 
iu  different  cases,  that  some  acts  may  be  said 
to  be  the  dictate  of  the  one,  and  some  of  the 
other. 

2.  Many  act  almost  wliolly  from  feeling.  — 
Jifost  men  exert  their  mental  powers  but  fee- 
bly, barely  enough  to  apprehend  in  the  vaguest 
way  common  objects  and  common  relations. 
But  these  perceptions,  vague  as  they  are,  are 
sufficient  to  awaken  various  kinds  of  feelings, 
which,  together  with  the  spontaneous  feelings 
of  our  nature,  at  once  acquire  the  ascend- 
ency in  the  mind,  and  control  the  conduct. 
They  hunger  and  thirst ;  they  are  warm  and 
they  are  cold ;  they  love  and  hate ;  they  arc 
gratified  and  displeased ;  they  have  desires  and 
aversions ;  they  feel  for  others'  joys  and  woes ; 
they  have  hopes  and  fears ;  they  experience 
the  peace  of  an  approving  conscience  and  the 
Mtterness  of  remorse.  Thought,  in  its  nature, 
is  silent  and  unobtrusive ;  and  being  exercised 
80  feebly  by  them,  they  are  scarcely  aware  that 


40  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

they  have  any  thoughts,  and  thus  give  them 
selves  up  ahnost  wholly  to  the  more  engrossing 
and  exciting  perturbations  of  feeling.  Feeling 
becomes  a  sort  of  sixth  sense  to  them;  indeed, 
it  is  well  nigh  a  substitute  with  tliem  for  all 
tlie  senses. 

3.  Feelings  however,  is  but  a  blind  guide.  — 
But  feeling  is  no  guide  at  all,  except  as  it  is 
a  reflex  of  intelligence.  In  itself  it  is  dark 
and  blind.  It  bears  no  light  with  it,  but  at 
most  only  the  reflection  of  a  light.  The  feel- 
ings are  right  or  wrong  only  as  they  are  war- 
ranted or  unwarranted  by  the  facts  of  the 
case.  P]ven  our  most  amiable  and  humane 
feelings  cannot  be  trusted  as  guides.  Follow- 
ing the  unpulses  of  so  amiable  a  feeling  as 
gratitude,  a  judge  might  be  led  to  an  unjust 
decision  in  favor  of  a  benefactor ;  or,  follow- 
ing pity,  a  kind-hearted  man  might  give  to 
the  distressed  what  he  owed  to  his  creditors. 
So  indignation  or  hatred,  while  it  may,  under 
the  stimulating  influence  of  self-partiality,  lead 
to  revenge,  may  also  prompt  to  the  just  puu. 


RIGHT   ACTS   DICTATED   BY  INTELLIGENCE.      41 

ishment  of  evil  deeds.  These  cases — and  manj 
more  of  the  same  nature  might  be  adduced — 
show  that  feeling  can  be  trusted  aj  a  guide 
only  when  it  is  warranted  by  a  view  of  all 
the  facts  in  the  case.  Gratitude  is  good 
when  it  does  not  lead  to  the  violation  of  any 
other  relations,  and  is  evil  when  it  does.  The 
same  is  true  of  pity,  hatred,  shame,  and  all 
other  feelings.  There  arc  cases  where  these 
are  warranted  by  tlie  facts  in  the  case,  and 
may  be  rightly  followed,  and  cases  /here  they 
are  unwarranted  and  wrong.  ' 

4.  Yel  it  has  an  important  office  in  action.  — 
As  already  stated,  it  is  feeling  alone  which  gives 
us  that  lively  sense  of  things  which  impels  us 
to  action.  The  perceptions  and  conclusions  of 
the  intellect  are  clear,  but  cold ;  the  warmth 
and  impulse  essential  to  action  are  added  by 
feeling.  And,  when  our  intellectual  views  arc 
correct,  and  adequate  to  the  case  before  us, 
such  is  our  constitution,  that,  in  the  natural 
course  of  thhigs,  feeling  is  furnished  in  kind 
and  intensity  just  as  it  behooves  us  to  act 
4* 


42  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

Thus  a  landscape  spreads  out  before  one,  antJ 
he  has  the  calm  and  serene  emotion  of  beauty 
which  fixes  him  entranced  to  the  scene ;  or 
he  finds  himself  unexpectedly  upon  the  brink 
of  a  precipice,  and  he  has  the  thrilling  and 
agitating  emotion  of  fear  which  causes  him  to 
shrink  back  and  flee  from  the  danger ;  or  he 
commits,  or  sees  another  commit,  an  act  of 
injustice,  cruelty,  or  treachery,  and  he  shud- 
ders with  horror  in  thinking  of  it.  There  is. 
indeed,  in  our  fallen  state,  a  want  of  corre- 
spondence in  the  intensity  of  our  feelings  to 
the  nature  of  the  case,  on  moral  and  religious 
questions;  but  this  is  the  result  of  a  corrupt 
nature  and  corrupt  practice. 

5.  The  so-called  "  moral  sense  "  is  mere  feel 
ing.  —  Now,  feeling,  as  the  liveliest  impulse 
to  action,  attracts  our  attention  much  more 
strongly  than  the  operations  of  intelligence  do, 
and  seems,  indeed,  to  perform  the  whole  work, 
Thus  feeling  stands,  in  the  popular  mind  at 
least,  as  the  grand  director  of  action  and  the 
true  guide  of  life.     Indeed,  many  philosophers 


RIGHT   ACTS    DICTATED   BY   INTELLIGENCE.      43 

have  fallen  into  the  same  error  in  regarding 
conscience  as  a  "  moral  sense."  This  view 
wholly  overlooks  the  pcrceplion  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  gives  the  entire  ground  to  the 
more  obtrusive  element  of  feeling.  It  relies 
upon  the  sense  of  duty  given  by  feeling  ratlier 
than  upon  its  perception.  But,  as  we  have 
seen,  there  can  be  no  feeling,  or  sense  of 
things,  except  as  they  are  first  perceived. 
Tlie  view  thus  disregards  the  most  essential 
element  in  the  case  —  that  which  alone  can 
justify  and  warrant  the  feeling.  Hence  its 
defenders  have  never  been  able  to  make  the 
moral  sense  appear  to  be  any  thing  more  than 
a  fickle,  variable,  and  blind  guide,  as  it  really 
is.  Feeling  is  a  trustworthy  guide  to  duty 
when  it  is  authorized  by  the  entire  view  of 
the  case;  not  otherwise.  To  teach  men,  then, 
that  it  is  a  sufficient  justification  of  their  con- 
duct to  assert  that  they  feel  n  to  be  right, 
without  giving  any  reasons  to  show  that  the 
feeling  is  warranted  by  facts,  is  to  teach  a  blind 
morality,  and  make  men  conscientiously  obsti 


44  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

nate.  Persons  thus  guided  are  often  right,  but 
they  are  often  wrong  also ;  and,  not  being  re- 
quired to  look  for  any  reasons  for  their  feel- 
ings, they  have  no  means  of  determining  which.' 
6.  Conscience  must  embrace  intelligence  as 
well  as  feeling.  —  The  power,  or  powers,  by 
which  we  determine  our  duty,  is  usually  de- 
nominated conscience.  This  term  has  the  same 
derivation  as  consciousness^  from  the  Latin  con- 
scientia^  and  seems,  like  that  term,  to  denote  the 
intelligent  principle  in  general,  but  only  as  em- 
ployed about  action,  conduct,  character.  Bishop 
Butler  usually  speaks  of  conscience  as  a  "  prin- 
ciple of  reflection,"  "  a  capacity  of  reflecting 
upon  actions  and  characters,"  and  in  other 
terms  of  like  import.  And,  as  far  as  conscience 
is  a  perceptive  principle,  employed  in  appre- 
hending and  discriminating  acts  in  their  nature, 
there  seems  no  good  reason  for  regarding  it 
as  a  faculty  different  in  kind  from  our  per- 
ceptive and  reflective  faculties  in  general.  The 
apprehension  and  comprehension  of  acts  in 
their  nature  and  bearings,  as  we  shall  presently 


RIGHT  ACTS  DICTATED  BY  INTELLIGENCE.      45 

see,  require  the  exercise  of  the  same  cognitive 
powers  wliich  are  employed  in  the  apprehension 
and  comprehension  of  other  objects.  So,  too, 
the  peculiar  feelings  of  approbation  and  disap- 
probation connected  with  the  operations  of 
conscience  are  only  a  special  class  of  senti- 
ments consequent  upon  our  moral  perceptions. 
And  they  derive  their  peculiar  character  from 
the  nature  of  these  perceptions.  The  right  is 
tlie  most  important  and  the  most  sacred  of 
all  things,  and  hence  the  feelings  connected 
with  its  perception  partake  of  the  same  char- 
acter. As  man  is  the  great  actor  in  this  scene 
of  things,  and  hence  the  great  disturber  of 
God's  universe,  if  he  acts  wrongly,  it  is  fitting 
that  he  should  be  endowed,  not  only  with  ca- 
pacities for  knowing  the  right,  but  with  tlie 
most  pungent  and  authoritative  feelings  urging 
him  to  its  performance. 

7.  Conscience  as  a  perceptive  power.  —  Con- 
science is  called  the  moral  faculty  because  it 
lias  to  do  with  the  actions  Qnores^  of  men. 
A.nd,  taking  action  as  the  object  of  this  faculty 


46  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

we  may  readily  see  that  its  perceptions  are  of 
the  same  general  kind  as  those  of  our  ordi 
nary  faculties  of  intelligeuce  employed  upon 
other  objects.  In  solving  the  question  of  the 
right  or  wrong  of  an  act,  wd  employ  our  dif- 
ferent faculties  of  intelligence  just  as  in  other 
cases.  An  action,  as  far  as  it  is  external,  is 
observed  by  the  senses,  like  any  other  phenom- 
enon ;  and  as  far  as  it  is  internal,  or  a  mere 
conception  of  the  mind,  is  a  matter  of  con- 
sciousness to  us,  if  it  be  an  act  of  our  own, 
and  if  not,  is  judged  of  by  the  outward  act, 
the  situation  of  the  actor,  and  the  results  of 
our  experience  generally,  both  with  regard  to 
our  own  and  others'  acts.  In  this  way  we 
form  a  notion  of  the  different  acts  both  of 
ourselves  and  others.  At  the  same  time,  from 
our  knowledge  (^f  the  actor  and  his  rela- 
tions to  other  objects  and  beings,  we  perceive 
the  bearings  of  his  acts  upon  them,  and  hence 
judge  of  their  suitableness  or  unsuitableness 
under  the  circumstances.  When  they  seem 
suital)le   to    the    natnre    of  the    actor   and  his 


RIGHT    ACTS   DICTATED   BY   INTELLIGENCE.      47 

relations,  we  call  them  right,  and  wlien  not, 
wrong.  In  conducting  such  an  inquiry,  it  is 
obvious  that  we  use  only  our  ordinary  facul- 
ties of  intelligence.  The  peculiarity  of  moral 
questions  arises  wholly  from  the  object-matter 
to  which  they  pertain,  and  the  special  charac- 
ter of  the  feelings  connected  with  our  per- 
ceptions. 

8.  Conscience  as  distinguishing  man  from 
the  brute.  —  If  this  be  the  correct  view  of  con- 
science, man  is  distinguished  from  the  brute, 
as  a  moral  being,  very  much  as  he  is  as  an 
intelligent  being.  To  man  alone,  of  all  ter- 
restrial animals,  belong  those  nicer  kinds  of 
perception,  judgment,  and  feelings  necessary 
for  the  comprehension  and  appreciation  of  the 
subtle  and  complicated  elements  which  enter 
into  conduct  and  character.  The  intelligence 
of  tiie  brute  is  not  of  a  high  order  enough 
to  compass  such  questions,  and  hence  he  is 
not  morally  responsible  for  his  acts.  Thus 
Bishop  Butler  remarks,  "  It  does  not  appear 
that  brutes  have  the  least  reflex  sense  of  at> 


48  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

tions,  as  distinguished  from  events,  or  that  will 
and  design,  which  constitute  the  very  nature 
of  actions  as  such,  are  at  all  an  object  to 
their  perception.  But  to  ours  they  are ;  and 
they  are  the  object,  and  the  only  one,  of  the 
approving  and  disapproving  faculty." 

9.  Conscience  and  the  laiv  of  the  land.  — 
The  laws  and  institutions  of  a  state,  like  every 
thing  else  which  is  human,  are  liable  to  be 
wrong.  This  we  should  suppose  would  be  so 
from  the  nature  of  the  case ;  and  we  find  the 
liability  realized  in  fact  in  the  history  of 
every  nation.  In  most  nations,  the  institutions 
and  laws  are  established,  not  for  the  good  of 
the  whole,  but  for  the  benefit  of  a  few.  In- 
deed, as  yet  there  probably  has  not  existed  a 
nation  on  the  face  of  the  earth  whose  institu- 
tions were  framed  with  the  simple  purpose  of 
meting  out  even-handed  justice  to  all.  And 
if  any  institutions  had  be6n  formed  with  such 
a  purpose,  they  might  fail  of  securing  the  end 
proposed,  from  short-sightedness  in  the  framers. 
Now,  as  civil  institutions  and  laws  bear  most 


RIGHT    ACTS    DICTATED   BY   INTELLIGENCE.      49 

directly  upon  the  interests  and  happiness  of 
men,  any  injustice  in  them  must  be  deeply 
felt  by  those  whom  they  affect  unfavorably, 
and,  from  sympathy  with  their  fellows,  by  all 
just  men  also,  even  if  they  arc  not  themselves 
unfavorably  affected  by  them.  Is  it  to  be  ex 
pocted,  then,  that  such  laws  will  escape  the 
indignant  criticism  of  the  sufferers  or  their 
sympathizers  ?  Is  there  any  thing  so  sacred 
in  human  laws  that  their  merits  may  not  bo 
canvassed  ?  The  evils  of  open  resistance  to 
law  are  so  great  that  one  may  not  lightly  re- 
sort to  it ;  but  he  may,  or  rather  he  should, 
openly  and  persistently  expose  the  injustice  of 
all  wrong  laws  ;  nay,  where  they  directly  enjoin 
upon  him  the  doing  of  any  thing  positively 
wrong,  openly  refuse  obedience,  be  the  conse- 
quences what  they  may.  Conscience  is  higher 
than  law ;  and,  in  a  clear  case  of  conflict  be- 
tween them,  the  law  must  yield  —  at  least, 
conscience  cannot. 

10.    Conscience   and    Scripture.  —  JScri}*ture 
do^s  not  profess  to   supersede  conscience,  but 


60  FIRST   PUINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

rather  comes  to  its  aid  by  offering  new  light 
and  additional  sanctions  to  duty.  It  addresses 
man  as  knowing,  in  general,  the  right  from  the 
wrong,  but  as  in  danger  of  disregarding  his 
duties,  especially  to  his  Maker,  from  tl»e  evil 
tendencies  of  his  corrupt  natui'c.  While  it 
presses  upon  men  the  general  principles  of  hu- 
manity,—  such  as  love  to  enemies  and  tlio 
like,  which  they  are  specially  liable  to  neglect, 
—  it  most  emphatically  calls  their  attention  to 
their  duties  to  their  Creator,  whom  they  are 
so  prone  to  forget  and  to  regard  as  a  God 
afar  off,  having  no  intei'ost  in  their  conduct, 
and  requiring  no  service  at  their  hands.  And, 
besides  thus  coming  to  the  aid  of  conscience 
in  cases  where  we  might  know  our  duty  from 
the  light  of  nature,  the  Scriptures  enjoin  many 
positive  duties  at  which  we  could  not  arrive 
by  the  light  of  nature,  and,  especially,  disclose 
to  us  a  plan  of  recovery  from  our  sinful  and 
lost  state.  Even  Scripture,  of  course,  cannot 
escape  the  scrutiny  of  intelligence.  But  since, 
in  its  soccific  character  of  i-evelation,  it  treats 


RIGHT    ACTS    DICTATED    BY   INTELLIGENCE.       51 

of  the  nature,  plans,  purposes,  and  requirements 
of  an  Infinite  God,  we  may  well  distrust  tlie 
ability  of  our  finite  powers  to  grapple  with  sucli 
subjects,  and  positively  and  authoritatively 
to  pronounce  upon  their  truth  or  propriety. 
We  may,  however,  inquire  into  the  historical 
evidence  that  the  Bible  is  a  revelation  from 
God  ;  for  this  is  a  subject  wholly  within  the 
scope  of  our  powers. 

11.  Conscience,  then,  is  supreme  within  its 
sphere.  —  Conscience,  as  a  perceptive  faculty, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  is  only  another  name 
for  the  highest  forms  of  our  intelligence.  It 
is  our  perceptive  and  rational  faculties  in 
their  highest  and  most  responsible  exercise. 
As  the  capacity  of  knowing  the  right,  as  the 
clearest  and  strongest  light  witliin  us, —  sec- 
onded, as  it  is,  by  the  most  urgent  and  author- 
itative feelings, —  it  is  the  natural  guide  of 
our  lives.  It  points  to  tlie  path  in  which  we 
should  walk,  and  illuminates  it  as  we  advance. 
Of  course,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case, 
WQ   are    bound    to    follow   the    strongest   light 


52  FIRST   PRLNCIPiZS   OF   ETHICS. 

within  us,  and  not  to  turn  aside  into  dark- 
ness, which  would  be  sheer  folly  and  perverse- 
ness.  That  we  have  such  faculties  is  evidence 
that  it  was  intended  we  should  exercise  them. 
And,  if  we  do  exercise  them,  we  must  follow 
them,  unless  we  prefer  darkness  to  light.  Eve- 
ry thought  or  feeling  prompting  to  word  or 
deed  can  be  rightfully  allowed  only  as  it  is 
pronounced  right  and  good  by  our  highest  in- 
telligence. Even  piety,  or  the  sentiment  of 
reverence  for  the  Supreme  Being,  becomes  wild, 
fantastic,  and  cruel,  —  as  liable  to  be  directed 
to  a  false  as  to  the  true  God,  —  unless  it  be 
under  the  control  of  intelligence. 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OP  THINGS.      /jS 


CHAPTER   V. 

RIGHT  ACTS   MUST   BE   GROUNDED   IN   THE 
NATURE   OF  THINGS. 

Different  theories  as  to  the  ground  of  right 
and  wrong. —  Different  theories  have  been  held 
as  to  the  ground  of  right  and  wrong ;  but  they 
all  resolve  themselves  into  three,  viz.  :  that 
this  ground  exists  either,  I.  In  the  nature  of 
man ;  or,  II.  In  the  nature  or  will  of  God ; 
or,  III.  In  the  nature  of  things.*  It  is  the 
design  of  this  chapter  to  examine  these  differ- 

*  I  omit  here,  as  evidently  only  partial  grounds  of 
right,  the  views  —  quite  celebrated,  indeed,  in  the  history 
of  morals — that  acts  are  right  only  as  they  tend  to  our 
own  good,  or  to  the  good  of  others.  These  are  really 
only  the  grounds  of  the  particular  virtues  of  prudence 
and  benevolence,  and  will,  therefore,  be  considered  under 
those  hea  Is. 


64  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

eiit  theories  with  the  view  of  ascertaining,  if 
possible,  which  is  true. 

I.    The  Ground  op  Right  not  in  the  Nature 
OP  Man. 

1.  What  is  here  meant  by  *•' ground .''  —  The 
ground  of  any  thing  is  that  in  which  it  in- 
heres, and  where  it  is  found  or  perceived. 
Thus  matter  is  the  ground  of  its  properties. 
And  hence,  in  a  secondary  or  derived  sense, 
the  ground  of  any  thing  is  that  upon  which  it 
rests,  and  which  supports  it ;  as  where  we  spi.'ak 
of  the  ground  color  in  painting  or  embroidery, 
or  the  grounds  of  an  argument,  complaint,  and 
the  like.  It  is  in  this  latter  sense  that  the 
term  is  here  used.  The  ground  of  right,  then, 
is  that  upon  which  it  is  found  to  rest,  when 
it  is  traced  back  as  far  as  our  powers  can 
trace  it;  or  it  is  the  source  whence  we  draw 
our  reasons  for  it  and  defences  of  it.  As  tlie 
ground  of  a  complaint  is  the  reasons  for  it, 
so  the  ground  of  right  is  the  reasons  for  that. 
Hence   the   ground   here   spoken   of   is   cithc'* 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.      55 

that  which  supplies  tlie  reason  for  our  per- 
ceiving the  right,  or  tliat  which  furnislies  the 
reason  for  its  existence. 

2.  Difference  between  the  ground  of  knoioing 
and  the  ground  of  being,  —  The  doctrine  of 
"sufficient  reason,"  as  it  has  been  called,  teach 
cs  that  nothing  exists,  or  is  known,  without  a 
competent  reason  —  the  one  being  called  the 
reason  or  principle  of  a  thing's  existing,  (j'atio 
essendi^)  the  other  the  reason  or  principle  of 
our  knowing  it,  (ratio  cognoscendi.}  Hence, 
in  regard  to  right,  as  in  regard  to  every  thing 
else,  we  may  inquire  either  for  the  ground  of 
its  existence  or  for  tlie  ground  of  our  percep- 
tion of  it.  We  cannot  doubt  that,  if  our  fac- 
ulties were  competent,  we  should  find  a  reason 
for  each.  We  are  sure  that  our  faculties  are 
competent  to  the  inquiry  in  the  latter  of  these 
two  forms,  whether  they  are  to  the  other  or 
not.  Besides,  this  is  the  only  view  of  the  ques- 
tion which  is  of  any  practical  importance  to 
us,  althougli  the  other  is  the  one  which  has 
been  the  most  argued  by  moralists.     In  treat 


56  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

ing  of  right  and  wrong  as  tlie  ground  of  duty, 
we  must  treat  of  them  as  they  are  perceived 
by  the  human  mind.  By  the  "  ground  of  right 
and  wrong,"  then,  is  meant  the  ground  or  rea- 
son of  our  perceiving  them. 

3.  WItat  is  meant  by  saying'  that  this  g-round 
"  is  not  in  the  nature  of  vian^  —  As  we  per- 
ceive at  all  only  as  we  have  powers  of  jwrcep- 
tion,*  in  one  sense  every  perception  may  be 
said  to  have  its  ground  in  our  nature.  Was 
not  our  nature  a  conscious  or  perceptive  na- 
ture, nothing  could  ever  be  perceived  by  us. 
But,  though  all  perception  depends  upon  our 
having  a  conscious  nature,  yet  some  of  our 
perceptions  depend  immediately  and  wholly 
upon  that  nature,  so  that  we  can  give  no 
other  reason  whatever  for  them,  while  others 
do  not.  Now,  it  is  here  asserted  that  our  per- 
ception of  right  and  wrong  is  not  of  the  former 
kind,  but  of  the  latter.  The  former  class  of 
perceptions  are  called  intuitive,  the  latter  dis- 

*  "Perception,"  here,  and  generally  in  this  treatise,  is 
nsci  in  its  largest  sense,  for  any  mental  apprehension. 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.      57 

cursive.  An  intuitive  perception  is  a  direct 
beholding  of  an  object,  real  or  ideal,  as  somc- 
^liing  presented  and  standing  immediately  be- 
fore the  mind,  and  taken  in  at  a  single  view. 
Discursive  perceptions,  on  the  contrary,  are 
indirect  perceptions,  such  as  inferences,  conclu- 
sions, and  the  like.  Now,  as  these  latter  admit 
of  some  description,  and  may  in  some  measure 
be  accounted  for  by  reference  to  the  matte i* 
with  which  they  deal,  they  may  be  said,  by 
way  of  distinction  from  our  intuitive  percep- 
tions, to  have  their  ground  in  something  out 
of  our  nature. 

4.  Distinction  of  intuitive  and  discursive  per- 
ceptions illustrated.  —  Perceptions  by  the  senses 
are  intuitive,  and  may  be  said  to  have  tlieir 
ground  wholly  in  our  nature.  When  I  look  at 
one  object,  and  it  seems  to  me  to  be  of  tlie  color 
which  we  call  green,  and  at  another,  which 
seems  to  me  red,  etc.,  I  can  give  no  other 
reason  for  these  perceptions  than  that  my  na 
ture  compels  me  to  them  —  that  I  cannot 
perceive  them  otherwise.     I  might,  indeed,  say 


58  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

that  the  objects  themselves  are  green,  red,  etc., 
and  I  perceive  them  as  they  are,  and  hence 
my  perceptions  are  determined  by  the  objects. 
But  this,  though  higlily  probable,  I  never  can 
know,  since  our  knowledge  of  objects  is  neces- 
sarily relative  to  our  powers,  and  hence  I  can- 
not assert  it  positively  as  the  ground  of  my 
perceptions.  I  do  know  that  I  am  determined 
to  perceive  them  so  by  my  nature,  and  this 
is  the  only  valid  reason  which  I  can  give  for 
the  perceptions.  As  perceptions,  tlien,  they 
have  their  ground  wholly  in  my  nature.  But, 
when  I  make  an  inference,  or  draw  a  conclu- 
sion, from  a  process  of  reasoning,  I  justify  this 
conclusion  by  pointing  out  the  steps  in  the 
proof,  or  by  reference  to  material  probabilities, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  case.  Hence 
this  class  of  perceptions,  as  we  do  not  refer 
for  their  justification  to  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  may  be  said  to  have  their  ground  in 
something  out  of  ourselves. 

5.    The  perception  of  ri^ht  and  ivrong-  not 
intuitive,  —  And  if   the   ground   of  right   and 


RIOHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.       59 

wrong  is  not  in  the  nature  of  the  liiunan 
mind,  according  to  the  distinction  just  made, 
uur  perceptions  of  right  and  wrong  must  be 
discursive,  not  intuitive.  And  such,  I  am  con- 
fident, they  can  be  shown  to  be.  If  conscience 
be  an  intuitive  faculty,  or  an  intuitive  exercise 
of  reason,  apprehending  the  right  and  wrong 
of  acts,  just  as  we  apprehend  the  qualities  of 
objects  by  the  senses,  then  it  would  be  just 
as  absurd  to  ask  one  why  he  thinks  such  an 
act  to  be  right  or  wrong  as  it  would  be  to 
ask  him  why  he  thinks  the  sky  to  be  blue. 
The  only  answer  which  he  could  make,  in 
either  case,  would  be,  that  he  thinks  so  be- 
cause it  so  appears  to  him.  That  is  to  say, 
he  could  give  no  reason  whatever  for  his  per- 
ception, but  only  allege  it  as  a  fact.  There 
could  be  no  reasoning,  therefore,  at  all,  on 
moral  questions,  any  more  than  about  colors. 
But,  while  we  never  hear  one  asked  to  give  a 
reason  for  thinking  this  to  be  black,  and  that 
blue,  we  do  hear  men  questioned  continually 
about   the   correctness  of  their   moral  distinc- 


60  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

tions.  Men  are  always  disputing  about  the 
viglit  and  the  wrong  in  conduct,  or  the  prin- 
ciples of  conduct.  Besides,  ethics  is  evidently 
a  progressive  science,  whereas  it  should  be  sta- 
tionary if  our  perception  of  the  right  is  intui- 
tive. The  perceptions  of  the  senses  are  just 
tlie  same  now  that  they  were  when  the  first 
human  eye  was  opened  on  nature ;  and  why 
should  not  the  same  moral  distinctions  be 
made  by  the  most  ignorant  and  the  most  en- 
lightened, by  the  men  of  one  age  as  by  those 
of  another,  if  they  depend  upon  the  direct 
perceptions  of  an  internal  sense,  just  as  the 
qualities  of  objects  do  upon  those  of  our  ex- 
ternal senses  ?  Conscience,  then,  must  be  a 
discursive  faculty.  And  the  same  appears  from 
an  account  of  the  perceptions  necessary  in  de- 
termining the  character  of  an  action,  as  given 
in  the  last  chapter,  (No.  7.) 

6.  What  it  is  which  deceives  men  in  this 
matter.  —  What  deceives  men,  apparently,  in 
this  matter,  is,  that  the  moral  feelings,  like 
all   feeling,  are  of  course  immediate,  or,  if  1 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.       C\ 

may  so  say,  intuitive.  When  an  act  is  scon 
to  be  right  or  wrong,  or  according  to  right 
or  wrong  relations,  certain  feelings  in  regard 
to  it  immediately  spring  up  in  the  mind  — 
wo  arc  attracted  towards  or  repelled  from  it ; 
we  approve  it  or  disapprove  it.  And,  as  the 
operations  of  our  perceptive  powers  are  silent 
and  unobtrusive,  and  as  we  are  not  accustomed 
to  analyze  our  states  of  mind,  these  feelings 
are  all  that  we  are  conscious  of — so  mucli 
so,  that,  in  speaking  of  things  which  are  re- 
garded as .  right  or  wrong,  we  commonly  say 
merely  that  we  feel  them  to  be  so.  Thus, 
though  tl»e  moral  feelings  exist  only  as  the 
result  of  moral  perceptions,  yet,  as  the  more 
obtrusive  element  of  the  two,  they  very  natu- 
rally attract  the  chief  attention,  and  stand  in 
jnost  minds  as  the  sole  indicators  of  right  and 
wrong.  It  is  thus,  as  it  would  seem,  that  the 
perception  of  right  and  wrong  has  como  so 
generally  to  be  considered  intuitive. 
6 


6!2  FIRST    PRINCIPLES   OF    RTHTCS. 

11.  'J'hk  Giiouxf)  OF  RuniT  not  in  the  Nature 
OR  Will  of  God. 

1.  The  ground  of  its  existence  viaij  be  the 
tcill  of  God,  but  not  of  its  perception.  —  Recur- 
ring to  the  distinction  already  made  between 
tlie  ground  of  the  existence  of  a  thing  and 
of  our  knowledge  of  it,  the  nature  or  will  of 
God  may,  perhaps,  be  said  to  be  the  ground 
of  right  in  the  former  sense,  since  it  is  by  tho, 
will  of  God  that  it  exists.  As  all  things  exist 
by  the  will  of  God,  right  and  wrong  may  be 
said  to  exist  thus,  but  only  as  it  is  admitted, 
at  the  same  time,  that  the  elements  of  right 
and  wrong  exist  in  the  nature  of  things ;  since 
right  and  wrong  in  us,  whether  in  thought 
or  deed,  exist  rather  by  the  will  of  man.  If 
the  elements  of  right  and  wrong  exist  in  the 
nature  of  things,  as  things  exist  by  the  will 
of  God,  so  do  these  elements.  In  this  sense, 
the  will  of  God  may  be  said  to  be  the  ground 
of  the  existence  of  right  and  wrong,  while  the 
natui'e  of  things  is  the  ground  of  our  perceiv- 
ing illCJTJ. 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.       63 

2.  Does  the  mUure  of  God  determine  Ins  oion 
acts?  —  If  tilings  exist  as  they  do  by  the  will 
of  God,  a  still  furtlier  question  may  be  raised 
as  to  liow  his  will  or  acts  are  themselves  de- 
termined ;  or,  ill  other  words,  liow  he  came  to 
make  things  as  they  are.  Was  he  determined 
ill  creation  solely  by  his  own  nature,  or  was 
he  influenced  to  make  things  as  they  arc  by 
the  consideration  that  such  an  arrangement 
of  things  is  fit  and  proper?  In  eitlier  case, 
the  universe  would  be  but  a  transcript  of  his 
nature  —  being,  in  one  case,  the  result  of  the 
spontaneous  action  of  that  nature,  and  in  the 
other,  of  its  action  controlled  by  the  proprie- 
ties of  the  case.  The  question,  then,  seems  to 
be  similar  to,  if  it  be  not  indeed  precisely  the 
same  as,  that  which  arises  in  regard  to  the 
freedom  of  our  own  will  or  action.  If  God 
acts  independently  of  considerations  out  of 
himself,  he  is  free  in  his  acts ;  but  if  he  acts 
from  extraneous  views,  these  seem  to  control 
and  determine  his  acts.  We  cannot  expect, 
therefore,   to    come    to    any  clearer   or    more 


64  FIRST   PRINJIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

satisfactory  views  on  this  point,  in  regard  to 
God,  than  in  regard  to  onrselves.  In  both 
cases,  as  far  as  we  can  make  it  out  in  thought, 
acts  seem  to  be  controlled  rather  than  sponta^ 
neous,  though  we  have  a  consciousness  in  re- 
gard to  ourselves  that  we  are  free.  The  nature 
of  God  may,  therefore,  spontaneously  determine 
his  acts ;  but  the  reverse  seems  to  us  to  be 
the  case.  In  the  former  case,  the  nature  of 
God  might  be  said  to  determine  the  existence 
of  the  right;  but  in  the  latter,  the  right  would 
determine  the  acts  of  God. 

3.  The  revealed  will  of  God  not  the  ground 
of  right  and  lorong.  —  As  we  have  already  seen, 
Scripture  does  not  profess  to  impart  to  men 
their  first  notions  of  right  and  wrong,  but  ad- 
dresses them  as  already  possessiijg  such  notions, 
and  blames  them  for  not  applying  them  in  de- 
termining and  practising  what  is  right.  It 
thus  comes  to  the  aid  of  conscience,  rather 
than  supersedes  it.  This  must  be  obvious  to 
any  one  who  is  familiar  with  the  spirit  and 
words  of  Scripture.    It  speaks  of  man  as  "  a  law 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OP  THINGS.      6ij 

to  himself,"  and  as  able  of  himself  to  "  judgo 
what  is  right."  It  exhorts  men  to  practise 
^^  whatsoever  things  are  pure,"  etc.,  (as  though 
they  were  able  of  themselves  to  determine  wliat 
is  such,)  "  to  add  to  their  faith  virtue,  and 
temperance,  and  purity,"  etc.,  and  "  do  to 
others  what  we  would  have  them  do  to  us" 
—  all  which  supposes  a  capacity  in  us  of  judg- 
ing wliat  is  virtue,  temperance,  and  riglit  con- 
duct to  others.  Indeed,  if  the  ultimate  ground 
of  right  and  wrong  was  to  be  found  in  tlic 
precepts  of  Scripture,  we  could  have  no  con- 
ception of  right  and  wrong  in  general,  but 
only  of  certain  things  as  commanded  or  for- 
bidden. There  are,  indeed,  some  things  com- 
manded or  taught  in  Scripture  of  the  propriety 
of  whicli  we  are  incapable  of  judging,  since 
we  do  not  know  all  the  reasons  for  tliem  — 
such  as  baptism  and  the  Lord's  supper,  the 
observance  of  the  Sabbath,  the  necessity  of 
sacrifice  for  sin,  tlie  efficacy  of  faith  and  prayer, 
and  the  like.  These  are  revelations  on  the 
authority  of  God ;  and,  as  far  as  they  are  duties 
6* 


66  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP    ETHICS. 

aiijoined  on  us,  are  called  ^^  positive  duties," 
since  they  are  imposed  by  a  lawful  superior, 
who  is  supposed  to  see  good  reasons  for  thein, 
although  these  reasons  do  not  fully  appear  to 
us.  All  which  is  entirely  analogous  to  tho 
proceedings  of  a  parent  or  teacher  with  tho 
children  under  his  care.  He  imparts  lessons 
and  lays  down  rules,  which  he  expects  them 
to  receive  on  his  authority,  although  they  do 
not  fully  understand  them  in  all  their  reasons 
and. bearings.  But  great  as  is  our  indebtedness 
to  Revelation  for  our  knowledge  of  the  higher 
and  most  important  of  all  duties,  as  well  as 
for  the  light  and  sanctions  which  it  imparts  to 
duty  in  general,  it  cannot  properly  be  regarded 
as  the  ground  of  right  and  wrong. 

III.   The  Ground  of  Right  and  Wrong  exists 
IN  THE  Nature  of  Things. 

1.  What  is  meant  by  the  terms  here  employed, 
—  As  we  have  already  seen,  the  ground  of  any 
thing  is  that  on  which  it  rests,  and,  when  ap- 
pliei   analogically  to    spiritual    things,    means 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.      67 

the  reasons  on  wliicli  any  conclusion,  feeling, 
or  mental  state  rests,  or  that  which  accounts 
lor  it.  It  has  also  been  stated  that  right  and 
wrong,  in  this  discussion,  are  considered  only 
as  perceptions  of  the  human  mind  pertaining 
to  human  acts.  How  right  and  wrong,  as 
elements  in  things,  came  to  exists  is  another 
question,  upon  which  some  suggestions  have 
been  made  ;  but  the  only  practical  question 
for  us  is,  how  we  come  to  the  knoivtedg-e  of 
them.  Right  and  wrong,  to  us,  are  right  and 
wrong  as  perceived  by  us  in  our  own  or 
others'  acts.  Right  and  wrong  indicate  a  dis- 
tinction in  our  perceptions  of  tlie  character  of 
different  acts ;  and  the  question  is.  What  is 
there  in  the  nature  of  different  acts  which  de- 
termines us  to  decide  one  to  be  right  and  the 
otlier  wrong  ?  or,  in  other  words,  What  are  the 
reasons  for  our  decision  drawn  from  the  na- 
ture of  each  case  ?  For  an  act  is  a  case,  a 
happening,  or  an  event  —  or  the  purpose  of 
an  event  —  of  a  given  character,  both  in  itself 
Qud  in  its  connections  with,  or  bearuigs  upon, 


68  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

other  things.  The  nature  of  thhigs,  then,  re- 
ferred to,  is  the  nature  of  acts  as  hearing  upon 
things^  or  of  things  as  related  to  the  act  and 
the  actor — including,  of  course,  not  only  things 
material,  but  sensitive  and  intelligent  creatures, 
the  actor  himself,  as  well  as  all  other  beings 
affected  by  his  act.  Now,  in  this  sense,  it  is 
asserted  that  the  ground  of  the  right  or  wrong 
of  acts  exists  in  the  nature  of  things. 

2.  The  thesis  proved,  —  If  our  perceptions 
of  right  and  wrong  in  acts  are  not  intuitive, 
as  it  has  already  been  shown  that  they  are 
not,  then  they  are  discursive  acts  of  the  mind. 
In  other  words,  our  perceptions  of  right  and 
wrong  are  judgments,  or  conclusions,  formed 
from  various  considerations,  aside  from  our 
peculiar  mental  constitution,  which  constitute 
their  ground  or  reason.  Whence,  now,  do  we 
derive  these  considerations  ?  It  has  been  sliown 
that  they  cannot  be  derived  from  the  nature 
or  will  of  God,  which  are  Ihe  only  conceiva- 
ble sources  of  them  out  of  ourselves,  except 
the  nature  of  things.      The   reasons   for  these 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.      69 

conclusions  or  judgments,  therefore,  must  be 
drawn  from  the  nature  of  things.  There  must 
be  something  in  the  nature  of  each  act,  con- 
sidered in  itself  and  in  its  bearings,  which 
warrants  the  conclusion  to  which  we  arrive, 
or,  at  least,  seems  to  us  to  warrant  it. 

3.  The  thesis  illustrated.  —  In  saying  that 
the  ground  of  the  right  or  wrong  of  acts  is 
in  the  nature  of  things,  I  mean  very  much 
the  same  as  when  it  is  said  that  the  ground 
of  truth  is  in  the  nature  of  things.  Absolute 
truth  depends  upon  the  absolute  nature  of 
things,  and  truth  to  us  upon  nature  as  it  ap- 
pears to  us.  So  the  absolute  right  of  acts 
depends  upon  their  absolute  nature  and  bear- 
ings upon  things,  and  right  to  us  upon  their 
nature  and  bearings  as  they  appear  to  us.  As 
the  elements  which  constitute  truth  are  found 
in  nature,  so  the  elements  which  constitute 
tlie  right  or  wrong  of  acts  are  found  in  the 
nature  of  things  as  affected  by  these  acts. 
The  elements  of  right  are  as  plainly  discover- 
able in  the  l)earings  of  an  act  upon  the  nature 


70  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

of  things  as  the  elements  of  truth  are  from 
the  nature  of  things  themselves.  Our  final 
appeal  is  to  the  nature  of  things  in  one  case 
as  really  as  in  the  other.  This  was  expressed 
by  the  old  English  moralists  in  their  formula 
that "  right  is  accordance  with  the  nature  and 
reason  of  things."  There  is  always  a  reason 
for  a  right  act,  which  may  be  drawn  from  the 
nature  of  things  as  affected  by  it.  A  careful 
consideration  of  an  act  in  its  nature  and  bear- 
ings—  if  it  be  not  an  act  indifferent  in  its 
bearings  —  will  always  disclose  some  reason 
why  it  ought  or  ought  not  to  be  done.  This 
will  be  seen  more  clearly  when  we  come  to 
treat  of  the  different  virtues  as  embraced  un- 
der Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence,  and  Tem- 
perance or  Prudence. 

4.  Confirmation  of  the  above  view.  —  This 
view  is  confirmed  by  the  ready  explanation 
which  it  affords  of  various  moral  phenomena, 
which  appear  as  insuperable  difficulties  on  the 
supposition  that  our  apprehension  of  right  and 
wrong    is    intuitive.      For    instance,    there   aro 


RIGHT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OP  THINGS.       71 

some  acts  which  seem  to  us  morally  iiidiircr- 
cut  —  as  whether  one  shall  stand  or  sit,  walk 
or  ride,  and  the  like.  And  why  ?  Because 
their  bearings  upon  ourselves  and  others,  as 
well  as  upon  the  facts  of  nature  and  history, 
are  inditferent ;  the  reasons  for  and  against 
them,  drawn  from  these  sources,  seem  equal. 
Again,  if  acts  seem  to  us  right  or  wrong  ac- 
cordhig  to  their  bearings  upon  men  and  things, 
wo  see  why  it  is  that  men's  notions  of  right 
vary  witk  their  intelligence;  since  it  is  by  in- 
telligence alone  that  we  arrive  at  the  true 
conception  of  these,  and  of  the  kind  of  acts 
demanded  by  the  nature  or  reasons  of  the 
case.  From  the  nature  of  the  relation  between 
parent  and  cliild,  reasons  may  be  deduced  for 
certain  mutual  duties.  But  a  parent  convinced 
that  life  is  a  curse  would  think  the  reason  of 
the  case  required  that  he  should  leave  the 
infant  to  perish ;  while  he  who  regards  life  as 
a  blessing  would  feel  bound  to  rear  it  with 
special  care.  And  the  like  difference  would 
arise,   from    different   views   of  the    case,  witli 


72  FIRST    PRINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

regard  to  the  treatment  of  parents,  in  their 
old  age,  bj  their  children.  And  sucli  we  find 
to  be  the  fact.  False  views  of  humanity  and 
human  relations  lead  to  infanticide  and  parri- 
cide among  savage  nations,  as  truer  views  lead 
to  tlie  reverse  of  this  among  civilized  and 
Christian  nations.  Thus  it  is  tliat  tlie  moral 
code  of  a  community  is  so  much  affected  by 
its  customs,  education,  and  laws,  since  these 
tend  to  determine  and  fix  our  views  of  the 
nature  and  relations  of  men  and  things. 

5.  Bishop  Butler'' s  view.  —  But  it  may  be  said 
the  above  view  is  not  in  accordance  with  the 
teachings  of  Bishop  Butler,  confessedly  the  pro- 
foundest  and  most  satisfactory  writer  on  morals 
in  the  English  language,  if  not  in  any  lan- 
guage. There  is,  I  admit,  some  apparent  dis- 
crepancy between  the  above  view  and  his,  but 
it  is  scarcely  more  than  apparent.  His  funda- 
mental principle  is,  tliat  vice  is  contrary  to 
human  nature^  considered  as  an  economy,  or 
in  the  true  relation  of  its  parts ;  and  virtue, 
of  course,  is  following  human   nature,  consid- 


mr^HT  ACTS  GROUNDED  IN  NATURE  OF  THINGS.       73 

ered  under  the  same  view.  But,  in  consider- 
ing the  nature  of  man  as  an  economy,  or  sys- 
tem of  related  and  duly  subordinated  parts, 
reason  or  conscience,  of  course,  comes  out  the 
superior  or  ruling  principle.  The  I'csult,  then, 
is,  that  the  economy  of  man's  nature  makes 
conscience  the  guiding  principle  ;  and  human 
nature,  as  a  guide  in  morals,  is  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  conscience  as  a  guide.  Th\is  his 
theory,  if  not  exactly  the  same  as  that  advo- 
cated above,  comes  to  substantially  the  same 
result.  For,  according  to  his  theory,  not  only 
is  the  yielding  to  any  of  the  lower  principles 
of  our  nature  against  the  dictates  of  con- 
science, wrong,  or  a  violation  of  the  proper 
order  of  our  nature,  but  acts  of  ftilseness,  in- 
justice, cruelty,  etc.,  are  also  contrary  to  our 
nature  in  beinjij  contrary  to  conscience,  its  rep- 
resentative faculty.  In  other  words,  reasons 
may  be  given  against  every  species  of  wrong, 
and  hence  all  wrong  may  be  said  to  be  con- 
trary to  human  nature,  as  summed  up  in 
7 


74  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

reason,  or  conscience.  Now,  this  is  precisiily 
what  is  taught  above  —  only  it  is  there  added 
that  these  reasons  are  always  supplied  by  the 
nature  of  each  case. 


JUST   ACTS    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  75 


CHAPTER    VI. 

JUST  ACTS  ARE   ALWAYS   RIGHT. 

What  justice  is.  —  Justice  is  one  of  the  car- 
ihnal  virtues,  as  they  have  been  called,  and  is 
the  most  cardinal  of  them  all.  It  is  the 
foundation  of  all  right  character,  and  without 
it  the  other  virtues  are  of  little  avail.  Justice, 
according  to  its  derivation,  —  from  the  Latin 
Jubeo  (jussum^,  '■'1  command,"  —  is  what  may 
be  authoritatively  commanded.  It  presupposes 
a  clear  case,  therefore,  and  strong  and  valid 
reasons  on  its  side.  What  we  bid  or  command 
men  to  do,  we  must  feel  that  we  can  enforce 
upon  them  by  the  most  cogent  reasons.  Now, 
as,  according  to  the  theory  advanced  above, 
every  right  act  may  be  enforced  by  sul>stantial 


76  FIRST   PRLNaPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

reasons  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
justice,  in  its  most  general  sense,  may  be  said 
to  comprehend  all  the  virtues.  And  tlie  terra 
is  sometimes  used  in  this  comprehensive  sense; 
as  when  we  speak  not  only  of  justice  to  others, 
but  of  justice  to  ourselves,  of  justice  to  truth, 
and  even  of  justice  to  the  distressed.  But 
justice  to  ourselves  is  Prudence,  justice  to  truth 
is  Veracity,  and  justice  to  the  needy,  the  dis- 
tressed, etc.,  is  Benevolence.  It  is  better,  then, 
to  leave  to  each  of  these  virtues  its  propei 
sphere,  and  under  Justice  to  treat  only  ot  the 
rights  of  man  as  man,  as  based  upon  wliat  is 
his  oton,  and  hence  excluding  all  others.  Jus- 
tice, therefore,  has  respect  to  the  rights  of 
men,  I.  As  to  property;  II.  As  to  life;  III.  As 
to  liberty ;  and,  IV.  As  to  reputation. 

I.     Justice  in  Regard  to  Property. 

1.  Ground  of  (he  rig-ht  of  property.  —  In  ac« 
cordance  with  the  preceding  view  of  right,  I 
liold  that  tiie  rightful  owner  of  any  tiling  can 
vtlways    show    a   reason    for   his    claim,   drawn 


JUST   AUTS    ALWAYS    RIGHT.  77 

from  the  nature  of  the  case,  which  no  other 
person  can — in  otlier  words,  that,  in  the  nat- 
ural order  of  things,  there  is  always  a  hand, 
and  hut  one  hand,  to  which  every  possession 
rightfully  belongs ;  that  when  in  this  hand,  it 
is  in  its  natural  place,  and  when  not  in  this 
hand,  it  is  out  of  its  natural  phice.  An  arti- 
cle does  not  become  property  until  it  has  been 
appropriated  by  some  one ;  and  when  any  one 
has  thus  appropriated  an  article,  he  is  expected 
to  prove  his  title  to  it;  if  disputed,  he  must 
be  able  to  show  a  better  reason  why  he  should 
possess  it  than  any  one  else  can.  If  he  has 
prodiiced  it  by  his  labor  from  elements  which 
rightfully  belong  to  him,  or  bought  it  with  his 
money,  or  received  it  as  a  free  gift  from  some 
one,  or  taken  it  from  the  ocean  or  any  of  the 
great  unappropriated  fields  of  nature,  no  one 
can  dispute  his  claim  to  it,  i.  e.,  contest  his 
right  to  it  on  rational  grounds.  In  his  hand, 
therefore,  it  is  in  its  right  place.  He  holds  it 
without  a  rival,  and  has  the  sole  right  of  its 
vlisposal.  No  other  person,  therefore,  can  pre- 
7* 


78  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

sent  any  good  reason  wliy  he  should  have  the 
article  without  his  consent;  and,  should  one 
take  it  without  his  consent,  he  has  just  as 
truly  removed  it  from  its  natural  place  as  one 
would  a  tropical  plant  by  transplanting  it  to 
the  pole.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the 
right  of  property  is  founded  in  the  nature  of 
things,  and  that  rightful  possession  may  always 
be  defended  on  that  ground. 

2.  Tills  illustrated,  —  We  appropriate  only 
what  we  take  to  ourselves  to  the  exclusion  of 
others.  Air,  water,  and  sunlight,  under  ordi- 
nary conditions,  cannot  be  tluis  appropriated, 
and  hence  cannot  become  articles  of  property. 
Of  articles  whicli  may  become  property,  some 
are  easily  appropriated,  since,  occupying  but  a 
small  space,  they  may  be  directly  clutched  by 
the  hand,  or  lodged  in  our  houses  or  about 
our  premises.  Other  articles,  such  as  tracts 
of  land,  are  not  so  easily  appropriated.  But, 
however  appropriated,  in  order  to  hold  the 
property  securely,  one  must  be  able  to  prove 
his  title.     Now,  if  I  find  a  nugget  of  gold  on 


JUST    ACTS    ALWAYS    RIGHT.  79 

ail  uninhabited  island,  or  a  piece  of  coined 
money  in  tlie  liighvvay  for  which  no  owner 
can  be  found,  or  take  a  fish  or  a  pearl  from 
llie  ocean,  or  a  wild  animal  at  large  in  the 
mountains,  or  receive  an  estate  from  a  friend, 
or  discover  and  enclose,  or  appropriate  by  other 
iin|)rovements,  a  portion  of  land  owned  by  no 
one  else,  I  have  a  reason,  in  each  case,  for 
my  possession,  or  why  the  piece  of  property 
should  be  held  by  me,  that  no  other  man  has. 
And  it  matters  not  whether  it  costs  me  much, 
or  little,  or  no  labor.  I  may  find  a  piece  of 
money  in  the  highway  while  journeying,  and 
another  man  may  be  journeying  with  me,  and 
yet,  if  I  see  it  and  get  possession  of  it  first, 
it  is  mine,  in  case  no  owner  appears,  and  not 
his.  So  that  the  original  right  of  property 
depends  upon  prior  appropriation.  If  I  have 
appropriated  an  article  which  has  never  been 
in  the  possession  of  any  other  human  being, 
or  for  which  no  owner  can  be  found,  '..  have 
a  sufficient  reason  for  retaining  it  against  all 
others,  and  hence   have  a   right   to  it.      Most 


S€  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF    ETHICS. 

articles  can  be  appropriated  only  by  labor,  and 
property  is  improved  only  by  labor;  bcnee,  in 
general,  labor  is  tlie  proper  representative  of 
value,  but  it  is  not  tbe  ground  of  the  original 
right  of  ownership,  unless  it  can  be  shown  to 
have  been  bestowed  on  the  article  before  it 
came  into  the  hands  of  any  one  else.  Labor 
simply  changes  or  transmutes  previously  exist- 
ing materials  or  elements  ;  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily impart  the  original  title  to  them.  As 
the  representative  of  value,  it  entitles  the  la- 
borer to  the  value  conferred,  but  not  to  the 
article  itself  if  previously  possessed  by  some 
one  else. 

3.  Importance  of  the  right  of  property.  — 
Every  right  is  important  because  it  is  right. 
We  cannot  show  the  importance  of  any  thing 
more  effectually  in  any  other  way  than  in 
showing  it  to  be  right.  If  the  right  be  sini^ 
ply  accordance  with  the  nature  of  tilings,  it 
must  lead  to  the  good.  The  right,  conspiring 
and  harmonizing  with  nature,  must  lead  to 
good  results.     Conduct  guided  by  the  right  is 


JUST    ACTS    ALWAYS   ..IGHT.  81 

no  longer  at  cross-purposes  either  with  nature 
or  the  God  of  nature,  and  must  end  well.  But 
we  can  see  directly  many  of  the  advantages 
arising  from  the  sacred  observance  of  the  right 
of  property.  Where  the  right  of  property  is 
not  generally  admitted  and  strictly  observed, 
capital  can  never  accumulate,  as  no  one  will 
attempt  to  accumulate  what  may  at  any  mo- 
ment be  taken  from  him.  It  is  only  as  each 
one  is  allowed  to  retain  unmolested  the  fruits 
of  his  labor  that  industry  is  developed  and 
property  accumulated.  And  without  capital 
and  industry  there  can  be  no  progress  in  a 
community.  Men  improve  their  food,  clothing, 
dwellings,  lands,  comforts,  conveniences,  and  all 
which  enters  into  the  notion  of  civilization, 
iust  in  proportion  as  each  one  is  left  in  the 
undisputed  possession  of  what  is  his  own. 

4.  The  right  of  each  to  what  he  needs. — 
But,  it  is  said,  as  God  has  given  existence  to 
every  man,  it  must  be  that  eacli  human  being 
has  a  riglit  to  at  least  as  much  as  is  necessary 
for  his  subsistence.      But  how  has  he  a  right 


82  FIRST  PRl.'^CIPLES   OP  ETHICS. 

to  this?  God  has  not  only  ^iven  us  rnr  ex- 
istence, but  he  has  so  constituted  things  that 
the  means  of  continuing  this  existence  can  be 
obtained  only  by  labor.  If  no  one  labors  or 
puts  forth  any  kind  of  exertion,  there  must  be 
a  total  want  of  all  means  of  subsistence.  Now, 
labor  being  the  condition  of  subsistence,  it  is  a 
condition  to  one  just  as  much  as  to  another, 
and  no  one  can  rightfully  say  to  another,  You 
work,  and  I  will  eat.  This  is  not  the  order 
of  things  which  God  has  established,  but  rather 
tliat  ''  lie  that  will  not  work,  neither  shall  he 
eat."  Of  course,  if  God  has  not  given  one  the 
ability  to  labor,  the  condition  does  not  liold  in 
his  case,  and  others  should  labor  for  him.  The 
feeble,  the  sick,  the  disabled,  the  unfortunate, 
are  the  proper  objects  of  the  sympathy  and 
charity  of  the  healthy,  the  robust,  and  the  suc- 
cessful. But  of  those  who  are  able  to  labor, 
all  are  under  equal  obligation  to  do  so;  and, 
if  one  can  say  to  any  other,  You  work,  and 
I  will  eat,  tlien  all  may  say  so. 
5.  What  h  implied  in  the  right  of  proper t/ 


JUST   ACTS   ALWAYS   RIGHT.  5d 

—  Property  is  what  is  one's  own,  and  lience 
the  right  to  it  is  exclusive.  What  is  one's 
own  cannot  be  another's.  There  cannot  be 
two  owners  to  the  same  thing  or  the  same 
part  of  a  thing.  As  far  as  one  is  an  owner 
of  an  article,  liis  ownership  excludes  all  others. 
He  has  the  sole  right  to  its  possession,  tlierc- 
fore,  and  can  dispose  of  it  as  seems  to  him 
best — under  his  responsibility,  of  course,  to 
his  Maker.  No  man  may  take  and  use  it, 
or  in  any  way  interfere  with  his  right  to  it, 
without  his  consent.  He  may  liimself  bestow 
it  upon  another,  either  with  or  witliout  con- 
sideration ;  and  in  so  doing  he  conveys  to  the 
other,  by  the  very  act,  the  same  exclusive  right 
to  it  which  he  had.  So  he  may  part  witli  a 
certain,  portion  of  his  property  for  the  advan- 
tages derived  from  civil  government ;  but  tiie 
government  cannot  rightfully  demand  of  liini 
any  more  than  is  absolutely  necessary  for.  tlic 
proper  conduct  of  the  government  according 
to  the  compact  under  which  he  voluntarily 
lives.     If  it  do,  it  is  just  as  mucl). robbery  as 


84  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF  ETHICS. 

though   it  were   taken  from   liim  by  a   private 
individual. 

II.     Justice  l\  Regard  to  Life. 

1.  Ground  of  our  right  to  life.  —  If  a  man 
has  a  right  to  any  thing,  it  is  to  his  life. 
His  life,  !>urely,  is  his  own,  as  against  any 
other  claimant.  Like  every  thing  else  which 
we  possess,  it  is  indeed  the  gift  of  God ;  but, 
being  a  gift  to  the  individual,  it  becomes  his 
to  liold  under  God  —  it  is  his,  and  not  an- 
other's. It  is  his  property,  and  the  most  val- 
uable of  all  property,  since  without  it  no  other 
property  is  possible,  or  would  be  of  any  avail 
if  it  were.  Hence  it  is  said  that  "  all  that  a 
man  hath  will  he  give  for  his  life."  Life  is 
tlius  not  only  a  lawful  possession  of  each  one, 
but  the  ground  and  condition  of  all  other 
possessions.  No  one,  tlierefore,  may  liglitly 
take  the  life  of  another — never,  indeed,  with- 
out being  able  to  show  that  the  other  has  for- 
feited his  title  to  it,  and  that  he  is  the  rightful 
executioner. 


JUST    ACTS    ALWAYS    RICTIT.  Sb 

2.  Justifiable  homicide.  —  But  suppose  tliat 
one  is  attacked  by  another  from  malice,  or  for 
tlie  purpose  of  robbery  or  murder ;  may  he  not 
rightfully  defend  himself,  and,  if  necessary,  take 
the  life  of  his  assailant?  The  right  of  self- 
defence  in  general  need  not  here  be  discussed. 
The  only  question  to  be  considered  here  is. 
whether  self-defence  to  the  extent  of  taking 
tiie  life  of  another  is  ever  justifiable.  To  tliis 
question  it  may  be  answered  at  once,  tliat, 
when  it  is  obvious  that  the  object  of  the  as- 
sailant is  robbery  alone,  the  taking  of  his  life 
would  not  be  justifiable.  The  reason  of  the 
case  does  not  seem  to  demand  it.  Life  i:: 
more  precious  than  money ;  and,  if  the  robber 
will  be  satisfied  with  your  purse,  let  him  have 
it  and  go  on  his  way,  and  rely  upon  other 
means  of  bringing  him  to  justice.  But  where 
the  life  is  aimed  at  by  the  assailant,  the  case 
becomes  equalized,  and  it  is  life  for  life.  In 
such  a  case,  as  one  life  is  just  as  valuable  to 
its  possessor  as  another,  the  party  assailed 
would  seem  to  have  sufficient  i-eason  for  taking 
8 


8fi  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   oP   ETHICS. 

the  life  of  his  assailant,  since  thus  only  could 
he  save  his  own.  Of  course,  it  will  not  always 
be  certain  what  the  purpose  of  the  assailant 
is,  and  then  the  duty  of  the  assailed  become^' 
doubtful ;  but  when  the  purpose  is  clear,  the 
duty  is  clear. 

8.  Taking  life  in  war.  —  The  whole  history 
of  tlic  world  shows  that  war  is  one  of  the 
greatest  of  the  evils  whicli  have  afflicted  our 
race.  It  is  the  enil)odinient  of  the  very  spirit 
of  ruin.  It  wastes  the  earth,  crushes  out  every 
vestige  of  civilization  which  comes  in  its  way, 
swallows  up  capital  as  in  a  vortex,  stimulates 
the  basest  and  fiercest  of  passions,  and  fills 
the  land  witli  desolation,  sorrow,  and  death. 
So  great  an  evil  may  not  be  incurred  for  ev- 
ery trifling  cause.  It  can  be  justified  only  by 
the  most  urgent  reasons.  Wars  of  aggression, 
or  simply  for  the  purposes  of  national  aggran- 
dizement, can  never  be  justified.  Such  wars 
are  mere  robbery,  or  rather  murder  for  tlie 
sake  of  robbery.  Wars  to  deliver  ourselves  or 
others  from  oppression  may  unquestionably  be 


JUST   ACTS    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  87 

justified  in  some  instances,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  case ;  as  wliere  the  oppression  is 
extreme,  crushing  out  every  thing  which  is 
valuable  in  life,  or  where  it  is  an  insuperable 
barrier  to  some  great  progress  for  which  a  peo- 
ple are  prepared,  and  which  they  are  able  to 
make,  if  left  to  themselves.  Defensive  wars, 
too,  are  justifiable,  when  the  assailed  party  are 
themselves  right,  and  not  .the  guilty  cause  of 
resistance  or  assault.  In  such  a  case,  the 
question  becomes,  as  in  the  case  of  a  personal 
assault,  one  of  life  for  life.  But  in  most  cases, 
national  quarrels  are  as  unnecessary  and  as 
unjustifiable  as  family  quarrels  or  individual 
quarrels  are. 

4.  Taking:  life  as  a  punishment.  —  Life  being 
the  most  valuable  of  all  possessions,  there  can 
be  no  justification  for  taking  the  life  of  an- 
other, whether  by  the  individual  or  by  society, 
except  when  it  is  a  case  of  life  for  life.  The 
individual,  as  we  have  seen,  may,  in  self- 
defence,  take  the  life  of  another,  when  his 
own  is  in  danger.     So^  it  would  seem,  might 


8S  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

j>ociety  rightfully  take  the  life  of  one  who  ha« 
designedly  and  with  premeditation  taken  the 
life  of  one  of  its  unoffending  members.  The 
individual  not  having  been  able  to  defend 
himself,  and  having  unjustly  lost  his  life  by 
the  assault  of  another,  it  becomes  the  duty  of 
the  society  to  which  lie  belongs,  or  rather  of 
the  government  wliich  represents  that  society, 
and  which  has  been  established  to  protect  the 
citizens,  to  take  up  his  cause  and  defend  it. 
This  is  not  to  be  done,  however,  in  a  vindic- 
tive spirit;  and  hence  the  retribution  is  not 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  immediate  friends, 
but  in  the  hands  of  the  government,  who  can 
look  impartially  at  all  cases.  Still,  the  pun- 
ishment inflicted,  to  satisfy  the  community, 
must  correspond  somewhat  to  the  nature  of 
the  offence.  The  feeling  of  ill  desert,  which 
all  have  in  such  a  case  towards  the  offender, 
must  be  met;  and  this  is  adequately  met,  as 
I  conceive,  only  by  taking  life  for  life.  Punish- 
ments arc  undoubtedly  for  the  good  of  soci- 
ety ;   but  this  is  not  the  idea  which   prompts 


JUST    ACTS   ALWAYS    RIGHT.  89 

tliciQ,  or  which  should  deteriniiic  them.  Thi? 
would  be  wholly  disregarding  the  crime,  by 
looking  away  from  it  to  the  interests  of  the 
community.  The  offender,  in  that  case,  would 
not  be  regarded  as  guilty,  but  simply  as  a 
scape-goat  for  the  good  of  society. 

III.    Justice  in  Regard  to  Liberty. 

1.  Ground  of  our  right  to  liberty. —  Liberty 
is  freedom  to  use  our  time,  talents,  and  pro[)- 
erty  as  we  choose.  That  this  is  the  inaliena- 
l)lc  right  of  every  luiman  boing  is  obvious. 
Every  human  being,  not'  utterly  demented  or 
insane,  has  been  endowed  with  the  capacity 
of  knowing,  choosing,  and  acting  for  himself. 
One  may  have  these  capacities  in  a  higlier 
degree  than  another,  but  eacli  individual  has 
tliem  in  some  degree.  And,  having  been  en- 
dowed with  such  capacities  by  his  Maker,  each 
one  feels  that  he  has  a  riglit  to  exercise  them, 
and  tliat  he  alone  is  responsible  for  their  ex- 
ercise. Next  to  life,  liberty  is  held  hy  all  to 
bo  our  most  valuable  possession.  Hence  the 
8* 


90  FIRST  :-RINCIPLE8  OP  ETHICS. 

language  of  the  orator  is  barely  the  expression 
of  the  feeling  of  each  one  —  "Give  me  liberty, 
or  give  me  death."  It  may  be  true  that  many 
persons  might  be  guided  more  wisely  by  others 
than  they  guide  themselves,  or  are  capable  of 
guiding  themselves.  And  should  sucli  persons 
become  convinced  of  this,  and  voluntarily  place 
themselves  under  the  guidance  of  another, 
there  could  be  no  valid  objection  to  such  an 
arrangement.  But,  feeling  their  right  to  lil)- 
erty,  and  ability  to  guide  themselves,  no  one 
may  deprive  them  of  this  right.  Besides, 
it  is  to  be  recollected  that  men  arc  ex- 
tremely selfish  ;  and  if  one  was  entitled  to 
the  guidance  of  others  on  account  of  his  su- 
perior ability,  that  ability  would  inevitably  be 
exerted  in  guiding  them,  not  for  their  good, 
but  for  his  own.  Liberty,  then,  is  the  univer- 
sal birthright  of  man. 

2.  The  ivrong'  of  slavery. — If  liberty  is  the 
right  of  men,  slavery,  of  course,  is  wrong. 
Slavery  is  not  only  a  theoretical  denial  to  men 
of  the  right  to  the  control  of  their  time,  prop- 


JUST   ACTS   ALWAYS   RIGHT.  91 

erty,  and  talents,  but  is  a  practical  en  for  cement 
of  tliis  denial.  It  is  holding  another  human 
being  as  our  own  —  one  who  has  as  distinct  a 
personality  and  responsibihty  of  his  own  as 
Itis  self-styled  master.  It  is  nothing  less,  then, 
tlian  a  claim  set  up  by  one  man  to  own  die 
soul  of  another.  There  must,  tlicrefore,  be 
continually  rankling  in  the  bosom  of  the  en- 
slaved a  sense  of  injury,  insult,  and  wrong. 
This  makes  him  restless,  vindictive,  and  un- 
faithful. Feeling  that  his  master  has  no  right 
to  him,  he  feels  justified  in  avenging  the 
wrong  to  himself  by  any  ill  return  whicli  he 
can  make.  Conscious  that  he  docs  not  owe 
the  service  imposed  upon  him,  he  will,  of 
course,  perform  it  but  grudgingly,  and  escape 
from  it  at  the  first  safe  opportunity  of  doing 
so  which  offers  itself;  nay,  goaded  to  despera- 
tion, may  even  vindicate  his  right  to  liberty 
by  destroying  his  oppressor.  At  the  same  time, 
the  master,  aware  of  this  state  of  mind  in  his 
slave,  and  conscious  of  the  wrong  which  he 
has    done    him,   is    rendered    suspicious,   over- 


92  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

bearing,  and  cruel.  It  is  thus  that  slavery,  in 
its  operation  as  well  as  in  its  conception,  pro 
claims  the  unnaturalness  and  hatefulness  of 
the  relation. 

3.  Defence  of  slavery  from  the  Old  TesUtr 
vient  Scriptvres.  —  Slavery,  like  other  forms  of 
wrong,  has  existed  in  all  ages.  And  it  is  ol> 
vious,  from  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures,  that 
it  existed  among  the  Jews.  Nay,  the  writers 
of  the  Old  Testament,  while  they  do  not  by  any 
means  justify  it,  do  not  expressly  condemn  it. 
They  refer  to  it  as  it  existed,  without  attempt- 
ing directly  to  interfere  with  it,  satisfied  with 
inculcating  a  general  spirit  of  humanity,  jus- 
tice, and  equality,  in  the  sight  of  God,  which 
would  be  sure  in  time  to  subvert  the  system. 
Besides,  the  type  of  slavery  which  existed 
among  the  Jews  was  one  of  the  mildest.  At 
most,  it  was  but  partial  bondage.  We  learn 
from  the  earlier  books  of  these  ancient  Scrip- 
tures, especially  from  tlie  twenty-first  chapter 
of  Exodus,  the  twenty-fiftli  chapter  pf  Leviti- 
cus, and   the  twenty-tliird   chapter  uf  Dcutcr- 


JUST   ACTS   ALWAYS   RIGHT.  9B 

onoray,  that  the  servant  was  not  without  his 
rights,  and  not  beyond  the  hope  of  freedom. 
He  might  be  redeemed  by  his  friends ;  he  was 
not  to  l)e  delivered  up  to  his  master,  in  case 
lie  escaped ;  if  he  was  maimed  or  abused  by 
his  master,  he  was  to  be  set  free ;  if  he  was 
killed,  his  master  was  to  be  punished ;  religious 
instruction  and  worship  were  secured  to  him ; 
and  every  fiftieth  year  all  slaves  were  to  be 
set  free.  Such  a  system  of  slavery,  even  if  it 
were  sanctioned  by  the  sacred  writers,  could 
hardly  be  appealed  to  as  justifying  slavery  as 
it  exists  in  this  and  some  other  countries  at 
the  present  day. 

4.  Defence  of  slavery  from  the  New  Testa- 
ment. —  But  slavery  as  it  existed  among  the 
Greeks  and  Romans,  where  Christ  and  his 
apostles  labored  and  taught,  was  of  a  very  dif- 
ferent character,  it  is  said.  This  is  admitted. 
The  power  of  the  master  over  his  slave,  in 
those  countries,  was  well-nigh  absolute,  involv- 
ing even  the  power  of  life  and  death.  And 
y  it  tliis  system  is  recognized  in  the  New  Tcs- 


94  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

tameiit,  and  the  relative  duties  of  master  and 
slave  under  it  arc  prescribed.  Granted.  The 
duties  enjoined  upon  the  master,  however,  are 
only  those  of  humanity  towards  liis  slave,  not 
the  duty  of  holding  him  in  bondage  ;  while  the 
duty  of  obedience  enjoined  upon  the  slave  is 
not  enjoined  as  the  duty  of  obedience  to  tlieir 
parents  is  upon  children, — because  it  is  right, 
—  but  as  an  exercise  of  Christian  submission, 
such  as  one  may  exhibit  under  the  infliction 
of  any  other  suffering  or  wrong.  And  this, 
for  the  same  reason  that  the  Christians  of 
that  day  were  required  to  submit  to  the 
powers  that  were,  though  tliat  power  was 
wielded  by  so  great  a  monster  as  Nero.  It 
was  better  to  submit  with  Christian  meek- 
ness, and  thus  exhibit  their  religion  under 
its  most  attractive  aspect,  trusting  to  the 
silent  operation  of  its  benign  spirit  and  pre- 
cepts in  general,  than  to  resist,  and  incur  the 
risk  of  the  total  subversion  of  their  religioii 
by  the  strong  arm  of  masters  and  magistrates. 
But   a   religion    which    laid    down    tlie    broad 


JUST   ACTS   ALWAYS   RIGHT.  95 

rule  of  duty,  that  "  all  things  whatsoever  we 
would  that  men  should  do  to  us,  we  should 
do  even  so  to  them,"  could  not  have  sanc- 
tioned slavery  in  any  way.  Indeed,  the  gen- 
eral spirit  of  the  New  Testament,  from  begin- 
ning to  end,  is  a  constant  rebuke  to  slavery. 
That  the  above  account  of  the  ground  on 
which  slaves  are  commanded  to  submit  to 
their  masters  is  correct,  is  abundantly  evident 
from  a  passage  in  1  Peter,  ii.  18,  19 :  "  Ser- 
vants, be  subject  to  your  masters  with  all 
fear ;  not  only  to  the  good  and  gentle,  but 
also  to  the  froward.  For  this  is  thankworthy, 
if  a  man  for  conscience  toivards  God  endure 
grief,  suffering  wrongfully.''''  And  there  are 
many  other  passages  to  the  same  effect. 

5.  Defence  of  slavery  on  the  ground  of  in- 
feriority.  —  Slavery  is  the  fruit  of  war,  and 
h.ence  combines  this  peculiar  enormity  with  its 
own.  The  first  slaves  were  probably  captives 
in  war.  Indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
men  must  be  subdued  before  they  can  be  re- 
duced to  slavery.     No  man  submits  to  it  un- 


96  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

less  he  is  obliged  to.  Slavery,  then,  in  all 
cases,  must  arise  from  the  triumph  of  the 
stronger  over  the  weaker,  and  the  abuse  of 
that  superiority  in  oppressing  them.  The  en- 
slaved, in  this  sense,  are  always  inferiors  — 
they  are  the  weaker  party,  who  have  been 
pushed  to  the  wall.  But  where  is  my  war- 
rant for  enslaving  another  because  I  am  the 
stronger  ?  Does  might  make  right  ?  But  in 
defence  of  negro  slavery,  in  particular,  it  is 
said  that  they  are  an  inferior  race  in  intel- 
lect, and  capacity  of  action,  and  self-control  in 
general.  Now,  supposing  this  to  be  true,  it 
cannot  justify  the  enslaving  of  them,  as  long 
as  it  is  admitted  that  they  are  men  and  have 
human  souls.  If  they  are  men  they  are  each 
under  a  separate  accountability  to  God,  and 
cannot,  without  gross  wrong,  be  subjected  to 
the  will  of  another.  That  one  has  but  small 
capacities  may  be  a  reason  why  wc  should 
help  him  along  in  the  world,  but  not  surely 
for  enslaving  him,  and  using  what  capacities 
he   lias  solely  for  our  own  interest. 


JUST   ACTS    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  97 

6.  Defence  of  slavery  from  the  good  which 
it  has  done  to  the  enslaved.  —  That  slavery 
has  incidentally  done  some  good  we  need  not 
deny,  for  God  can  make  even  the  wrath  of 
man  to  praise  him.  That  Africans,  by  being 
brought  to  this  country  and  confiiiGd  to  ser- 
vice in  tlic  families  and  on  the  plantations 
of  civilized  men,  must  necessarily  be  more  or 
less  benefited,  is  obvious.  But  would  they  not 
be  much  more  benefited  by  a  voluntary  resi- 
dence in  such  families  ?  How  is  it  with  oiher 
foreigners  who  come  to  our  shores,  and  go 
out  to  service  in  the  free  states  ?  Is  not 
their  improvement  far  greater  ?  Do  we  not 
see  them,  by  hundreds  and  by  thousands, 
speedily  transformed  from  common  laborers  to 
land-owners,  capitalists,  head  mechanics,  pro- 
fessional men,  magistrates,  and  even  repre- 
sentatives in  the  councils  of  the  nation  ?  tho 
like  of  which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
can  never  happen  to  slaves.  In  a  wealthy 
country,  like  ours,  laborers  are  always  needed ; 
and  let  them  come  from  all  countries  and  all 
9 


98  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

climes,  and  in  helping  us  they  will  the  mos< 
elTectiially  help  themselves.  But  let  us  not 
go  and  stir  up  wars  among  native  tribes  for 
tlie  purpose  of  capturing  and  enslaving  such 
of  tlie  poor,  helpless  creatures  as  survive  "  the 
horrors  of  tlte  middle  passage,"  and  arc  land- 
ed safely  on  our  shores.  Neither  right,  nor 
humanity,  nor  Christianity  sanctions  such  a 
course.  From  whatever  point  of  view  we  look 
at  slavery,  it  is  evil,  and  only  evil,  and  that 
continually. 

IV.    Justice  in  Regard  to  Reputation. 

1.  Ground  of  the  right  to  our  reputation. — 
Reputation  is  as  mucli  a  rightful  possession 
as  any  tiling  else.  It  is  in  general  the  re- 
sult of  character,  and  as  far  as  it  is  such,  is 
tlie  most  costly  of  all  our  possessions.  For 
character  is  the  grand  result  })roduced  in 
us  by  all  previous  thinking  and  acting ;  and 
hence,  whether  good  or  bad,  is  a  most  costly 
product.  But  a  good  name  is  a  valuable  as 
well   as   a   costly  possession.     The    descent    tc 


JUST   ACTS    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  99 

infamy  is  easy,  but  the  ascent  to  true  honor 
and  virtue  is  rare  and  hard.  Well  may  it  be 
said,  then,  that  "  a  good  name  is  better  than 
precious  ointment."  This  is  what  gives  one 
currency  in  society,  and  places  him  in  a  po- 
sition to  exert  his  powers  to  the  best  advan- 
tage. It  secures  him  the  confidence  of  the 
community,  and  makes  liim  the  recipient  both 
of  their  esteem  and  their  favors.  A  man  of 
character  naturally  receives  the  most  impor- 
tant trusts.  Important  interests  are  commit- 
ted to  one  only  as  Ids  character  is  a  guar- 
anty tliat  he  will  attend  to  them  faithfully. 
Thus  our  success,  as  well  as  our  happiness 
and  general  well-being  in  society,  depends 
largely,  and,  as  we  might  say,  almost  wholly, 
upon  our  good  name.  Hence  our  reputation 
is  not  only  a  rightful  possession,  but  one  of 
the  greatest  importance  to  tis. 

2.  Duty  in  regard  to  the  reputation  of 
(ihers.  —  A  right  on  one  part  imposes  a  duty 
on  the  other.  If  each  man  has  a  right  to 
his   reputation,   it  is   the  duty  of  every   other 


100  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OP   ETHICS. 

man  to  respect  that  right.  Reputation  is  a 
flower  of  the  most  delicate  nature,  and  is, 
therefore,  most  easily  blasted.  Hence  every 
man  should  deal  tenderly  with  the  reputation 
of  every  other  man,  and  see  that  he  do  him 
no  injustice  on  so  vital  a  point.  So  great  is 
the  danger  of  doing  injustice  here,  on  ac- 
count of  the  delicate  nature  of  the  subject, 
that  it  is  generally  safer,  even  where  one's 
reputation  is  somewhat  factitious  and  above 
his  merits,  to  let  time  correct  the  wrong  esti- 
mate, than  to  attempt  to  correct  it  ourselves. 
But  where  we  know  that  there  is  an  utter 
dereliction  of  principle  in  a  man  who  passes 
in  the  community  for  a  fair  character,  and  is 
thereby  securing  •their  confidence  and  patron- 
age, we  are  not  at  liberty  to  conceal  our 
knowledge  of  his  true  character  from  the 
public.  But  even  in  such  a  case,  we  may  jiot 
deal  in  vague  suspicions,  nor  communicate 
even  positive  facts  in  malice,  but  only  for  this 
protection  of  the  community. 

B.    Ways   of   doing'  injustice    to   the   re/httar 


JUST   ACTS    ALWAYS    RIGHT.  lOi 

Hon  of  others.  —  Slander  is  Wi^J  g5eiiel."&l  tcmj' 
employed  to  designate  an»\  Qflfe,UQ3  ^gaiJmt;'tUq 
right  of  reputation.  But  this  may  be  either 
a  malicious  and  designed  traducing  of  the 
character  of  another,  or  only  a  thouglitless  and 
idle  reporting  of  evil  about  a  neighbor,  —  as 
In  scandal  or  gossip,  —  or  even  the  expression 
of  a  slight  suspicion,  or,  less  than  this,  barely 
an  ominous  silence.  In  all  these  ways  the 
good  name  of  another  may  be  injured,  and 
by  the  indirect  methods  of  suspicion  and  si- 
lence, quite  as  effectually,  perhaps,  as  by  the 
more  direct  methods.  A  suspicion  may  easily 
be  made  to  indicate  more  than  the  reality, 
and  silence,  where  it  might  naturally  be  sup- 
posed one  would  be  ready  to  speak,  in  case 
he  could  say  any  thing  favorable,  is  the  worst 
kind  of  slander.  These  indirect  methods, 
therefore,  are  often  resorted  to  by  tliose  who 
wish  to  slander,  but  do  not  wish  to  be  open 
to  the  charge  of  having  done  so.  Tlicy  are, 
however,  just  as  much  slanderers  as  though 
they  had  spoken  riglit  out  wliat  they  meant. 


102  FIRST    PRINCIPLES   OF    ETHTC8. 


CHAPTER    YII. 

VERACITY  IS  ALWAYS  RIGHT. 

1.  The  g'round  of  the  duty. — Veracity  be- 
ing something  which  is  required  of  each  man, 
irrespective  of  the  claims  of  others,  and  not, 
like  justice,  something  which  each  may  claim 
of  all  others,  on  account  of  his  special  owner- 
ship in  certain  things,  it  presents  itself  as  a 
duty^  rather  than  as  a  right.  But  it  is  our 
duty  to  do  only  what  is  right.  Veracity,  then, 
as  a  duty  in  us,  must  be  right  on  some 
ground  or  other ;  and,  as  the  rightness  of  it 
does  not  arise  from  the  nature  of  tlie  rchi- 
tions  of  men  to  any  particular  objects,  it  must 
arise  directly  from  the  nature  of  things  them- 
selves.    Tims,    in   the   most   literal   sense,  tlio 


VERACITY    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  108 

virtue  of  veracity  has  its  ground  in  the  na- 
ture of  things;  for  veracity  is  barely  speak 
ing  and  acting  out  things  as  they  are.  It  is 
merely  truth,  reality,  reflected  in  our  words 
and  acts  —  a  strict  conformity,  in.  all  that  we 
do  and  say,  to  tilings  as  they  exist.  It  may 
always  be  said,  that  sucli  a  statement  is  true, 
and  such  a  one  false,  because  it  is  accord- 
ing to,  or  contrary  to,  fact,  reality,  nature. 
When  one  states  that  to  be  true  which  he 
knows  to  be  false,  the  first  tiling  which  stares 
him  in  the  face  is,  that  he  has  lalsificd  fact. 
The  man  who  is  attempting  to  pass  off  a  lie 
for  the  truth  is  confronted  continually  by  the 
reality  as  it  is,  and  feels  condemned  in  the 
presence  of  injured  nature. 

2.  The  utility  of  veracity  but  a  secondary 
ground  of  the  duty^  at  most.  —  But  some  have 
regarded  the  evils  of  falsehood  and  the  bene- 
fits of  truthfulness  as  the  ground  of  the  duty 
of  veracity.  That  veracity  is  in  the  highest 
degree  useful,  and  falseness  in  the  highest 
degree    injurious,   is    very    true.     We   believe 


104  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

that  all  right  is  good,  and  all  wrong  evil : 
this,  however,  is  not  the  ground,  but  the 
effect,  of  their  being  right  and  wrong.  Su}> 
pose  injustice  were  not  harmful  in  its  ten 
dency ;  would  it  not  still  be  wrong  ?  Would 
not  the  taking  by  an  indolent  man  of  what 
an  industrious  man  had  earned  be  wrong, 
even  though  no  evil  consequences  flowed  from 
it  ?  Every  one  must  be  conscious  that  sucli 
would  be  the  case.  So  veracity  is  right  irre- 
spective of  the  benefits  to  society  which  result 
from  it.  It  is  true  that  we  could  hardly  live 
in  the  world  without  veracity ;  but  this  is 
only  because  that  departing  from  veracity  is 
departing  from  nature,  ,and  hence  must  neces- 
sarily lead  to  evil.  As  to  the  right  of  the 
matter,  the  uttering  of  a  falsehood  would  be 
just  as  wrong,  if  there  were  no  being  in  the 
universe  to  be  injured  by  it,  as  it  now  is. 
Still,  as  the  capacity  of  happiness  in  others 
is  a  reason  why  we  should  promote  their 
happiness,  as  far  as  we  can  consistently  with 
gtorner  duties,  the  benefits  springing   fiom  ve* 


VERACITY   ALWAYS   RIGHT.  lOo 

racity  may,  perhaps,  be  said  to  be  a  secondary 
ground  of  tlie  duty;  but  no  otherwise  than  it 
is  also  a  ground  of  justice.  In  strictness,  the 
good  of  others  is  merely  the  ground  of  benev- 
olence, which  is  subordinate  to  both  justice 
and  veracity. 

3.  Falsehood  defined.  —  The  false  is  the  op 
posite  of  the  true.  Whoever,  therefore,  states 
what  is  not  true,  states  a  falsehood.  But  tlie 
false  statement  may  have  been  made  by  the 
individual  on  the  supposition  that  it  was  in 
accordance  with  fact.  In  such  a  case,  we  say 
that  the  falsehood  is  not  intentional^  and  hence 
is  not  culpable.  Indeed,  such  a  statement 
is  not  false  to  the  mind  of  the  individual 
making  it.  He  meant  to  state  the  trutli,  but 
was  mistaken  in  regard  to  the  facts  in  tlie 
case.  We  can  blame  him,  therefore,  only  ae 
it  appears  that  he  neglected  the  means  at  his 
command  for  ascertaining  the  truth.  Oii  tlie 
other  liand,  persons  often  convey  a  false  im- 
pression in  stating  what  is  literally  true. 
When   the  statement  is  made  for  the  sake  of 


i06  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF    ETHICS. 

conveying  this  false  impression,  it  is  at^  niucli 
a  lie  as  though  the  thing  intended  liad  been 
stated  in  so  many  words.  But  the  use  of 
common  terms,  with  no  intention  to  deceive, 
is  not  falsehood,  even  though  others  shouhJ 
misunderstand  them.  So  our  looks,  gestures, 
motions,  and  even  our  silence,  may  be  eitlier 
true  or  false,  according  as  they  are  intended 
to  convey  a  true  or  false  impression  to  others. 
Certain  acts,  motions,  gestures,  usually  imply 
certain  tilings,  and  are  thus  a  sort  of  dumb 
language ;  they  are  a  substitute  for  words,  and 
are  to  be  interpreted  in  the  same  way.  It  is 
as  much  a  falsehood  to  give  assent  to  a  false 
statement  by  a  nod  of  the  head  as  it  is  to 
assent  in  words.  And,  on  the  principle  that 
"  silence  gives  consent,"  even  the  failure  to 
speak,  or  an  omission  of  part  of  tlie  truth, 
may,  in  certain  cases,  convey  a  false  impres- 
sion as  effectually  as  the  most  positive  words 
which  could  be  employed.  In  short,  ail  inten- 
tion to  deceive  is  falsehood ;  and  notliing  else 
is  f ilsehood,  whether  it  deceives  or  not. 


VERACITY    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  107 

4.  Evils  of  falsehood,  —  As  each  individual 
can  know  but  a  comparatively  small  portion 
of  things  for  himself,  we  are  dependent  chiefly 
u])on  the  statements  of  others  for  our  knowl- 
edge. It  is  vastly  important,  therefore,  that 
tliese  statements  should  be  reliable.  Any  con- 
siderable presumption  against  the  general  reli- 
ability of  writers  —  such  as  would  arise  from 
even  a  partial  infidelity  to  the  truth — would 
leave  us  in  uncertainty  on  the  most  important 
points.  Besides,  a  general  disposition  to  false- 
hood would  invalidate  all  testimony  before 
courts  of  justice,  and  hence  no  man's  life, 
property,  or  reputation  would  be  safe.  And 
how  could  we  get  along  in  every-day  life  — 
in  our  questions  and  answers,  our  promises 
and  expectations,  our  engagements  and  con- 
tracts— if  there  was  not  a  prevailing  regard  for 
the  truth  among  men  ?  Such  being  the  evils 
of  falsehood,  we  see  how  important  it  is  that 
every  one  should  cultivate  a  habit  of  the  most 
scrupulous  truthfulness  in  all  that  he  says  and 
does.     Small   departures   from  the   truth   lead 


108  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

to  greater  ones ;  ^'  white  lies  "  lead  to  thoi^c  of 
a  darker  line,  till  at  length  the  mind  becomes 
so  beclouded  that  truth  is  scarcely  distinguished 
from  falsehood. 

5.  Is  falsehood  eiwr  justifiable? — Some  mor- 
alists have  held  that  falsehood  is  allowable 
and  justifiable  under  some  circumstances,  as. 
for  instance,  where  we  are  attacked  by  a  rob- 
ber, and  can  escape  only  by  a  false  statement. 
But,  if  falsehood  is  wrong  in  the  nature  of 
things,  can  it  ever  become  right?  If  the  ob- 
ject of  the  robber  be  simply  to  obtain  posses- 
sion of  our  money,  it  were  certainly  better  to 
give  this  up  to  him  than  to  pollute  our  souls 
with  a  falsehood.  But  w^e  are  under  no  obli- 
gation to  say  any  thing  to  him  whatever, 
whether  false  or  true.  If  we  think  best  to 
reply  to  him  at  all,  the  reply  should  be  true ; 
if  we  do  not  think  best  to  reply,  we  risk  the 
consequences,  and  should  meet  them  manfully. 
If  attacked  by  force,  it  may  be  right  for  us  to 
defend  ourselves  by  force  —  but  not  bt/  lies. 
While,  therefore,  we  are  not  always  under  ob- 


VERACITY   ALWAYS   RIGHT.  109 

ligation  to  tell  all  that  we  know  on  any  point, 
nor  even  to  say  any  thing  at  all,  what  we  dc 
say,  or  indicate  in  any  way,  should  always  be 
Iriie. 

6.  Promises^  and  the  keeping-  of  them.  — 
Promises  are  assurances  given  by  one  to  an- 
other that  he  will  do  so  and  so.  The  keeping 
of  a  promise,  then,  is  making  good  our  wort  I 
—  i.  e.,  making  it  true.  It  is,  therefore,  ;i 
question  of  veracity.  When  I  make  a  prom- 
ise, I  promise  a  certain  fact  or  result ;  and,  in 
bringing  about  that  event,  I  show  my  regard 
for  the  truth ;  while  I  show  my  disregard  for 
the  truth  by  neglecting  to  fulfil  my  prom- 
ise. But  one  cannot  accomplish  impossibilities. 
Hence  there  is  need  of  caution  in  making 
promises.  Where  we  have  every  reason  for 
believing  the  result  to  be  within  our  reach, 
we  may  properly  promise  it ;  but  in  other  cases, 
we  should  give  only  qualified  promises.  But 
should  we,  through  carelessness,  make  a  prom- 
ise which  we  are  not  able  to  fulfil,  we  may 
be  blamed,  indeed,  for  our  carelessness,  but 
10 


110  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF    ETHICS. 

not  I'or  falsehood.  So,  il"  \vc  rashly  promise 
any  thing  which,  on  reflection,  we  discover  to 
be  wrong,  we  may  innocently  disregard  our 
promise.  Right  cannot,  in  any  case,  be  at- 
tained through  wrong.  As  to  the  sense  in 
which  a  promise  is  to  be  kept,  morally  the 
man  is  innocent  if  he  keeps  it  as  he  had 
good  reason  to  believe  it  would  be  understood, 
and  intended  it  should  be  understood,  (not  as 
he  intended  to  keep  it  himself.)  wlien  lie 
made  it;  though,  when  property  is  at  stake, 
he  may  legally  be  held  to  fulfil  his  promise 
according  to  the  common  and  fair  construc- 
tion of  the  language  employed.  What  has 
been  said  of  promises  holds,  of  course,  of  con- 
tracts^ which  are  but  mutual  promises,  usually 
made  with  some  formality,  binding  two  parties. 
7.  Promises  confirmed  by  an  oath.  —  Such 
promises  are  required  where  a  good  deal  is 
supposed  to  be  at  stake ;  as  where  one  is 
called  upon  to  testify  before  a  court  of  justice, 
and  thus  holds  in  his  hands,  as  it  were,  the 
life,  property,  or  other  important  rights,  of  his 


VERACITY    ALWAYS    RIGHT.  Ill 

fcUow-citizeiis;  or  is  called  to  take  upon  luiii- 
self  an  important  office,  in  which  the  inter- 
ests of  others  are  largely  committed  to  him. 
In  oaths  of  teslimontj,  the  individual  promises 
to  *'  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  notli- 
ing  but  the  trutli."  This  is  required  tliat  the 
whole  matter  may  be  brought  before  the  court, 
and  no  false  impression  be  given  by  present- 
ing but  one  side  of  it.  If  testimony  is  to  be 
relied  upon  at  all  in  courts,  nothing  less  than 
the  entire  knowledge  of  the  case  possessed  by 
every  witness  should  be  required.  Tiie  con- 
firmatory oath  is  contained  in  the  words  sub- 
joined to  the  promise,  So  help  me  God.  Tlio 
whole  declaration,  to  be  sure,  is  called  an 
oath  ;  but  it  is  simply  a  promise  sanctioned  by 
an  appeal  to  God.  And  this  appeal  is  of  the 
aiost  solemn  nature,  since  it  renounces  all 
hope  of  help  from  God,  both  here  and  hereafter, 
except  as  the  testimony  to  be  given  shall  be 
exactly  such  as  is  promised.  It  were  avcU  if 
dll  who  muke  this  solemn  appeal  realized  its 
full  import. 


112  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

8.  Propriety  of  oaths.  —  Oaths  are  certuinlj^ 
sanctioned  by  the  Scriptures,  as  even  the  Lord 
i«  frequently  spoken  of  in  the  Old  Testament 
as  swearing  by  himself,  (Isaiah  xlv.  28 ;  Jere- 
miah xlix.  13 ;  Amos  vi.  8,)  and  the  judicial 
oath  is  expressly  enjoined  in  Exodus  xxii.  11. 
Tiie  apostle  Paul,  also,  in  Hebrews,  (xvi.  13- 
17,)  refers  at  length  to  the  promise  of  God 
to  Abraham,  which  he  confirmed  by  an  oath  ; 
and  lie  himself  often  uses  a  form  of  protesta- 
tion of  the  nature  of  an  oath,  as,  "  For  (Jod 
is  my  witness,"  "  I  call  God  for  my  witness," 
and  the  like.  But,  it  may  be  objected,  decs 
not  our  Saviour  say,  "  I  say  unto  you.  Swear 
not  at  all,"  etc.,  (Matt.  v.  34-37)  ?  The  Qua- 
kers, and  perhaps  some  other  sects,  regard  all 
judicial  oaths  as  forbidden  in  this  passage, 
and  hence  refuse  to  take  such  oaths  on  any 
occasion.  But  a  candid  consideration  of  the 
passage  must,  it  seems  to  me,  lead  to  the  con- 
clusion that  it  does  not  refer  to  judicial  oaths, 
but  to  the  unauthorized  and  irreverent  appeals 
to   God    in    common    conversation  —  what    is 


VERACITY    ALWAYS   RIGHT.  113 

commonly  denominated  profane  siveanng'.  For 
although,  in  the  oaths  referred  to  in  that  pas- 
sage, the  appeal  was  in  words  made  to  "  heav- 
vin,"  to  "  the  earth,"  or  to  "  Jerusalem,"  yet 
the  Saviour  considered  them  as  equivalent  to 
appeals  to  God.  It  seems  that  the  Jews,  sup- 
posing it  to  be  less  irreverent,  were  in  tlie 
liabit  of  swearing  by  these  and  the  like  ob- 
jects, instead  of  God  himself;  just  as  Catho- 
lics, and  indeed  Protestants,  often  swear  by 
the  saints,  as  in  the  expression  "  By  George," 
etc.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  then,  that  it  is 
profane  swearing,  and  not  judicial  oaths,  which 
is  forbidden  in  this  passage.  And,  aside  from 
Scripture,  the  importance  of  the  interests  at 
stake  often  requires  that  men  should  be  pledged 
to  truth  and  duty  by  the  most  solemn  and 
binding  form  of  asseveration  which  it  is  possi- 
ble to  devise.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  how- 
over,  that  the  oath  is  often  trifled  with,  by 
l>oing  administered  in  an  irreverent  manner, 
and  in  cases  of  so  little  importance  as  not  to 
seem  to  requii-e  it.  Still,  the  oath  must  always 
10* 


114  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

remain  an  important  sanction  to  all  who  be- 
lieve in  the  existence  of  God  and  in  the  retri- 
butions of  eternity.  Not  that  the  oath  places 
a  man  under  any  obligation  to  truth  and 
duty  which  lie  is  not  always  under,  but  it 
constrains  him  to  them  by  a  special,  self- 
imposed  liability  of  forfeiting  the  help  and 
favor  of  God. 


BENEVOLENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST  AND  TRUE.      11^ 


CHAPTER    YIII. 

BENEVOLENT  ACTS  ARE  RIGHT  IF  JUST   AND 
TRUE. 

1.  Crround  of  the  duty  of  benevolence.  — 
Benevolence  is  a  duty  because  it  is  right, 
and  it  is  right  because  the  foundation  for  it 
is  laid  in  nature.  The  capacity  of  happiness 
and  misery  in  man  —  and,  indeed,  in  all  sen- 
sitive creatures  —  constitutes  a  reason,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  for  benevolence  towards  them. 
The  pleasurable,  the  agreeable,  we  must,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  —  simply  because  it  is 
pleasurable,  —  prefer  to  the  painful.  Indeed, 
happiness  is  the  great  good  of  man,  and  mis- 
ery his  great  evil.  And  does  not  this  consti- 
tute a  reason  why  men  should  promote  the 
happiness  of  each    other   in    all    possible  ways 


116  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

within  the  bounds  of  justice  and  voracit}  't 
Does  not  nature  point  to  such  a  course  by 
making  us  capable  of  happiness  and  misery  ? 
And,  corresponding  to  this  capacity  of  happi- 
ness and  misery,  we  find  ourselves  endowed 
with  sympathetic  feelings  towards  our  fellows, 
which  dispose  us  to  make  their  case,  whether 
it  be  one  of  joy  or  of  grief,  our  own.  Know- 
ing the  sweets  of  happiness  and  the  bitterness 
of  misery  ourselves,  we  know  what  they  must 
be  to  others,  and  hence  can  but  "  rejoice  witli 
those  that  do  rejoice  and  weep  with  those  that 
weep."  We  thus,  from  our  very  constitution, 
have  something  of  tlie  same  feelings  towards 
our  fellows,  in  the  varying  fortunes  of  life, 
which  we  have  ourselves  in  like  circumstances. 
These  feelings,  to  be  sure,  are  very  much  blunt- 
ed and  modified  by  the  hardening  and  per- 
verting experience  of  life ;  but  that  tliere  is  a 
ground  for  them  in  our  nature,  and  that,  ac- 
cidental circumstances  out  of  the  way,  they  do 
actually  exist  in  some  degree,  there  can  be 
no    doubt.      Here,   then,   in    the   very   nature 


BENEVOLENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IP  JUST  AND  TRUE.      117 

of  man,  we  find  solid  ground  for  the  duty  of 
benevolence. 

2.  Relation  of  benevolence  to  the  other  vir 
lues.  —  Benevolence,  in  itself,  is  but  a  feeling. 
It  is  the  kindly  sympathy  towards  our  fellows 
which  springs  from  our  making  their  case  our 
own,  in  some  measure,  in  the  various  experi- 
ence of  life.  It  supposes,  indeed,  a  knowledge 
of  tlieir  case,  —  of  their  joys  and  sorrows, — 
which,  however,  is  only  inferential,  not  a  di- 
rect knowledge.  We  judge  that  others  are 
affected  thus  and  thus,  under  given  circum- 
stances, because  we  know  that  we  are ;  and, 
judging  tlms,  we  have  something  of  the  same 
feelings  which  we  ourselves  have  in  like  cases. 
Thus  the  feeling,  as  in  all  cases,  implies  knowl- 
edge of  some  kind.  But  this  knowledge,  though 
important,  and  a  sufficient  ground  for  the  feel- 
ing, is  not,  even  with  the  feeling,  a  sufficient 
ground  for  action.  Right  action,  in  all  cases, 
must  be  approved  by  our  highest  intelligence ; 
it  must  be  pronounced  right  as  a  result  of 
our    host    investigation    of    the    nature    of    the 


118  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

case.  We  must  take  into  tlie  account,  Lot 
only  the  condition  of  the  person  sympathized 
with,  but  our  own,  and  our  relation  to  all 
other  persons  as  well,  before  we  can  act  rightly 
in  the  premises.  Kindly  feeling'  and  a  kindly 
bearing  towards  others  are  always  demanded 
by  the  community  of  nature  among  men ;  but 
acts  of  charitij  must  be  warranted,  not  only 
by  the  condition  of  the  recipient,  but  by  jus- 
tice to  ourselves  and  to  others.  If  one  hag 
nothing  to  give,  or  owes  all  tbat  he  has  iu 
his  possession  to  some  one  else,  or  if  by  giving 
he  would  encourage  indolence  or  vice,  or  in 
any  other  way  injure  the  community,  he  has 
no  rigJit  to  give,  however  great  may  be  the 
sufferings  of  the  party.  But  we  may  often 
induce  others  to  give  who  have  tlie  means, 
though  we. have  none  ourselves,  and  may  al- 
ways exorcise  kind  feelings  towards  the  dis- 
tressed, and  perform  many  kind  acts  even, 
witliout  injury  to  ourselves  or  others.  Hence 
benevolence,  as  an  active  principle,  must  al- 
ways be  restrained  witliin  the  bounds  of  justice 


BENEVOLENT  ACTS  BIGHT  IP  JUST  AND  TRUE.      110 

and  veracity,  if  not,  indeed,  of  prudence.  It 
is  certainly  subordinate  to  the  two  first-named 
virtues. 

3.  The  production  of  happiness  only  a  Umiled 
ground  of  right.  —  We  see  from  tlie  above 
how  unsound  the  principle  is,  which  is  so  con- 
fidently put  forward  by  many  moralists,  that 
the  production  of  happiness  is  the  universal 
ground  of  right.  If  this  be  so,  tlien,  in  de- 
ciding any  question  of  duty,  we  ought  to  pay 
no  attention  to  any  other  consideration  con- 
nected with  the  case,  except  the  single  one 
of  whether  the  proposed  act  will  be  likely  to 
produce  more  happiness  than  any  other.  But, 
instead  of  this  being  the  fact,  h\  questions  of 
justice  and  veracity,  we  pay  no  tttention  at  all 
to  any  supposed  tendency  in  particular  acts 
to  produce  happiness.  This  fact  is  forcibly 
expressed  in  the  proverbs,  "  Let  justice  bo 
done  though  the  heavens  fall,"  "  Tell  the 
truth  and  shame  the  devil."  Justice  and 
truth  must  be  observed  irrespective  of  all  re- 
gard  to  their  effects  upon  either  ourselves  or 


120  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF    ETHICS. 

Others.  The  good  of  others  is  the  special 
ground  of  the  duty  of  benevolence ;  but  this 
duty,  as  we  have  seen,  is  itself  limited  by  jus- 
tice and  veracity.  No  one  can  have  any  doubt 
that  the  right  will  lead  to  the  good,  and 
hence  that  happiness  will  be  the  result  of  the 
right,  though  not,  to  us  at  least,  its  ground. 
The  ground  of  right,  as  has  already  been 
shown,  is  in  the  nature  of  things ;  and  things 
may  have  been  made  as  they  are  because  such 
an  arrangement  would  lead  to  the  greatest 
good ;  and  hence  the  greatest  good  may  have 
been  the  end  of  God  in  creation,  and  hence 
the  grwmd  of  his  action,  and  hence,  again,  in 
this  sense,  the  ground  of  right.  But  the  pro- 
duction of  happiness,  whether  in  the  individ- 
ual actor,  or  in  a  greater  number,  or  in  the 
whole,  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  the  general 
ground  of  right  for  us,  since  we  do  not  even 
refer  to  it  in  the  greater  number  of  cases, 
and  should  inevitably  be  misled  by  it  if  we 
did,  as  we  are  very  poor  judges  of  what 
would   produce   the   greatest    amount   of    ha|> 


BENEVOLENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST  AND  TRUE.   121 

piness   in    so   vast    and   complicated   a   system 
of  things. 

4.  Particular  and  general  benevolence.  —  Par- 
ticular benevolence  is  kind  feeling  and  kind 
action  towards  individuals ;  general  benevo- 
lence, towards  a  larger  number,  or  tbe  whole. 
Tliese  two  forms  of  benevolence,  though  prompt- 
ed by  the  same  general  sympathetic  feelings  of 
our  nature,  are  not  always  coincident.  An  act 
which  would  be  kind  to  an  individual  is  not 
always  kind  when  considered  in  reference  to 
a  larger  number.  It  is  always  kind  to  the 
individual  to  assist  him  whenever  he  is  in 
distress ;  but,  as  such  indiscriminate  aid  will 
tend'  to  encourage  indolence  and  vice,  it  is 
not  always  kind  to  tlie  community.  And  where 
there  is  any  conflict  of  this  kind,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  the  good  of  the  man}* 
should  prevail  over  the  good  of  the  individ- 
ual On  this  principle,  as  well  as  on  the 
ground  of  desert,  the  punishment  of  individu 
als  for  crime  may  be  justified.  Tlie  commu- 
nity is  unsafe  without  it,  and  hence  no  mcrcj? 
11 


122  FIRST    PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

can  be  shown  them.  So,  too,  we  distinguish 
between  the  happiness  of  the  individual  for 
the  moment,  or  for  a  brief  period,  and  his 
happiness  for  the  whole  course  of  his  exist- 
ence, and  always  feel  justified  in  acting  so  as 
to  promote  the  latter,  even  to  the  disregard 
of  the  former  in  particular  instances.  Hencn 
we  may  rightly  withhold  relief  from  a  person 
in  great  distress,  when  it  is  clear  that  reliev- 
ing him  will  only  tend  to  foster  vices  or  hab- 
its which  will  inevitably  involve  liim  in  still 
greater  distress  in  the  end. 

5.  Importance  of  the  virtue  of  benevolence. — 
But  benevolence,  though  by  no  means  the 
whole  of  virtue,  is  yet  a  very  important  vir- 
tue. The  sufferings  and  sorrows  of  men  are 
great,  and  call  loudly  for  sympathy  and  aid. 
Indolence  and  vice,  natural  defects  or  want  of 
capacity,  misfortunes,  providential  calamities, 
and  the  "  inhumanities  of  man  to  man,"  in- 
volve thousands  and  millions  of  our  race  in 
unutterable  woes.  At  the  same  time,  the  great 
majority  of  the  race  are  living  in  a  compara* 


BENEVOLENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST  AND  TRUE.   123 

tively  depressed  state  for  the  want  of  true 
enlightenment,  true  liberty,  or  true  reI'/.don 
Tliere  are,  therefore,  on  all  sides,  deina.yding 
our  sympathy  and  aid,  the  vicious,  the  imbe- 
cile, the  unfortunate,  the  ignorant,  the  de- 
graded, and  the  oppressed.  Indeed,  all  men 
are  proper  objects  for  our  benevolent  regtrd, 
and  may,  under  some  circumstances,  beco/Xio 
proper  objects  for  our  active  assistance.  T.  ae 
benevolence  prompts  to  the  assistance  of  al)  In 
need  of  our  help,  as  far  as  that  can  be  donii 
consistently  with  justice  and  trutli.  Within 
these  bounds  its  scope  is  unlimited,  and  its 
objects,  in  every  degree  of  need,  are  without 
number.  It  is,  at  the  same  time,  the  most 
universal  and  the  most  amiable  of  all  the 
virtues. 

6.  Conjugal^  parental^  filial  affection^  etc.  — 
The  special  affections  of  kindred  and  friends 
are  usually  treated  as  something  quite  distinct 
from  the  general  principle  of  benevolence. 
But,  if  benevolence  has  its  foundation  in  the 
kindly  fellow-feeling  existing  among  men,  and 


124  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

be  but  a  general  term  to  designate  the  work 
ing  of  those  feelings  under  different  forms, 
there  seems  no  good  reason  for  regarding  the 
feelings  of  friendship,  etc.,  as  any  thing  more 
than  special  forms  of  the  principle  of  benevo- 
lence. It  is  clear  that  our  fellow-feeling  for 
each  other,  or  interest  in  each  other,  is  in- 
creased by  an  agreeable  acquaintance  with  each 
otlier.  Men  are  attracted  to  each  other  gen- 
erally by  a  common  nature  and  a  mutual 
sympathy.  But  some,  from  a  greater  corre- 
spondence between  their  natures,  are  specially 
attracted  towards  each  other,  and  find  partic- 
ular delight  in  each  other's  society.  Tlicy 
thus  become  familiar,  and  hence,  as  well  as 
from  the  stronger  affinities  of  their  natures,  are 
able  to  enter  better  into  each  other's  feelings, 
and  come  to  regard  each  other  almost  as  an- 
other self.  And,  even  where  there  is  no  spe- 
cial congeniality  of  nature,  simple  familiarity, 
from  being  much  together,  enables  us  the 
more  readily  to  sympathize  with  each  other, 
and  thus  creates  a  special  iaterest  between  the 


BENEVOLENT  .vCTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST  AND  TRUE.      125 

parties.  And,  besides  the  interest  created  b^ 
personal  attractiveness  and  familiarity,  there  is 
still  another,  called  gratitude,  arising  from  some 
special  evidence  of  good  will  to  us.  Thus  the 
peculiar  relations  of  husband  and  wife,  of 
parent  and  child,  —  the  parent  looking  upon 
the  child  as  but  a  part  of  himself,  and  the 
child  upon  the  parent  as  his  natural  guardian, 
and  hence  sensible  of  his  dependence  and  in- 
debtedness for  continual  favors,  —  of  friend 
and  friend,  of  benefactor  and  recipient,  develop 
the  benevolent  principle  under  various  special 
forms,  and  bind  men  together  by  peculiar  ties. 
7.  What  benevolence  forbids,  —  Justice  for- 
bids interfering  with  the  rights  of  men,  but 
benevolence  forbids  interfering  with  their  hap- 
piness, except  for  cause.  Both  our  own  hap- 
piness and  that  of  others,  to  be  pursued 
rightfully,  must  be  pursued  within  the  bounds 
of  justice  and  veracity ;  but,  within  these 
bounds,  true  benevolence  not  only  teaches  us 
positively  to  promote  it,  but  forbids  all  inter- 
ference witii  it.  True  benevolence  revolts  at 
11* 


126  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

all  injury  or  harm  to  others,  as  tliough  it 
were  done  to  ourselves.  We  may,  indeed, 
sometimes  refuse  a  fellow-being  aid  or  gratifi- 
cation, out  of  regard  to  his  greater  good  or  the 
good  of  the  whole ;  but  we  may  not,  in  any 
case,  interfere  with  his  pursuit  of  happiness 
while  he  keeps  within  the  bounds  of  justice 
and  veracity  —  lea'st  of  all  may  we  interfere 
with  it  for  our  own  gratification.  We  may 
not  subject  him  to  bodily  sufferings  and  toils, 
except  as  he  submits  to  them  voluntarily  for 
a  suitable  reward ;  we  may  not,  on  account 
of  our  greater  physical  strength,  treat  him 
rudely  and  liarshly  ;  we  may  not  darken  and 
pervert  his  mind  by  withholding  knowledge  or 
by  wrong  instruction ;  we  may  not  corrupt  his 
heart  by  indulging  his  evil  passions,  or  making 
him  serve  in  any  way  as  an  instrument  or 
medium  for  the  indulgence  of  our  own.  Hav- 
ing a  soul  ourselves,  and  being  capable  of 
attaining  to  a  high  state  of  virtue  and  happi- 
ness, benevolence  requires  that  we  should  treat 
others  as  capable  of  the  same,  and  aid  them 
in  attaining  it. 


BENEVOLENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST  AND  TRUE.       127 

8.  Cultivation  of  the  benevolent  feelings.  — 
Such  being  the  nature  and  scope  of  benevo- 
lence, we  see,  at  the  same  time,  its  importance, 
and  the  means  of  cultivating  it.  A  virtue  so 
extensive  in  its  applications,  so  much  needed 
in  the  world,  and  so  amiable  withal,  should 
be  assiduously  cultivated  and  practised  by  all. 
Kindness  is  sometimes  called  humanity^  because 
it  is  the  legitimate  fruit  of  true  manhood,  the 
evidence  of  a  genuine  sympathy  with  man  as 
man.  To  cultivate  benevolent  feelings,  there- 
fore, we  have  need  to  forget  ourselves,  except 
as  members  of  the  common  brotherhood  of 
man.  We  should  study  the  nature  and  wants 
of  man  in  the  light  of  our  own,  and  learn  to 
make  his  case  ours.  We  should  make  our- 
selves acquainted  with  the  condition  of  those 
around  us,  with  their  sorrows  as  well  as  their 
joys;  we  should  dwell  upon  the  spectacle  of 
misery  as  it  presents  itself  in  large  cities  and 
among  degraded  populations,  and  think  of  the 
countless  cruelties  and  tyrannies  by  which  so 
many  of  our  race  are  tortured  and  crushed  to 


128  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

the  earth.  By  filling  our  souls  thus  with  a 
true  conception  of  the  sufferings  of  our  race, 
we  can  but  feel  some  sympathy  for  them ;  and 
acting  upon  this  sympathy  will  tend  to  increase 
it,  till  it  becomes  a  settled  principle  of  action. 
Being  men  ourselves,  we  should  be  interested 
in  whatever  pertains  to  man,  and  most  of  all 
in  his  sufferings.  We  should  not  turn  away 
from  men  because  they  arc  filthy,  diseased,  dis- 
abled, degraded,  and  dying,  but  listen  all  the 
more  attentively  to  their  cry  on  tliis  account. 
This  is  l)ut  tlic  dictate  of  true  humanity,  as 
well  as  of  religiou. 


PRUDENT   ACTS   RIGHT   .'^   JUST,  TRUE,  ETC.      129 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PRUDENT    ACTS    ARE    RIGHT    IF    JUST,    TRUE, 
AND    KIND. 

1.  Ground  of  the  duty  of  prudence  or  tem- 
perance.—  Prudent  acts  are  wise  acts  consid- 
ered solely  with  reference  to  ourselves,  or 
some  particular  interest  committed  to  iis.  Pru 
dence,  considered  as  one  of  the  cardinal  vir- 
tues, is  a  wise  regard  in  all  that  we  do  and 
say  for  our  own  good.  It  weighs  pleasures, 
and  chooses  the  most  enduring  and  satisfy- 
ing. It  is  not  carried  away  by  blind  impulse, 
but  stops  and  thinks.  As  a  principle  of  action, 
it  does  not  look  beyond  self,  but  considers  well 
the  bearing  of  every  act  upon  self,  not  only 
for  the  present  moment,  but  for  the  future. 
A   prudent   act,   therefore,  is   one   ordered   \  y 


130  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

our  highest  intelligence,  as  far  as  regards  one's 
self.  Hence  such  acts,  if  they  be  neither  false, 
nor  unjust,  nor  unkind  to  others,  must  bo 
right  acts.  Tiie  same  conclusion  follows  from 
another  view  of  the  case.  Prudent  acts,  as 
guided  by  intelligence,  are  a  result  of  the 
triumpli  of  reason  over  passion  and  impulse. 
They  are  thus,  with  reference  to  the  lower 
principles  of  our  nature,  acts  of  moderation, 
self-restraint,  or  temperance.  One  can  act 
prudently  only  by  disregarding  blind  impulse, 
short-sighted  views,  and  momentary  gratifica- 
tions. Now,  to  follow  reason  or  conscience 
against  these  lower  principles  must  be  accord- 
ing to  the  true  economy  of  man's  nature ;  and 
this  is  shown  by  Bishop  Butler  in  his  "  Sermons 
on  Human  Nature."  Prudence,  therefore,  is 
our  proper  guide,  within  the  bounds  of  jus- 
tice, veracity,  and  benevolence. 

2.  Relation  of  prudence  to  the  other  virtues, 
—  A  prudent  act,  as  implied  above,  in  order 
to  be  right,  must  be  just,  and  true,  and  kind. 
No   act,   not    even    the    most    amiable    act   of 


PRUDENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST,  TRUE.   ETC.      IBl 

benevolence,  as  we  have  already  seen,  can  be 
right,  nnless  it  be  just  and  true.  As  justice 
and  truth  are  the  habitation  of  God's  throne, 
so  they  must  be  enthroned  in  every  right  act. 
Prudence  without  justice  and  truth  is  sheer 
dishonesty  and  low  cunning.  The  subordina- 
tion of  prudence  to  benevolence  is  not  quite 
so  obvious.  Prudence,  to  be  sure,  witliout  be- 
nevolence, is  mere  selfishness ;  but  so  is  justice, 
without  benevolence,  little  more  than  hard- 
heartedness.  Benevolence,  then,  seems  to  be  a 
necessary  supplement  to  every  virtue,  an  orna- 
ment fitting  every  character.  But  where  jus- 
tice leaves  no  room  for  benevolence,  as  we 
have  seen,  benevolence  must  yield.  Now,  is  it 
thus  between  prudence  and  benevolence  ?  Is 
one  at  liberty  to  follow  the  dictates  of  pru- 
dence, in  any  case,  at  the  expense  of  the 
happiness  of  another  ?  Certainly  not,  any  more 
than  at  the  expense  of  the  rights  of  another. 
Negatively,  therefore,  benevolence  limits  pru- 
dence ;  but,  as  the  duty  of  positively  promoting 
the    happiness    of   others,   benevolence   is   not 


l->2  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

paramount  to  prudence,  if,  indeed,  it  be  co- 
ordinate with  it.  Although  the  liappiness  of 
others  is  really  just  as  important  as  our  own, 
yet  our  own,  from  the  very  fact  of  its  being 
such,  must  always  seem  to  us  the  most  impor- 
tant, since  wo  can  but  have  a  more  lively 
sense  of  it  than  of  another's.  And  this  being 
the  necessary  result  of  the  constitution  wliich 
God  has  given  us,  it  would  seem  to  bo  right, 
between  two  acts,  one  of  which  would  pro- 
mote another's  happiness  just  as  mucli  as  the 
other  would  my  own,  that  I  should  choose  the 
latter.  Thus,  for  instance,  while  one  would 
always  be  under  obligation  to  save  the  life  of 
a  fellow-being  in  danger  of  perisliing,  if  he 
could  do  so  without  losing  his  own,  ho  might 
rightfully  save  his  own  life,  in  preference  to 
that  of  anotlicr,  when  it  was  not  in  his  power 
to  save  both.  Still,  as  in  reality  tlic,  happi- 
ness of  one  is  just  as  important  as  that  of 
another,  we  can  find  no  fault  with  one  who, 
in  a  case  where  both  have  the  same  interest 
at  stake,  prefers  that  of  the  othor  to  his  own ; 


PBUDENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST,  TRUE,  ETC.      133 

indeed,  we  commend  the  act  in  him  as  noble, 
and  indicating  a  rare  superiority  to  selfish 
views.  And,  on  the  contrary,  we  severely  con- 
demn, and  even  despise,  the  man  wlio  will 
risk  nothing  for  the  good  of  another,  however 
great  his  need  or  danger. 

3.  Prudence  is  the  fruit  of  self-love.  —  Pru- 
dence is  wisdom  in  action,  and  tliis,  properly, 
only  as  it  respects  the  actor  himself.  It  is 
that  wise  and  careful  calculation  of  results, — 
that  nice  weighing  and  balancing  of  probabil- 
ities, circumstances,  and  chances,  —  which  arc 
necessary  in  determining  how  one  may  act,  in 
each  case,  most  to  his  own  advantage.  Pru- 
dence, however,  does  not  look  to  immediate 
advantage  alone,  but  to  one's  good  on  the 
whole  ;  it  is  a  wise  regard  for  the  future  as 
well  as  for  the  present.  It  is  not,  therefore, 
a  regard  for  the  right  in  general,  —  it  does 
not  necessarily  pay  any  attention  to  that,  as 
faV  as  others  are  concerned,  —  but  only  to 
what  wisdom  dictates  in  regard  to  ourselves, 
\i\  each  case.  We  cannot  doubt  that  what  is 
12 


134  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

really  for  our  good  on  the  whole  will  be  for 
the  good  of  others ;  but,  short-sighted  as  we 
are,  our  wisdom  is  incompetent  for  determin- 
ing such  vast  questions.  Hence  prudence  can 
be  our  guide  only  within  the  bounds  of  the 
rights  of  others.  Such  being  the  nature  of 
orudencc,  we  see  that  it  is  wholly  the  fruit 
of  self-love.  Self-love,  being  a  desire  for  our 
own  good  and  for  such  objects  or  results  as 
tend  to  promote  it,  prompts  us  to  use  the 
various  powers  with  which  we  have  been  en- 
dowed in  securing  that  good ;  and  such  a  use 
of  our  powers,  as  we  have  seen,  is  prudence. 
Prudence,  then,  is  a  wise  use  of  our  various 
powers  for  our  own  good,  and  as  a  dictate  of 
self-love.  And,  as  the  whole  movement  origi- 
nates in  self-love,  prudent  acts  are  selfish  acts 
—  good  for  ourselves,  but  not  necessarily  for 
others. 

4.  The  other  virtues  not  inconsistent  with 
self-love.  —  Self-love,  as  a  universal  principle 
of  action,  is  an  unsafe  guide  in  many  respects, 
and  especially  is  liable   to   degenerate   into  a 


PllUDENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IP  JUST,  TUQL,  ETC.       135 

narrow  selfishness,  which  leads  one  to  suppose 
•that  any  happiness  which  he  may  be  the  oc- 
casion of  to  others  is  so  much  deducted  from 
his  own.  Indeed,  it  is  extremely  liable  to 
descend  even  lower  than  this,  and  become  so 
cautious  and  calculating  for  the  future  as  al- 
together to  overlook  present  enjoyments,  and 
even  produce  the  greatest  uneasiness  and  anx- 
iety with  regard  to  what  is  to  come — thus 
not  only  refusing  present  happiness,  but  sub- 
stituting in  its  place  a  perpetual  and  ever- 
increasing  uneasiness  with  regard  to  the  future. 
What  is  more  common  than  such  a  result  ? 
And  what  can  show  more  conclusively  the 
folly  of  sucli  a  principle  of  action  as  a  gen- 
eral guide  ?  How  much  better,  in  all  cases,  to 
follow  the  right,  leaving  the  result  with  God ! 
Then  we  shall  always  have  the  satisfaction  of 
an  approving  conscience.  Then,  while  pru- 
dence is  allowed  its  proper  scope,  we  shall,  at 
the  same  time,  be  just,  and  true,  and  kind. 
Then  our  minds  will  be  open  to  all  the  in- 
aocent  enjoyments  of  life,  by  which  alono  self- 


136  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETH.CS. 

love  is  gratified,  and  our  own  liappiness  se- 
cured .  Is  the  satisfaction  arising  from  "  doing 
justly,  loving  mercy,  and  walking  humbly  l:e- 
fore  God,"  less  than  that  arising  from  the 
pursuit  of  riches,  honor,  or  power  ?  Indeed, 
can  there  be  any  true  and  permanent  happi- 
ness from  any  pursuits  which  are  inconsistent 
with  justice,  trutli,  and  mercy?  An  approving 
conscience  is  the  universal  condition  of  all 
solid  peace  and  enjoyment;  and  this  can  be 
had  only  by  doing  right  to  others  as  well  as 
to  ourselves. 

5.  Prudence  requires  self-control. — Prudence, 
being  wise  action  as  far  as  we  ourselves  arc 
concerned,  requires  coolness,  deliberation,  fore- 
thought. The  prudent  man  must  not  act 
rashly,  but  stop  and  think.  Now,  the  great 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  deliberation  is  the  ex- 
citability and  violence  of  passion.  As  already 
stated,  feeling  of  some  sort  is  excited  by  al- 
most every  mental  perception  ;  and  it  is  excited 
on  the  very  moment  of  the  perception.  It 
does   not  wait  for  different  perceptions   to   be 


PRUDENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST,  TRUE,  ETC.       13T 

compared,  and  a  wise  conclusion  to  be  reached, 
but  is  developed  instantly,  like  the  explosion 
of  powder  by  the  spark,  and  tends  to  precipi- 
tate the  individual  into  immediate  action.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  blind  as  well  as  furious. 
It  bears  no  light  with  it,  but  only  force.  We 
can  have  no  prudence,  therefore,  unless  our 
passions  are  under  control.  The  man  who 
rushes  this  way  and  that,  and  catches  at  this 
pleasure  and  that  as  feeling  or  passion  prompts, 
is  the  mere  sport  of  circumstances,  and  a 
thousand-fold  more  likely  to  act  against  his 
own  interest  than  for  it ;  indeed,  if  he  acts 
for  liis  own  interest  at  all,  it  is  only  by  acci- 
dent. Tlie  fop,  the  glutton,  the  drunkard, 
tlie  debauchee,  the  violent  man,  are  as  far 
from  prudence  in  their  conduct  as  they  arc 
from  right.  It  is  only  when  our  passions  are 
so  under  control  that  we  can  stop  and  think 
calmly,  and  act  according  to  our  best  convic- 
tions, that  our  conduct  becomes  truly  wise, 
ilence  it  is  as  important  for  ourselves  as  for 
12* 


188  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

others  that  our  passions  should  be  under  due 
control. 

6.  Prudence,  requires  self-improvement.  — 
Prudence,  being  the  fruit  of  self-love,  must 
require  of  us  progress  in  whatever  is  for  our 
real  good.  Progress  is  the  law  of  our  being. 
The  right  exercise  of  the  various  powers  which 
God  has  given  us  necessarily  leads  to  progress. 
Progress,  improvement,  advantage  of  some  kind, 
is  the  very  end  of  prudence.  Wise  action  is 
wise  with  reference  to  some  end.  Prudence 
in  business  is  such  a  management  of  our  af- 
fairs as  is  calculated  to  lead  to  the  accumu- 
lation of  wealth ;  prudence  in  conduct  towards 
others  is  such  an  ordering  of  our  conduct  in 
public  as  is  calculated  to  secure  the  respect, 
the  honor,  or  the  suffrages  of  our  fellow- 
citizens.  But  the  ground  of  all  other  im- 
provements is  the  improvement  of  the  mind 
and  heart.  Whether  we  consider  it  in  itself 
or  in  its  fruits,  this  is  the  chief  good.  A 
mind  fully  developed  in  its  various  powers. 
and   a   heart  properly  chastened    and   purified 


PRUDENT  ACTS  RIGHT  IF  JUST,  TRUE,  ETC.   189 

m  its  sensibilities,  are  the  greatest  of  all  bless- 
ings. As  the  one  enables  us  to  understand 
the  true  and  the  good,  so  the  other  places  us 
in  full  sympathy  and  communion  with  them. 
Self-culture,  therefore,  is  demanded  by  pru- 
dence, as  clearly  as  it  is  prompted  by  curiosity. 


140  PmST  PRINCIPLES  OP  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER   X. 

ACTS   OF  PIETY  ARE  RIGHT  IF  DIRECTED  TO 
THE  TRUE  GOD. 

1.  What  piety  is.  —  To  tlie  four  cardinal 
virtues,  Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence,  and 
Prudence,  may  be  added  Piety,  which  is  a 
virtue,  indeed,  and  something  more  than  a 
virtue.  In  general  terms,  the  sentiment  of 
piety  may  be  described  as  a  disposition  to  rev- 
erence a  Supreme  Being.  All  men  have  some 
notion  of  a  Supreme  Being  as  the  Maker  and 
Preserver  of  the  universe.  This  wondrous 
frame  of  things,  these  bodies  so  fearfully  and 
wonderfully  made,  these  souls  with  such  as- 
tonishing powers,  this  mysterious  principle  of 
life  running  through  nature,  and  this  grand 
procession    of    things    moving    on    with    such 


WHEN    ACTS    OP   PIETY    ARE   RIGHT.  141 

majesty  around  us,  seem  to  imply  the  exist- 
ence, behind  the  scene,  of  an  ahnighty  oper- 
ating Agent.  Our  lives,  our  destiny,  our  all, 
are  in  the  hands  of  this  great  and  glorious 
Being.  And  not  only  so,  but,  looking  into 
our  hearts,  we  find  sin  there,  and  very  natu- 
rally conclude,  with  the  apostle,  that,  "  if  our 
heart  condemn  us,  God  is  greater  than  our 
heart,  and  knoweth  all  tilings,"  and  hence,  for 
a  stronger  reason,  will  condemn  us  also.  Thus 
the  sense  of  sin  is  added  to  our  sense  of  de- 
pendence, and  conspires  with  it  in  producing 
that  mhigled  sentiment  of  reverence,  gratitude, 
and  awe  towards  the  Supreme  Being,  which 
constitutes  the  basis  of  piety.  This  sentiment, 
however,  is  crude  and  undefined  in  most  per- 
sons, and  leads  to  no  rational  worship  or  true 
obedience. 

2.  How  the  sentiment  of  piety  varies  with 
our  conception  of  the  character  of  God.  —  Piety 
is  thus,  in  its  beginnings,  a  mere  sentiment,  or 
feeling,  springing  from  the  perception  of  cer- 
tain  relations  which  we   hold   to  God.      And, 


142  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

as  feeling  is  dependent  upon  knowledge,  ihe 
sentiment  of  piety  must  vary  in  its  character 
according  to  our  apprehension  of  these  rela- 
tions, or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  according 
to  our  notioii  of  the  character  of  God.  For 
how  do  we  form  a  notion  of  the  character  of 
God,  if  it  be  not  from  his  supposed  relations 
to  us,  and  what  we  see  around  us  ?  If  we 
have  any  idea  of  God,  it  is  as  our  God,  as 
our  Maker,  our  Preserver,  our  Benefactor,  our 
Keeper,  our  Judge.  Now,  if  we  misapprehend 
these  relations,  and  hence  get  a  wrong  notion 
of  the  character  of  God,  our  feelings  towards 
him  will  be  wrong.  If  we  conceive  him  sim- 
ply as  the  absolute  Proprietor  and  Sovereign 
of  men,  exercising  his  power  and  authority 
arbitrarily,  something  after  the  manner  of  an 
earthly  tyrant,  enraged  at  his  offending  crea- 
tures, and  demanding  their  humiliation,  their 
punishment,  their  destruction,  the  sentiment 
of  piety  becomes  little  more  than  fear,  filling 
tlie  mind  with  gloomy  forebodings,  and  prompt- 
ing to  wild,  fantastic,  and   cruel   acts  of  wor 


WHEx\    ACTS   OF   PIETY   ARE   RIGHT.  143 

ship,  such  as  prevail  in  most  heathen  nations. 
Whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  we  regard  God, 
as  he  is  represented  in  Scripture,  as  our  Maker, 
Preserver,  and  bountiful  Benefactor,  our  gra- 
cious heavenly  Father,  "  not  willing  that  any 
should  perish,  but  that  all  should  come  to  re- 
pentance," the  sentiment  of  piety  assumes  tlie 
form  of  love,  gratitude,  adoration.  Thus  piety, 
as  a  sentiment,  can  be  right  only  as  our  con- 
ception of  the  character  of  God  is  right. 

3.  How  piety  as  a  practical  principle  varies 
ivitli  our  conception  of  the  character  of  God.  — 
But  piety  is  not  merely  a  passive  sentiment. 
As  a  feeling  based  upon  our  conception  of 
the  character  of  God,  it  must  become  to  some 
extent  a  practical  principle.  As  a  practical 
principle,  however,  it  still  acts  in  its  character 
as  a  feeling ;  it  is  simply  a  feeling  or  tendency 
allowed  and  carried  out  into  act.  Of  course, 
then,  it  must  still  vary  with  our  conception 
of  the  character  of  God.  Hence  it  is  that  the 
religions  of  the  earth  differ  so  widely.  For 
religion   is   but  the   embodiment  of  tlie    scnti- 


144  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

ment  of  piety  in  acts  of  devotion,  institutions 
of  worship,  etc.  When,  therefore,  this  senti- 
ment is  wrong,  it  embodies  itself  in  wild  and 
frantic  acts  of  devotion,  and  in  absurd  rites 
and  institutions  of  worship,  such  as  we  meet 
with  in  heathen  lands ;  while  in  Christian  coun 
tries,  where  the  character  of  God  is  better 
known  from  Revelation,  and  especially  from 
tlie  revelation  of  himself  made  in  Christ,  re- 
ligious duties,  rites,  and  worship  assume  a 
more  consistent  and  rational  form.  But  even 
among  Christian  nations,  and  in  the  midst  of 
the  light  of  Revelation,  the  character  of  God, 
and  hence  of  his  requirements  of  us,  are  very 
extensively  misapprehended.  Fanaticism  on 
the  one  hand,  and  religious  indifference  on  the 
other,  alike  indicate  defective  views  of  God, 
and  a  defective  sense  of  obligation  to  him. 

4.  The  ground  of  true  piety.  —  According  to 
what  has  now  been  said,  the  ground  of  a  true 
and  rational  piety  must  be  sought  for  in  th.e 
character  of  God.  It  must  be  a  sentiment 
and  practice  inspired  by  a  true  conception  of 


WHEN    ACTS   OF   PIETY    ARE   RIGHT.  14a 

his  character.  Now,  whatever  may  be  the  real 
cliaracter  of  God,  we  can  know  nothing  of  it 
except  as  it  is  exhibited  to  us  in  nature  and 
revelation.  And  from  these  sources  we  learn 
tliat  God  is  the  original  Maker  of  all  things^ 
and  of  ourselves  among  other  beings  and 
things;  that  he  sustains  all  things  in  existence 
by  the  constant  exertion  of  his  power,  as  he 
orders  and  directs  them  by  a  constant  exercise 
of  his  wisdom ;  that  his  Providence  embraces 
every  movement  in  this  vast  scheme  of  things, 
and  is  ordered  for  the  best  good  of  his  intel- 
ligent creatures ;  that  he  knows  our  thoughts, 
words,  and  deeds,  and  holds  us  responsible  for 
the  same ;  that,  seeing  us  to  be  sinners,  and 
under  the  condemnation  of  the  law  of  right, 
he  compassionates  our  condition,  and  has  made 
ample  provision  for  our  recovery  from  our  lost 
state ;  but  that,  although  thus  long-suffering 
and  compassionate,  yet,  as  our  final  Judge,  he 
will  by  no  means  spare  those  who  persist  in 
sin,  but  consign  them  to  their  just  doom  in 
another  world.     Is  there  not  sufficient  ground 

la 


146  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF  ETHICS. 

in  the  character  of  such  a  being,  and  one 
standing  in  such  relations  to  us,  for  the  exer- 
cise of  piety  in  its  appropriate  forms  of  love, 
obedience,  and  worship  ?  There  can  be  no 
doubt  of  this.  But  lot  us  consider  each  of 
these  exercises  of  religion  separately. 

5.  The  duty  of  love  to  God.  —  We  are  made 
to  love  what  is  lovely.  Love  is  tlie  strongest 
kind  of  complacency  which  we  are  capable  of 
feeling  in  any  being  or  object.  What  we  love 
seems  to  us  very  dear  and  precious.  A  loved 
object  has  for  us  strong  points  of  attraction, 
either  on  account  of  something  in  itself,  or  on 
account  of  some  benefit  which  we  have  received 
from  it.  Hence  has  arisen  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  love  of  complacency  and  the  love 
of  gratitude  —  the  former  denoting  the  love 
which  we  have  towards  a  being  on  account 
of  his  character  or  personal  excellences ;  the 
latter,  the  love  excited  towards  a  being  on  ac- 
count of  favors  bestowed.  On  both  of  tliese 
grounds,  we  have  the  strongest  reasons  for  the 
exercise  of  love  to  God.     All  that  is  lovely  in 


WHEN    ACTS   OP   PIETY    ARE   RIGHT.  147 

nature,  whether  in  created  objects  or  created 
beings,  is  but  a  feeble  reflection  of  tlie  loveli- 
ness of  the  Creator.  And  shall  we  love  the 
copy,  and  not  the  original  —  the  creature,  and 
not  the  Creator?  And  what  being  in  the  uni- 
verse has  laid  us  under  such  obligations  to 
gratitude  as  God  ?  The  favors  of  all  others 
are  but  borrowed  gifts,  and  limited  in  extent, 
while  his  are  as  original  as  they  are  unbound- 
ed. The  very  gift  of  being,  which  alone  ren- 
ders us  capable  of  receiving  any  other  gift,  we 
owe  to  God,  as  well  as  all  the  subordinate  gifts 
of  life  which  go  to  make  this  being  tolerable 
or  happy.  But  God  has  made  the  strongest 
appeal  to  our  gratitude  in  the  provision  which 
he  has  made  for  our  recovery  from  sin  through 
Jesus  Christ.  Well  may  an  apostle  say,  "  But 
God  commendeth  his  love  towards  us,  in  that, 
while  we  were  yet  sinners,  Christ  died  for  us." 
Sliall  we  not,  therefore,  "  love  him  because  he 
first  loved  us"?  Accordingly,  Moses,  in  giving 
tliat  comprehensive  command  enjoining  upon 
men  love  to  God,  —  a  command  reiterated  and 


148  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

enjoined  anew  in  the  New  Testament,  —  hays, 
^'Thoii  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all 
thy  heart,"  etc.,  and  calls  upon  each  one,  as 
a  reason  for  the  duty,  to  "  consider  hoiv  great 
thing's  He  hath  done  for  thee.'' 
^  6.  The  duty  of  obedience  to  God.  —  "If  yo 
love  me,"  says  the  Saviour,  "  keep  my  com- 
mandments." And  what  is  more  reasonable  — 
nay,  wliat  is  more  natural  —  than  this?  Love 
leads  naturally  to  obedience.  We  always  con- 
sider ourselves  at  the  service  of  one  whom  we 
love  in  every  thing  which  is  reasonable.  And 
infinite  as  our  obligations  are  to  God,  we  can 
hardly  conceive  of  any  service  which  it  is  })os- 
sible  for  him  to  demand  of  us  that  would  \)q 
unreasonable.  The  attitude  of  every  human 
being  towards  God  should  be  like  that  of  the 
great  apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  when,  arrested  by 
God  in  his  mad  career,  and  brought  to  his 
right  mind,  "  he,  trembling  and  astonished, 
said,  Lord,  what  wilt  thou  have  vie  to  do?'' 
Or,  as  the  Psalmist  has  it,  "  When  thou  saidst, 


WHEN    ACTS    OF   PIETY   ARE   RIGHT.  x49 

Seek  ye  my  face,  my  heart  said  un:o  thee, 
Thy  face,  Lord,  will  I  seek."  If  we  owe  ser 
vice  to  any  benig,  we  certainly  owe  it  to  God. 
If  we  are  bound  to  respect  the  wishes  and 
commands  of  any  one,  are  we  not  bound  to 
respect  those  of  our  heavenly  Fatlier?  Now, 
Ihe  commands  of  God  to  us,  as  uttered  both 
by  tlie  voice  of  nature  and  of  revelation,  are 
many  and  urgent.  But  obedience  to  these 
commands,  so  far  as  they  are  not  a  mere  re- 
enjoining  of  the  general  duties  of  morality, 
and  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  consider  them 
liere,  may  be  comprehended  under  the  general 
duty  of  worship^  which  I  now  proceed  to  con- 
sider. 

7.  Tlie  duty  of  worship.  —  Worship,  accord- 
ing to  the  derivation  of  the  word,  means  an 
expression  of  our  sense  of  the  ivorlh  of  God. 
It  is,  therefore,  adoration,  praise,  intercession. 
A  true  sense  of  the  greatness  and  glory  of 
God,  as  "  King  of  kings  and  Lord  of  lords," 
holding  universal  sway  over  all  realms  and 
13* 


150  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

all  worlds,  fills  the  soul  witli  the  most  exalted 
and  irrepressible  feelings,  which  spoiitaneoiisly 
hurst  forth  in  such  strains  of  adoration  and 
praise  as  are  found  in  some  of  the  Psalms  of 
David.  At  tlie  same  time,  a  sense  of  our  own 
need,  of  our  dependence,  our  ignorance,  and, 
most  of  all,  our  sinfulness,  impels  us,  as  by 
an  inward  necessity,  to  fly  for  aid  and  pardon 
to  this  same  glorious  Being,  who  has  revealed 
himself  to  us  as  a  God  of  mercy  and  grace, 
as  well  as  a  God  of  wisdom  and  power.  The 
various  acts  of  worship,  therefore,  —  sucli  as 
adoration,  praise,  and  prayer,  —  are  the  natu- 
ral result  of  right  views  of  ourselves  and  of 
God,  and  furnish  a  solid  foundation  for  the 
general  structure  of  public  and  private  wor- 
ship as  observed  in  Christian  nations.  But 
true  worsliip,  be  it  observed,  springs  only 
from  true  views  of  God  and  of  ourselves ; 
and  hence,  while  we  need  faith  to  enable  us 
to  apprehend  God  in  his  true  character,  and 
as  ever  near  us,  we  need  also  a  consciousness 


WHEN   ACTS   OP   PIETY    ARE   RIGHT.  lol 

of  our  weakness  and  sinfulness  to  impel  us 
to  seek  his  aid  and  forgiveness.  Such,  as  1 
conceive,  is  the  nucleus  of  the  religious  char- 
acter, from  which,  as  a  fruitful  germ,  spring 
alike  the  whole  round  of  religious  duties  and 
the  whole  energy  of  the  religious  life. 


152  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF    ETHICS. 


CHAPTEK   Xi. 

ENVIOUS    AND    MALICIOUS  ACTS   ARE  ALWAYS 
WRONG. 

1.  Ency  is  a  faulty  excess  of  emulation. — 
Emulation  seems  a  natural  consequence  of 
oiir  desire  of  self-development  and  progress. 
As  eacli  one  has  this  desire,  there  is  of  neces- 
sity a  universal  struggle  for  the  good  which 
each  one  places  before  himself  as  an  end,  and 
hence  an  animated  rivalry  to  see  which  will 
attain  his  end  first  and  most  perfectly.  Now, 
as  it  is  not  only  natural,  but  also  proper,  that 
we  should  pursue  with  our  might  any  coveted 
object,  provided  that  object  be  a  worthy  one, 
and  should  even  be  stimulated  in  its  pursuit 
by  tl\e  progress  of  others  towards  the  same 
end,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  not  necessarily 


ENVIOUS   AND   MALICIOUS    ACTS   WRONG.       158 

any  thing  wrong  in  mere  cniulation.  Emula- 
tion, however,  like  benevolence  and  every  other 
feeling,  may  be  faulty  in  degree,  and  always 
becomes  so  when  it  is  not  warranted  by  tlio 
reason  of  the  case.  And  especially  does  cnni- 
latioii  become  faulty  when,  not  content  with 
simply  vying  with  others  for  the  mastery  in 
any  thing,  one  attempts  positively  to  hinder 
the  progress  of  another  by  retarding  or  injur- 
ing him  rn  any  way.  Here  emulation  passes 
into  envy,  which  is  always  and  necessarily 
wrong,  whether  as  a  feeling  or  a  principle  of 
action.  It  never  can  be  right  positively  to  in- 
jure another  in  any  degree,  or  even  to  wish 
him  evil. 

2.  Malice  or  revenge  is  a  fauHij  excess  of 
indignation  or  anger.  —  Anger,  indignation,  re- 
sentment, are  words  of  similar  import.  They 
do  not,  indeed,  mean  precisely  the  same  tlnng; 
but  neither  of  them  implies  any  thing  whicli 
is  necessarily  wrong.  Even  anger,  which  im- 
plies more  that  is  unreasonable  than  either  of 
the   other    terms,  is   not    always  wrong,  as   ia 


154  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

plainly  implied  in  that  injunction  of  the  apos- 
tle Paul,  "  Be  ye  angry,  and  sin  not."  There 
is  an  anger,  then,  which  is  not  sinful.  Wc 
may  resent  an  injury,  or  be  angry  at  the  in- 
jurious person,  or  indignant  at  the  wrong 
which  he  has  done  us,  without  committing 
sin.  These  are  not  only  natural  feelings,  but 
may  bo  justified  by  the  nature  of  the  case. 
It  is  right  that  we  should  resent  an  injury, 
though  it  may  not  always  be  riglit  that  we 
should  undertake  of  ourselves  to  avenge  it. 
However,  such  feelings  are  of  the  greatest  ser- 
vice —  nay,  absolutely  essential  —  in  bringing 
wrong-doers  to  justice,  and  thus  protecting  so- 
ciety from  destruction.  They  are,  indeed,  tlie 
special  forms  through  which  conscience  ex- 
presses its  condemnation  of  wrong  and  wrong- 
doers. But  anger  as  a  mere  blind  passion,  a 
sort  of  fury  of  feeling  without  sufficient  cause, 
is  wrong,  and  so  is  resentment  or  indignation, 
when  no  injury  is  intended,  or  when  the  re- 
sentment or  indignation  is  greater  than  the 
injury    demands.      And    all    of    these    feelings 


ENVIOUS   AND   MALICIOUS   ACTS   WRONG.       155 

alike,  when  they  pass  over,  as  they  often  do, 
into  ill-will  and  ill-doing  to  others,  are  always 
wrong.  This  will  be  evident  from  a  brief  ex- 
position. 

3.  The  lorong  of  malice  and  revenue.  —  Mal- 
ice is  wishing  or  intending  ill  to  one ;  and 
revenge  is  inflicting  evil  for  evil,  or  for  sup- 
posed evil.  Now,  since,  as  already  stated,  our 
sentiments  of  anger,  resentment,  etc.,  act  an 
important  part  in  bringing  offenders  to  justice, 
why  may  they  not  be  allowed  to  act  directly 
in  effecting  this  result?  Why  not  allow  the 
individual  to  take  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice into  his  own  hands,  and  follow  these 
instinctive  feelings  in  administering  it?  This 
may  be  allowed  where  immediate  action  is 
essential,  as  in  warding  off  sudden  danger  or 
violence,  or  where  the  state  of  society  is  such 
as  to  provide  no  better  remedy.  But  in  a 
well-organized  society,  provided  with  laws  and 
courts  of  justice,  the  right  of  self-defence  must 
be  limited  to  those  instances  where,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  no  other  remedy  is  possi- 


156  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

ble.  We  have  a  clear  right  to  defend  our- 
selves when  our  lives  are  endangered  by  the 
assault  of  another,  and  may  be  excused,  per- 
liaps,  for  the  instinctive  return  of  indignity 
for  indignity  prompted  by  the  spontaneous  ac- 
tion of  resentment ;  but  experience  clearly 
shows  that,  in  general,  revenge,  or  the  render- 
ing of  evil  for  evil,  by  the  party  injured,  only 
tends  to  call  forth  revenge  again  in  ret\irn, 
and  so  on  without  end,  and  in  a  constantly 
increasing  ratio.  Such  a  course,  therefore, 
cannot  be  right.  Experience  has  proved  that 
legal  remedies,  in  such  cases,  are  far  bf,tter ; 
nay,  even  where  there  are  no  such  vein? dies, 
it  is  generally  better,  except  in  extreme  cases, 
to  suffer  wrong  than  to  resort  to  such  danger- 
ous means  of  redress.  And  as  to  malice,  or 
any  form  of  ill  will  towards  a  fellow-being,  — 
even  against  those  who  have  done  us  the 
greatest  injvuy,  —  it  never  can  be  justified. 
We  may  resent  their  wrong  to  us,  and  desire 
to  have  tliem  punished  for  it,  but  may  not 
wish  them  any  real  evil. 


ENVIOUS    AND   MALICIOUS    ACTS   WRONG.       157 

4.  The  duty  of  loving'  enemies.  —  Our  Sa- 
viour, addressing  his  disciples,  and,  through 
them,  us,  says,  "  Love  your  enemies,  bless 
them  that  curse  you,  do  good  to  them  that 
hate  you,  and  pray  for  them  which  despite- 
fully  use  you  and  persecute  you."  This  lias 
been  regarded  as  a  hard  saying,  and  as  en- 
joining a  virtue  too  high  for  the  attainment 
of  so  frail  a  creature  as  man.  It  is  evident, 
however,  that  we  can  but  regard  it  as  a  vir- 
tue, and  a  virtue  of  the  highest  and  most 
transcendent  character.  But  it  cannot  be  a 
virtue  for  us  if  there  is  any  impossibility  in 
the  case.  Is  there,  then,  any  impossibility 
here  ?  Must  I  necessarily  be  an  enemy  to 
one  who  is  an  enemy  to  me,  or  who  has  in- 
jured me  ?  Certainly  not.  His  happiness  is 
not  the  less  important  because  he  has  injured 
me,  nor  will  my  hostility  to  him  help  at  all 
the  injury  done  me.  But,  it  will  be  said,  we 
are  so  made  that  we  can  but  resent  a  wrong 
done  us.  Very  true ;  but  resentment,  as  ^\  ^ 
have  seen,  is  not  hatred  or  ill  will.  A  parent 
14 


1.58  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

may  be  indignant  at  a  wrong  committed  by  a 
cliild,  or  a  friend  resent  an  offence  in  a 
friend,  and  even  assist  in  bringing  liim  to 
punishment  for  ihe  same,  and  yet  have  the 
most  cordial  good  will  to  him  all  the  time. 
We  may,  then,  forgive  injuries  in  others,  and 
these  being  forgiven,  the  common  sympathy 
existing  among  beings  of  the  same  race  in- 
sures a  residuum  of  good  will  towards  the 
offenders,  or  real  interest  in  their  welfare. 

5.  The  duty  of  loving  our  neighbor  as  our- 
sclucs.  —  The  Scripture  precept,  that  cacli 
should  love  his  neighbor  as  himself,  is  a  di- 
rect consequence  of  the  principle,  that  the 
liappiness  of  every  other  man  is  just  as  im- 
porUmt  as  our  own.  This  every  one  recog- 
nizes as  a  correct  principle,  and  will  admit, 
in  general,  that  it  warrants  the  duty.  Theo- 
retically, the  duty  seems  plain.  But  how^  is 
it  possible  for  such  beings  as  we  are  to  carry 
it  out?  Is  it  possible  for  us  to  love  another 
as  we  love  ourselves  ?  Can  we  enter  into 
the   case  of  another   so  as  to  have   the   same 


ENVIOUS    AND    MALICIOUS   ACTS    WRONG.      159 

feelings,  of  any  kind,  for  him,  which  we. do 
for  ourselves  ?  It  may  be  doubted  whetlier, 
as  far  as  intensity  is  concerned,  the  same  feel- 
ings can  be  exercised  by  us  towards  another 
wliich  we  experience  in  ourselves  in  a  like 
case.  But  we  may  have  the  same  feelings  in 
kind  towards  otliers  which  we  have  towards 
ourselves.  And  these  feelings  may  be  suf- 
ficiently strong  to  move  us  to  act  towards 
others  as  we  should  towards  ourselves  in  like 
circumstances.  And  this,  as  I  conceive,  is 
what  is  required  by  the  precept.  We  are  re- 
quired to  have  the  same  kind  of  regard  to 
the  happiness  of  others  which  we  have  to 
our  own,  and  to  act  in  a  like  way  in  the 
two   cases. 

6.  The  duty  of  doing  to  others  as  we  looula 
that  they  should  do  to  vs. — What  has  been 
called  the  Golden  Rule  of  Scripture  requires 
that  we  "  should  do  to  others  as  we  would 
have  them  do  to  us."  Here,  what  we  demand 
of  others  is  made  the  standard  of  our  duty 
to  them.     Now,  even  if  we   take  the   rule  iu 


160  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

itR  most  unqualified  sense,  there  is  a  sort  of 
justice  in  it.  We  cannot,  according  to  the 
rule,  be  unreasonable  in  our  demands  upon 
others,  without  laying  ourselves  liable  to  iho 
like  unreasonable  demands  being  made  in  turn 
upon  ourselves.  The  rule,  then,  is  calculated 
to  bring  down  our  demands  upon  others  to 
the  standard  of  simple  right  and  justice. 
Hence  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  the 
rule  most  unquestionably  is,  that  we  should 
do  to  others  wliatcver  we  can  reasonably  de- 
mand tliat  they  should  do  to  us.  The  stan- 
dard of  our  duty  to  otiiers,  then,  is  not  what 
our  caprice  or  selfishness  may  require  of 
them,  but  what  the  reason  of  the  case  would 
authorize  us  to  require  of  them. 

7.  The  malevolent  affections.  —  The  malevo- 
lent affections^  as  they  have  been  styled,  are 
the  opposite  of  the  benevolent  affections,  and 
are  such  as  envy,  anger,  resentment,  hatred, 
malice,  and  the  like,  already  referred  to. 
Some  of  these,  as  we  have  seen,  are  but 
faulty   outgrowths   of   tlie  others,   and   all  or 


ENVIOUS    AND   MALICIOUS   ACTS   WRONG.      161 

them,  according  to  Bishop  Butler,  are  but 
secondary  principles  of  our  nature,  having 
reference  to  the  evils  incident  to  an  impor- 
feet  state  of  existence,  such  as  is  appointed 
us  here,  but  not  necessary  to  the  complete- 
ness of  our  nature  in  a  perfect  state.  If 
there  was  no  such  thing  as  wrong  in  the 
world,  there  would,  of  course,  be  no  use  for 
such  a  passion  as  resentment.  But  wliether 
this  be  the  correct  account  of  these  passions 
or  not,  it  is  certain  that  such  of  them  as 
are  not  mere  faulty  excesses  of  the  others, 
liave  nothing  necessarily  evil  in  them.  As 
we  liave  seen,  they  do  not  necessarily  involve 
ill  will  to  others,  but  merely  impel  to  the  re- 
sistance of  wrong,  and  to  bringing  the  wrong- 
doer to  justice,  and  thus  serve  as  a  balance 
to  pity,  which  would  be  likely  to  let  the  of- 
fender go  free.  Thus  we  see,  that  the  wrong 
of  our  nature  is  not  in  its  original  principles, 
but  in  the  faulty  excesses  to  which  we  carry 
them.  All  the  original  principles  of  our  na- 
ture are  good,  but  many  of  them  may  be 
14* 


162  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   F/IHICS. 

carried  to  excess,  and  all  of  tliem  may  i)e 
perverted  from  tlieir  proper  use  and  purpose 
to  serve  the  selfish  ends  of  the  individual. 
Indeed,  selfishness  may  be  regarded  as  the 
root  of  the  corruption  of  our  uature. 


OBLIGATION    TO   DO   RIGHT.  163 


CHAPTER    XII. 

OBLIGATION   TO   DO   RIGHT. 

1.  Nature  of  moral  obligation. — We  are 
now  prepared  to  consider  the  nature  of  moral 
obligation.  Obligation,  as  was  remarked  of 
the  terms  right  and  ivrong,  is  a  word  of 
general  application,  and  must  have  radically 
the  same  meaning  in  all  cases.  It  denotes, 
according  to  its  derivation,  that  which  binds 
or  constrains  to  something.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, a  physical,  but  a  rational  constraint, 
which  is  referred  to  —  the  force  of  some  con- 
sideration over  the  mind.  A  note  of  hand  is 
called  an  obligation,  })ecause  it  contains  a 
promise  to  pay,  and  acknowledges  an  actual 
indebtedness.     So  we  feel  ourselves  obliged  to 


164  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

one  who  has  bestowed  a  favor  upon  us,  and 
thus  created  a  balance  against  us.  In  like 
manner,  moral  obligation  is  only  tlie  con- 
straint to  a  given  act,  or  course  of  action, 
which  arises  from  the  reason  or  reasons  that 
urge  to  it.  It  is  obvious  from  the  account 
wliich  has  been  given  of  the  ground  of  right 
and  wrong,  that  it  can  be  nothing  else  than 
this.  The  same  is  implied  in  tlie  other  terms 
employed  to  express  moral  obligation,  such  as 
ought,  duty,  etc.  Ought  means  to  ov)e,  and 
duty  implies  a  debt — what  is  due.  Both  words 
alike  imply  a  balance  against  one ;  i.  e.,  a 
deficiency,  an  incompetence  to  meet  the  case 
rationally,  without  performing  the  act  in  ques- 
tion. Moral  obligation,  then,  is  a  rational 
constraint  to  a  particular  course  of  conduct, 
urged  home  by  the  most  persistent  and  au- 
thoritative feelings  of  our  nature. 

2.  Moral  obligation  according  to  Butler,  — 
Bearing  in  mind  what  was  said  in  an  earlier 
chapter  of  the  view  of  conscience  taken  by 
B'shop  Butler,  —  that  with  him  conscience  is  a 


OBLIGATION    TO    DO    RIGHT.  165 

rational  faculty,  and  is  our  natural  guide  in 
conduct,  because  it  is  the  clearest  and  strongest 
light  in  our  nature,  —  keeping  this  in  mind,  the 
above  account  of  moral  obligation  is  entirely 
consistent  witli  that  given  by  this  eminent  mor- 
alist in  the  following  passage,  found  in  his  third 
Sermon  on  Human  Nature :  "  But  allowing 
that  mankind  hath  the  rule  of  right  within 
himself,  yet  it  may  be  asked,  '  What  obliga- 
tions are  we  under  to  follow  it  ? '  1  answer, 
It  has  been  proved  tliat  man  by  his  nature 
is  a  law  to  himself,  without  the  particular 
distinct  consideration  of  the  positive  sanctions 
of  that  law ;  the  rewards  and  punishments 
which  we  feel,  and  those  which,  from  the 
light  of  reason,  we  have  ground  to  believe, 
are  annexed  to  it.  The  question,  then,  car- 
ries its  own  answer  along  with  it.  Your  ob- 
ligation to  obey  this  law,  is  its  being  the  law 
of  your  nature.  That  your  conscience  ap- 
proves of  and  attests  to  such  a  course  of 
action,  is  itself  alone  an  obligation.  Con- 
•cicuce   does   not   only  offer  itself  to  show  u? 


166  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

the  way  we  should  walk  in,  but  it  likewise 
carries  its  own  authority  with  it  that  it  is  our 
natural  guide  —  tlie  guide  assigned  us  by  the 
Author  of  our  nature ;  it  therefore  belongs  to 
our  condition  of  being ;  it  is  our  duty  to  walk 
in  that  path,  and  follow  this  guide,  without 
looking  about  to  see  whether  we  may  not  pos- 
sibly forsake  them  with  impunity." 

3.  Oblig'alion  to  the  ri^kt  arising  from  di- 
vine conimamls.  —  Although  the  liglit  which 
God  has  put  within  us  must  have  been  in- 
tended as  our  guide  within  its  proper  sphere, 
yet,  being  limited  in  its  power  of  illumination, 
and  in  the  extent  to  which  its  rays  reach,  it 
is  not  a  competent  guide  in  all  spheres  of 
duty.  Our  whole  obligation  to  what  are  called 
positive  duties  arises  from  their  having  been 
enjoined  by  God.  God  is  our  rightful  Supe- 
rior, and  may  see  reasons  for  many  things 
whicli  we  are  utterly  incapable  of  seeing,  and 
may  therefore  rightfully  enjoin  upon  us  duties 
the  ground  of  which  we  are  incapable  of  com- 
prehending.     So,  too,  the  obligation   to  man)! 


OBLIGATION   TO   DO   RIGHT.  IGl 

of  our  peculiar  duties  to  God  depends  upon 
liib  special  revelation  of  his  character  and 
ways  to  us,  and  is  not,  therefore,  wholly  de- 
rived from  our  unassisted  reason.  And,  indeed, 
even  the  ordinary  duties  of  morality  derive 
additional  sanction  from  being  reenjoined  in 
the  Word  of  God.  The  cliild,  from  the  dic- 
tates of  his  own  conscience,  may  have  a  clear 
notion  of  his  duties  to  his  brothers  and  sis- 
ters ;  but  when  those  duties  are  reenjoined 
upon  liim  by  his  father,  and  ilpOn  the  ground 
that  tliey  are  all  children  of  tlie  same  parents, 
he  feels  himself  constrained  to  tlicm  by  an 
additional  obligation.  So  is  it  with  the  com- 
man'^s^'of  our  heavenly  Fatlicr.  They  bring 
us  all  up,  as  it  were,  into  his  presence,  and 
impress  upon  us  anew,  and  with  additional 
force,  our  relative  duties  to  each  other  as 
members  of  the  same  great  family. 

4.  Obligation  to  the  right  because  the  right 
leads  to  the  good.  —  We  must  believe  that  vir- 
tue is  consistent  with  our  true  happiness.  We 
cannot  conceive  tliat  tiie  right  sliould  lead  In 


108  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

an  evil  issue,  under  the  government  of  a  per- 
fect Being.  A  perfect  government  must,  as  a 
final  result  at  least,  secure  the  happines-s  of 
Ihe  righteous.  And,  as  far  as  our  experience 
goes,  we  see  a  tendency  to  such  a  result  even 
in  the  present  life.  Although  there  is  a  sort 
of  satisfaction  in  many  kinds  of  sinful  self- 
indulgence,  still  it  is  short-lived,  soon  loses  its 
power,  and  even  undermines  the  power  of  sat- 
isfaction from  otlier  sources.  On  the  contrary, 
the  satisfaction  arising  from  doing  right,  and 
the.  exercise  of  the  virtuous  affections,  though 
less  exhilarating  for  the  moment,  is  pure  and 
unalloyed,  and  not  only  perennial  itself,  but 
opens  and  prepares  the  mind  for  the  reception 
of  ever-increasing  satisfaction  from  all  inno- 
cent sources.  So,  too,  though  the  wicked, 
from  the  operation  of  artificial  causes,  often 
prosper  for  a  time,  yet,  other  things  being 
equal,  the  upright,  the  honest,  the  virtuous, 
generally  come  out  the  best  in  tlie  long  run. 
Hence,  even  in  the  present  life,  virtue  seems 
the  surest  road  to  liappinoss,  and  we  feel  cer- 


OBLIGATION   TO   DO   RIGHT.  169 

taiii  that  it  must  be  hereafter.  And,  such 
being  the  case,  it  is  obvious  that  it  imposes 
upon  us,  as  rational  beings,  an  additional  obli- 
gation to  a  virtuous  life.  As  rational  beings, 
we  can  but  prefer  what  appears  to  be  for  our 
good  to  what  appears  to  be  for  our  harm. 
Hence,  when  the  right  is  seen  also  to  be 
good,  we  are  constrained  to  it  by  an  additional 
motive. 

5.  Obligation  to  the  right  is  no  burdensome 
restraint.  —  The  obligation  to  do  right  is  a 
rational  constraint,  and  hence  carries  the  whole 
mind  along  witli  it.  To  feel  the  obligation,  in 
any  case,  one  must  be  conscious  of  a  prepon- 
derance of  reasons  towards  a  certain  act  or 
course  of  conduct,  such  as  to  silence  all  ob- 
jections to  its  performance.  Thus  the  "yoke" 
of  duty,  when  really  seen  to  be  such,  becomes 
"  easy,  and  its  burden  light."  But,  in  being 
constrained  to  the  right,  we  are  restrained,  of 
course,  from  the  wrong.  A  restraint  is  put 
upon  our  conduct  by  the  law  of  duty.  We 
are  conditioned  in  all  that  we  do  by  tlie  right. 
15 


170  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   Of    ETHICS. 

We  must  look  out  for  the  wrong,  and  avoid 
tlie  wrong  in  all  our  conduct.  The  virtuous 
man  must  walk  circumspectly  in  all  things. 
But  there  is  nothing  in  all  this  wliich  makes 
the  condition  of  the  virtuous  man  so  very  pe- 
culiar, or  places  him  at  any  special  disadvan- 
tage as  compared  with  others.  No  end  can 
he  attained  without  submitting  to  tlie  con- 
dition —  often  very  onerous  —  of  using  the 
appropriate  means  and  incurring  certain  con- 
sequences. The  practice  of  vice,  therefore,  as 
well  as  the  pursuit  of  virtue,  is  conditioned. 
And,  as  Bishop  Butler  remarks, '' With  respect 
to  restraint  and  confinement,  whoever  will  con- 
sider tlie  restraints  from  fear  and  shame,  the 
dissimulation,  mean  arts  of  concealment,  servile 
compliances,  one  or  other  of  which  belong  to 
almost  every  course  of  vice,  will  soon  be  con- 
vinced that  the  man  of  virtue  is  by  no  means 
upon  a  disadvantage  in  this  respect.  How 
many  instances  are  there  in  which  men  feel, 
and  own,  and  cry  aloud  under  the  chains  of 
vice  with  which  thev  are  entliralled.  and  which 


OBLIGATION   TO    DO    RIGHT.  17] 

yet  they  will  not  shake  off!  How  many  in- 
stances in  which  persons  manifestly  go  through 
more  pains  and  self-denial  to  gratify  a  vicious 
passion  than  would  have  been  necessary  to  the 
conquest  of  it !  " 

6.  Obligation  to  obey  a  depraved  conscience. 
—  But  suppose  one's  conscience  be  perverted, 
or  rather,  suppose  one  has  a  wrong  view  of  a 
case,  or  a  view  which  is  not  in  accordance 
witli  the  real  nature  of  things ;  is  he  still  un- 
der obligation  to  follow  his  conscience  ?  Cer- 
tainly. If  moral  obligation  be  a  rational 
constraint  to  some  course  of  conduct,  a  man 
must  be  bound  to  follow  the  best  light  he  has, 
whether  that  light  be  the  best  possible  or  not. 
He  is  culpable,  to  be  sure,  if  he  has  neglected 
any  means  at  his  command  for  obtaining  cor- 
rect views ;  but  to  go  counter  to  his  present 
convictions,  however  erroneous,  would  only  be 
adding  a  sin  of  commission  to  a  sin  of  omis- 
fiion.  The  man  is  just  as  much  self-condemned 
who  disobeys  a  perverted  conscience  as  he  is 
who  dis"»bcys   an    enlightened    conscience.     As 


172  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP  ETHICS. 

the  apostle  Paul  says,  "  Whatsoever  is  not  of 
faith  is  sin."  Whoever  acts  against  his  host 
convictions,  even  though  these  be  wrong,  is 
himself  wrong.  He  has  violated  the  plainest 
dictates  of  his  conscience,  and  can  but  con- 
demn himself.  In  such  a  case,  lie  is  wrong 
in  his  acts  as  well  as  in  his  convictions ; 
wlicreas,  if  lie  follows  his  conscience,  even 
though  perverted,  he  is  riglit  in  his  acts,  ami 
only  wrong  in  his  convictions. 


THE   RIGHT,  THE   TRUE,  AND   THE   GOOD.      173 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

THE  RIGHT,  THE  TRUE,  AND  THE  GOOD. 

1.  What  truth  is.  —  We  have  seen  what  the 
right  is;  and  it  is  now  necessary,  in  order  to 
point  out  their  relations  to  eacli  other,  to  learn 
also  what  tlie  true  and  the  good  are.  It  is 
an  old  question,  What  is  truth?  Even  if  we 
accept  that  derivation  of  the  term  trvfh  which 
makes  it  mean  simply  what  one  troweth,  or 
thinketh,  yet  thinking  (i.  e.,  thing-ing-,  or  deal- 
ing with  things)  is  not  mere  imagining.  All 
thinking  consists  in,  or  springs  from,  perceiv- 
ing. Even  the  figments  of  the  imagination 
are  made  up  of  elements  received  througli  the 
senses,  and  hence  are  regarded  as  having  a 
likeness  to  tlio  trutli,  thougli  not  tlie  truth 
15* 


174  FIRST  PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

itself.  Real  thinking,  then,  implies  a  real  ol> 
jcct  of  thought.  Hence  truth,  even  according 
to  this  derivation  of  the  term,  is  thinking  in- 
spired by  real  objects.  Truth,  then,  may  be 
defined  to  be  the  knowledge  of  things  as  they 
are.  It  may,  indeed,  be  objected  to  this  defi- 
nition, that,  if  nothing  but  the  knowledge  of 
things  as  tliey  are  constitutes  truth,  tlien  we 
never  can  be  certain  that  we  have  attained  to 
the  truth,  since  we  never  can  be  certain  that 
our  best  knowledge  of  things  is  really  an 
apprehension  of  them  just  as  they  are.  As, 
however,  we  are  constrained  to  believe  that 
our  knowledge,  as  far  as  it  goes,  is  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  reality  of  things,  and  can 
never  know  that  it  is  not,  the  perceptions  of 
our  senses,  and  the  legitimate  inductions  and 
deductions  from  these,  must  be  trutli  to  us. 

2.  Relation  of  the  right  to  the  true.  —  Truth, 
then,  as  it  seems,  is  a  knowledge  of  things  as 
they  are,  including  not  merely  our  perceptions 
of  things  external,  but  inferences  drawn  from 
th^se  perceptions,  when  viewed  under  different 


THE   RIGHT,  THE   TRUE,  AND    THE   GOOD.       175 

relations  by  the  mind.  The  right,  also,  as 
we  have  seen,  relates  to  things  as  tnoy  are. 
Things  as  they  are,  within  a  certain  sphere 
varying  with  the  nature  of  the  act,  are  af- 
fected by  every  action.  There  must  be  an 
appeal,  therefore,  to  these  things  in  determin- 
ing the  propriety  or  impropriety  of  every  act. 
But  tlicy  are  appealed  to  only  as  known  by 
us.  Iii  short,  in  determining  the  riglit  or 
wrong  of  acts,  we  merely  make  use  of  our 
knowledge  of  things  as  far  as  it  bears  upon 
each  case.  The  question,  in  every  instance, 
is.  Is  this  act  warranted  by  the  best  knowl- 
edge which  I  have  of  the  nature  of  the  case, 
or  of  its  bearings  upon  all  concerned  ?  The 
right,  therefore,  though  differing  from  the  true, 
is  yet  determined  by  it.  Knowledge  is  not  an 
end  in  itself.  We  are  made  capable  of  know- 
ing the  truth  only  that  we  may  act  according 
to  it.  Thus,  while  the  riglit  is  determined  by 
the  true,  it  is,  nevertheless,  the  end  of  the 
true.  And  hence  the  true  end  of  life  is  not 
knowledge,  but  duty. 


176  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

3.  What  the  good  is.  —  The  good  is  of  vari 
ous  grades,  from  the  slightest  momontary 
gratification  to  the  chief  good,  the  summum 
bonum  of  the  ancient  philosophers.  Good  is 
the  opposite  of  evil,  and  is  of  two  general 
kinds  —  natural  and  moral.  Natural  good  im- 
plies happiness  of  some  kind,  or  the  means 
of  happiness.  Thus  the  gratification  of  any 
appetite  or  passion  is  a  good  ;  peace  of  con- 
science is  a  good ;  the  acquisition  of  property, 
as  the  means  of  happiness,  is  a  good ;  so  also 
is  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  a  good.  The 
good,  in  all  these  cases,  is  evidently  happiness, 
or  the  means  of  happiness.  When  reduced 
down  to  what  is  actually  intended,  the  good, 
in  all  such  cases,  turns  out  to  be  happiness, 
or  satisfaction  of  some  kind.  Both  property 
and  knowledge  are  mere  utilities,  i.  e.,  some- 
thing to  be  used  by  us,  and  hence  to  serve 
us,  in  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  Nay,  even 
the  development  of  our  powers  and  tlie  per- 
fection of  our  natures  are  but  the  means  of 
happiness,    or,    at    least,    the    occasion    of    it. 


THE   RIGHT,  THE   TRUE,  AND   THE   GOOD.       177 

What  is  called  moral  good  is  right  conduct  and 
character.  And  it  is  so  called,  as  I  conceive, 
because  right  conduct  is  sure  to  lead  to  happi- 
ness in  the  end.  Wrong  leads  to  disorder  and 
confusion,  and  hence  to  wretchedness ;  while 
the  right  tends  to  order  and  happiness.  The 
former,  therefore,  is  evil,  and  the  latter  good. 
And,  since  all  temporary  enjoyments  and  every 
species  of  happiness  lead  to  misery  in  the  end, 
unless  they  are  in  accordance  with  the  right, 
moral  good  must  be  considered  as  the  chief 
good  —  the  real  summum  bonum. 

4.  Relation  of  the  good,  the  right,  and  the 
true.  —  The  true,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the 
real.  The  right  and  the  good  alike,  therefore, 
have  their  foundation  in  the  true.  Without 
the  true,  neither  the  right  nor  the  good  could 
exist.  The  right,  however,  is  directly  and 
immediately  determined  by  the  true,  while  the 
good  is  only  indirectly  and  remotely  deter- 
mined by  it.  While  the  right  springs  IVom 
the  true,  the  good  springs  from  the  right. 
The  true   is  thus   the  substantiating  cause  of 


178  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

the  right  and  the  good,  as  the  good  is  the 
final  cause  of  the  right  and  the  true.  Al- 
though the  good,  as  well  as  the  right,  is  pos- 
sible only  through  the  true,  yet  the  true  only 
exists  immediately  for  the  right,  and  ultimately 
for  the  good.  Hence  the  true  is  the  end  ol 
knowledge,  the  right  of  duty,  and  the  good 
of  faith  and  hope. 


THE   NATURE   OP   VIRTUE.  179 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

THE   NATURE   OF  VIRTUE. 

1.  Of  virtue  in  a  restricted  sense. — Yirtiie, 
according  to  its  derivation,  means  manliness. 
With  the  ancient  Romans,  virtus  (derived  from 
vir')  denoted,  ahnost  uniformly,  that  manly 
courage  which  we  call  bravery.  Being  an  in- 
tensely martial  people,  tlie  courage  to  do  battle 
with  the  enemies  of  the  state,  and  face  tlie 
foe,  seemed  to  them  the  greatest  human  ex- 
cellence —  the  highest  proof  of  manhood.  But 
there  are  foes  within  as  well  as  foes  without, 
and  the  resistance  of  these  is  a  higher  manli- 
ness than  the  resistance  of  external  foes.  As 
we  have  it  in  Proverbs,  "  He  that  is  slow  to 
anger  is  better  than  the  mighty ;  and  he  that 


180  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

ruleth  his  spirit,  than  he  that  taketh  a  city." 
Resistance  to  temptation,  struggling  against 
sinful  inclinations  or  allurements  to  evil,  is 
the  best  possible  evidence  of  manliness,  the 
highest  excellence  of  which  we  are  capable. 
Hence,  in  its  specific  sense,  virtue  differs  from 
moral  goodness  —  is,  indeed,  but  a  species  of 
it.  Thus,  while  we  ascribe  moral  goodness  to 
God,  we  never  ascribe  virtue  to  him.  So, 
while  we  consider  any  right  act  performed  by 
men  as  a  good  act,  we  hardly  consider  it  a 
virtuous  act,  unless  it  is  accompanied  by  some 
temptation  to  act  differently.  We  often  May 
of  one  who  has  told  the  truth,  or  performed 
an  act  of  justice.  Why,  that  is  no  evidence  of 
virtue,  since  tliere  was  no  temptation  to  the 
contrary.  Thus  virtue  supposes  a  struggle 
with  temptation,  and  a  triumph  over  it.  In- 
deed, although  right  conduct  is  always  right 
and  good  in  itself,  yet  it  is  only  when  the 
right  is  performed  as  right,  —  and  to  choose 
it  distinctly  as  such  implies  some  thought  or 
temptation  to   the  contrary,  —  that  it  has  any 


THE   NATURE   OP   VIRTUE.  181 

special  merit.  The  greater  the  temptation  to 
evil,  therefore,  the  greater  the  merit  in  acting 
rightly  in  any  case.  True  virtue,  then,  is  a 
triumph  of  good  over  evil.  And  such  is  the 
frailty  of  our  nature,  and  such  the  temptations 
which  beset  our  path,  that  right  conduct  in 
man  usually  partakes  of  the  nature  of  virtue 
even  in  this  restricted  sense. 

2.  Of  virtue  in  a  more  general  sense.  —  But 
virtue  is  often  used  loosely  to  denote  right 
conduct  and  right  principles  and  dispositions 
in  general.  We  often  have  occasion  to  speak 
of  all  moral  excellence  as  one,  and  virtue  is 
the  term  employed  for  that  purpose.  In  this 
sense,  it  includes  all  right  action,  whether  at- 
tended by  temptations  or  not.  Any  right  act 
may,  in  general,  be  said  to  be  a  virtuous  act. 
But,  even  here,  virtue  refers  more  empliati- 
cally  to  right  principles  and  right  dispositions 
than  to  right  acts.  A  virtuous  man  is  one, 
to  be  sure,  that  acts  rightly ;  but,  more  than 
this,  he  is  a  man  of  right  principles,  of  riglit 
ijitentions,  of  right  dispositions.  He  is  not 
16 


182  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

only  right  outwardly,  but  inwardly.  Virtue 
is  moral  excellence,  or  moral  worthiness,  and 
is,  therefore,  a  thing  preeminently  of  the 
heart.  The  virtuous  man  must  not  only  do 
the  right,  but  love  the  right.  He  must  be 
possessed  of  such  principles  and  disposition? 
as  incline  him  to  the  right,  and  fortify  him 
against  temptations  to  the  wrong.  Virtue  is 
the  sum  of  all  moral  excellence,  whether  in 
character,  principles,  or  conduct.  It  is,  there- 
fore, if  not  "  the  pearl  of  great  price,"  the 
next  thing  to  it  —  the  most  precious  of  all 
things  earthly. 

3.  Of  virtue  and  the  virtues.  —  Virtue,  as  we 
have  seen,  is,  externally,  doing  right,  and,  in- 
ternally, intending  right.  It  is,  therefore,  the 
principle  of  right  deep-seated  and  established 
in  the  heart  —  tliat  reverence  for  the  right 
which  brings  all  tlie  thoughts,  words,  actions, 
and  feelings  into  subjection  to  it,  and  moulds 
the  whole  character  after  the  model  of  the 
highest  perfection.  The  general  principle  of 
virtue,  then,  is,  to   be    riglit   and   to   do  right 


THE   NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  183 

ill  all  things.  The  principle  is  tlius  one.  But 
this  principle,  manifested  in  any  particular  de- 
partment of  life,  may  very  properly  be  called 
a  virtue,  and  tlnis  there  may  be  a  variety  of 
virtues.  The  four  cardinal  virtues  have  al- 
ready beeu  enumerated  and  considered,  and 
there  are  many  others  under  these.  These 
virtues,  however,  are  not  to  be  considered 
merely  as  so  many  separate  habits^  but  as 
equally  the  fruit  of  the  general  principle  of 
virtuQ.  The  principle  of  habit,  or  the  fact 
that  repetition  produces  an  increased  ten- 
dency to  action  in  any  direction,  is  an  impor- 
tant aid  to  virtue  when  it  has  become  habitual, 
as  it  is  an  aid  to  vice  when  that  has  become 
habitual ;  it  is,  however,  in  itself,  neither  vir- 
tuous nor  vicious,  but  only  a  law  of  our 
nature,  which  ought,  indeed,  to  be  engaged  in 
the  service  of  virtue,  as  every  other  principle 
of  our  nature  should.  While,  therefore,  there 
ar'^  many  virtues,  the  principle  of  virtue  is 
oi\e;  and  :ience  he  who  shows  a  deficiency  in 
%ny  one  virtue,  to   the   same  extent  shows  a 


184  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

icficioncy  in  tlie  virtuous  principle.  It  is  on 
this  ground  that  the  apostle  James  says,  "  Who- 
soever shall  keep  the  whole  law,  and  yet  offend 
in  one  u  *iit,  he  is  guilty  of  all." 


SUPPLEMENT.  185 


SUPPLEMENT. 

HISTORICAL  ABSTRACT   OF   OPINIONS   ON   THE 
GROUND   OF  RIGHT  AND   AVRONG. 

1.  Since  Ethics,  as  a  theory,  has  to  do  wholly 
with  the  ground  of  right  and  wrong,  an  ab- 
stract of  the  views  of  the  most  eminent  mor- 
alists on  this  central  doctrine  of  the  science 
will  form  a  fitting  supplement  to  the  preced- 
ing treatise.  Accordingly,  it  is  here  proposed 
to  set  forth,  as  far  as  may  be  in  chronological 
order,  some  of  the  more  prominent  opinions 
Khich  have  been  held,  in  different  ages,  and 
oy  different  speculators,  as  to  the  ground  of 
right,  or  the  nature  or  principle  of  virtue. 
Opinions  on  other  points  will  be  referred  to 
only  incidentally,  and  as  they  bear  upon  the 
main  doctrine. 

16* 


f86  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF    ETHICS 

2.  In  such  an  abstract  wc  need  lg  :r 
fartl\er  back  than  Socrates,  (about  450  B.  C.) 
Tlie  Grecian  sages  before  him  liad  cultivated 
physical  pliilosophy  chiefly,  confining  their 
speculations  almost  wholly  to  the  origin  and 
nature  of  things.  Coming  on  to  the  stage 
of  action  contemporaneously  with  the  Sophists, 
who,  as  teachers  of  the  art  of  success,  seem 
to  have  subordinated  morality,  as  they  had 
philosophy,  to  effect  in  speaking  and  acting, 
Socrates  appears  to  have  felt  the  necessity  of 
a  more  formal  and  distinct  enunciation  of  the 
grounds  both  of  knowledge  and  of  virtue. 
To  establish  a  solid  ground  for  virtue,  he  ap- 
pealed from  individual  opinion  to  the  genera! 
convictions  of  men,  and  maintained  the  doc- 
trine that  the  right  is  as  certain,  and  as  much 
a  science,  as  the  truth  ;  nay,  more,  that  they 
are  the  same ;  and  hence,  that  virtue  is  but 
wisdom  in  action.  According  to  his  theory, 
the  truly  wise  man  will  be  a  virtuous  man. 
He  thus  makes  virtue  independent  of  utility, 
by  giving  it   a  foundation  in  nature,  like  tho 


SUPPLEMENT.  187 

truth.  But  at  the  same  time,  he  vitiates  his 
wliole  system  by  not  allowing  for  the  influ- 
ence of  passion,  habit,  and  w  rong  biases.  Ex- 
perience shows  that  one  may  ''know  the  right 
and  approve  it  too,"  may  "  hate  the  wrong, 
aiul  yet  the  wrong  pursue." 

3.  In  the  doctrines  of  the  schools  of  Meg- 
ara  and  Cyrene,  which  sprang,  by  opposite 
tendencies,  from  the  Socratic  teachings,  we 
find  the  beginnings  of  two  opposing  systems 
of  morals,  which  have  ever  since  divided  the 
opinions  of  moralists,  and  which  became  espe- 
cially famous  under  the  rival  sects  of  the 
Stoics  and  Epicureans.  The  ^fegaric  philoso- 
pher Stilpo,  by  teaching  tliat  the  highest 
attainable  excellence  consists  in  a  profound 
impersonal  indifference^  first  suggested  the  Sto- 
ical doctrine  of  apathy^  which  afterwards  be- 
came so  famous,  as  the  symbol  of  a  theory 
of  morals,  which  made  virtue  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  happiness.  On  the  other  hand, 
A^ristippus  of  Gyrene,  in  putting  forth  the 
doctrine  of  "  Pleasure  the  Chief  Good,"  made 


188  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

pleasure  the  rule  of  right,  and  laid  the  foun- 
dation for  the  more  rational  system  of  the 
Epicureans,  tliat  a  well-regulated  happiness  is 
the  rule  of  right. 

4.  Plato,  as  "  the  beloved  disciple,"  more 
truly  reflects  the  moral,  as  he  does  also  the 
metaphysical,  principles  of  Socrates,  than  any 
of  his  successors.  The  spirit  of  his  philoso- 
phy, like  that  of  his  master,  is  eminently 
ethical.  It  proposes  as  its  object  the  purifi- 
cation of  the  soul  by  the  contemplation  of 
ideal  truth  and  excellence.  In  his  view,  the 
True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  are  all 
one ;  or  rather,  the  two  former  are  merged 
in  the  latter,  —  the  true  and  the  fair  both 
alike  minister  to  the  good.  The  good  or 
the  perfect  is  alike  the  end  of  both.  The 
study  of  truth,  therefore,  is  the  study  of 
goodness ;  and  philosophy  is  the  purification 
of  the  soul.  This  is  only  carrying  out  to  its 
consequences  the  doctrine  of  Socrates,  that 
knowledge  is  virtue.  True  happiness,  too,  was 
the  fruit  of  philosophy,  with  Plato,  as  it  had 


SUPPLEMENT.  189 

boeii  of  wisdom  or  virtue,  with  Socrates.  Thus 
philosophy  was  the  chief  good  witli  him,  but 
only  because  it  was  the  pursuit  of  the  good 
through  the  true.  Indeed,  the  good  was  the 
end  of  God  himself,  both  in  making  the  world 
and  in  all  his  acts.  The  good  determined  all 
his  actions,  as  it  should  those  of  men.* 

5.  Aristotle,  a  disciple  of  Plato,  the  next 
great  name  in  the  history  of  Grecian  philoso- 
pliy,  departed  considerably  from  his  master  in 
ethics,  as  he  did  in  other  branches  of  phi- 
losophy. He  placed  morality  in  doing,  rather 
than  in  knowing,  and  recognized  much  more 
distinctly  than  his  master  the  influence  of 
the  passions  and  affections.  Still,  he  requires 
that  the  passions  and  affections  should  be 
under  the  control  of  reason,  in  order  to  be 
riglit.  Passion,  or  feeling,  as  the  impulse  to 
action,  may  be  deficient,  or  it  may  be  in  ex- 
cess;  but  there  is  a  certain  just  exercise  of 

*  This  paragraph  has  been  transferred  from  the  Ap- 
pendix to  my  Intellectual  Philosophy,  as  have,  also,  a 
few  o*.her  paragraphs  in  this  abstract 


190  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

tlio  passions  sanctioned  by  reason,  wliicn  is 
virtuous.  Virtue,  therefore,  with  him,  was  a 
mean  between  two  extremes  —  it  was  modera- 
tion  in  all  things. 

6.  Advancing  now  to  the  rival  sects  of 
Stoics  and  Epicureans,  which  fill  so  large  a 
epace  in  the  history  of  Greek  |)lulosophy,  we 
find  the  great  ethical  principle  of  the  former 
to  have  been,  tliat  virtue  is  acting  according 
to  nature.  For,  as  the  order  of  nature  is 
the  will  of  God,  to  act  according  to  it  is  the 
highest  virtue.  Conduct,  then,  should  be  con- 
trolled by  reason  taking  a  calm  and  compre- 
hensive survey  of  the  order  of  nature,  and 
not  by  impulse  or  tlie  love  of  pleasure.  Hap- 
piness and  all  external  advantages  were  re- 
garded by  them  as  mere  accidental  concom- 
itants of  action,  not  as  a  real  good,  or  end 
of  nature.  The  system  not  only  placed  hap- 
piness below  the  right,  but  disregarded  it 
altogether,  and  endeavored  to  replace  all  emo- 
tion by  a  profound  indifference  and  apatliy. 

7.  The   ethical    doctrines  of  the  Epicureans 


SUPPLEMENT.  191 

were  an  exaggeration  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. As  the  Stoics  rejected  happiness  alto- 
gether, as  an  end  of  life,  the  Epicureans 
made  it  tiie  chief  end  of  life ;  not,  indeed, 
the  happiness  of  unrestrained  gratification,  of 
whatever  sort,  like  the  Cyrenaic  school ;  but 
yet,  mere  happiness,  as  such.  Epicureanism 
was  not  a  system  of  mere  sensualism  or  mo-' 
mentary  indulgence,  but  rather  of  self-interest. 
It  required  a  subordination  and  systematiza- 
lion  of  the  different  kinds  of  happiness,  but 
only  as  sucli  a  course  is  necessary  in  order 
to  attain  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness 
on  tlie  whole.  Conduct  was  to  be  regulated, 
but  by  no  higher  standard  than  that  of  an 
enlightened  self-interest.  It  recognized  no  im- 
mutable law  of  right  and  wrong,  and  hence 
left  each  one  to  be  governed  by  the  wholly 
uncertain  standard  of  his  individual  concep- 
tion of  what  was  for  liis  own  good.  At  the 
same  time,  it  made  happiness  consist  largely 
in  the  absence  of  pain  and  care  ;  and  hence 
exempted  the  gods  from  all  interest  or  con- 
cern in  the  affairs  of  men. 


192  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OP   ETHICS. 

8.  Nothing  of  any  considerable  significance, 
in  an  ethical  point  of  view,  emerged  in  the 
sabsequent  developments  of  Greek  philosophy, 
cither  on  Grecian  soil,  or  later,  at  Rome. 
Cicero,  though  an  extensive  reporter  of  Gre- 
cian philosophy  and  ethics,  added  nothing 
of  importance  of  his  own.  Indeed,  he  ap- 
pears to  have  held  distinctly  to  uo  particular 
system,  though  more  of  an  Academician  than 
any  thing  else.  The  Schoolmen,  also,  of  the 
middle  ages,  proposed  no  new  system  of  mor- 
als, being  devoted  to  theology  rather  than 
ethics.  Indeed,  we  find  no  new  contributions 
to  the  theory  of  morals,  of  any  importance, 
till  the  time  of  Cromwell,  when  Thomas 
Hobbes  published  his  "  Leviathan."  The  real 
principle  of  this  book  is,  that  might  is  right, 
and  conscience  only  fear.  He  regards  mutual 
hostility,  or  war,  as  the  natural  state  of  man. 
and  civil  government  as  the  only  restraint 
upon  this.  He  denies  any  natural  distinc- 
tion between  right  and  wrong,  ascribing  the 
distinction    which    is   observed    between    them 


SUPPLEMENT.  198 

wholly  to  law  and  custom.  Virtue,  then,  is 
simply  obedience  to  the  powers  that  be ;  and 
that,  too,  for  the  sake  of  the  benefit  to  be 
deriyed  thence. 

9.  In  France,  the  principles  of  Hobbes 
were  embraced  by  Gassendi,  and  gradually 
carried  out  to  their  consequences  by  the  sub- 
sequent writers,  who  brought  on  the  corrup- 
tion in  morals  and  religion  which  ended  in 
the  French  revolution.  The  advantage,  or 
happiness,  wliich  Hobbes  regarded  as  the  end 
of  virtue,  was  gradually  lowered  down  till  it 
became  simply  momentary  sensual  pleasure 
And,  as  might  have  been  expected,  the  whole 
movement  ended  in  tlie  denial  of  all  morality, 
and,  indeed,  of  religion  even,  and  the  very 
existence  of  God. 

10.  In  England,  on  the  contrary,  the  views 
of  Hobbes  were  generally  rejected  and  op- 
posed, and  this  on  two  different  grounds ; 
one  class  of  writers  admitting  happiness,  or 
well-being,  to  be  the  proper  end  of  action,  but 
regarding  virtue  as  the  essential  condition  of 

17 


194  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

this  well-being ;  while  the  other  class  of  writora 
held  that  right  is  in  itself  the  proper  rule  and 
end  of  action.  Henry  More  and  Richard  Cum- 
berland are  representatives  of  the  former  class 
of  writers,  while  Ralpli  Cudworth  and  Samuel 
Clarke  stand  as  representatives  of  the  latter. 

11.  More,  in  his  Enchiridion.  Ethicum^  de- 
fines ethics  to  be,  the  art  of  living-  luell  and 
happily ;  but  this  happiness  must  spring  pri- 
marily from  virtue,  not  from  sensual  enjoy- 
ment. In  like  manner,  Cumberland,  in  his 
Disquisitio  de  Legibus  Natnrcc^  takes  the 
ground  that  a  universal  benevolence  of  each 
to  all  is  the  true  law  of  nature  in  regard  to 
man's  actions.  Such  a  law  is  shown  to  tend 
to  the  greatest  happiness  of  all,  and  hence,  it 
is  inferred,  must  be  the  law  of  God,  as  well 
as  the  law  of  nature.  Thus,  with  both  those 
writers,  virtue  was  but  a  means  to  the  further 
end  of  happiness. 

12.  Cudworth  and  Clarke,  on  the  contrary, 
made  virtue  an  end  in  itself.  This  is  indi- 
cated, in  the  case  of  the  former,  bj   the  very 


SUPPLEMENT.  195 

tide  of  the  treatise  in  which  his  etxiical  views 
are  set  forth  most  fully — "A  Treatise  con- 
cerning Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality."  In 
this  treatise,  good  and  evil,  justice  and  injus- 
tice, are  held  to  be  independent  of  all  law, 
of  all  mere  tendency  to  happiness,  and,  in- 
deed, of  every  tiling  else,  except  the  mind 
perceiving  them.  Dr.  Clarke,  although  he 
wrote  no  treatise  expressly  upon  the  subject 
of  morals,  yet  set  forth  his  ethical  views  very 
distinctly  in  several  tracts  on  other  subjects. 
He  makes  moral  distinctions  depend  upon  the 
fitness  and  unfitness  of  things.  As  God  is 
determined  in  his  acts  by  a  view  of  the  fitness 
of  things,  so  should  man  be.  The  nature  of 
each  case  renders  a  given  course  of  conduct, 
or  a  certain  kind  of  action,  fit ;  and  this  fit 
ness  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may 
always  be  seen  by  the  reason.  Right,  there- 
fore, is  conformity  in  action  to  the  nature  and 
reason  of  things,  and  wrong  is  a  want  of  such 
conformity. 

13.  Lord  Shaftesbury,  the  next  English  eth- 


196  FIRST   PRINCIPLES  OP  ETHICS. 

ical  writer  of  any  note,  instead  of  following 
?n  the  track  of  Cudworth  and  Clarke,  and 
other  writers  belonging  to  the  school  of  inde- 
pendent moralists,  inclined  to  the  morality  of 
consequences,  and  adopted  a  doctrine  of  virtue 
very  similar  to  that  held  by  Cumberland.  He 
recommends  virtue,  not  distinctly  as  being  right 
in  itself,  but  as  the  greatest  good,  the  source 
of  the  greatest  happiness.  At  the  same  time, 
he  places  virtue  in  the  exercise  and  gratificn- 
tion  of  the  affections  and  dispositions  which 
tend  towards  the  good  of  others,  which  he 
says  are  "approved,  by  what  he  calls  a  "  reflex 
sense,"  and  sometimes  a  ''^  moral  sensed"*  Thus 
Shaftesbury  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to 
apply  the  designation  moral  sense  to  the  moral 
faculty  —  a  designation  which  has  been  exten- 
sively  used   ever   since. 

14.  Francis   Hutcheson,   who  has  been   called 
"the   father   of   the   modern    school  of   specula-* 
tive   philosophy   in   Scotland,"   adopted   substan- 
tially    the     ethical     principles     of     Shaftesbury, 
which   he   developed   in  a   treatise   denominated 


SUPPLEMENT.  197 

"All  Inquiry  into  the  Ideas  of  Leauty  and 
Virtue."  In  this  treatise  he  adopts  the  desig- 
nation moral  sense  for  the  moral  faculty, — 
which  had  been  only  incidentally  employed  by 
Shaftesbury,  —  as  best  indicating  the  nature 
of  the  action  of  conscience.  With  him,  con- 
science was  but  a  feeling  or  sense  of  approba- 
tion or  disapprobation.  At  the  same  time,  he 
held,  with  Shaftesbury,  that  the  benevolent  or 
kind  affections  are  the  special  objects  of  the 
approbation  of  the  moral  sense,  and  hence 
constitute  virtue. 

15.  It  thus  appears  that  virtue,  among  Eng- 
lish moralists,  was  placed  upon  three  different 
grounds  —  tlie  moral  sense,  the  nature  of 
things,  and  tlie  will  of  God.  These  different 
theories  were  stoutly  maintained  by  their  re- 
spective defenders,  and  were  generally  in  sharp 
conflict  with  each  other.  It  was  under  such 
circumstances  tliat  Warburton,  in  his  "  Divine 
Legation,"  came  forward  with  his  plan  for  the 
inclusion  of  all  these  theories  in  a  common 
system.  He  saw  nothing  necessarily  hostile  in 
17* 


198  FIRST   PRINCIPLES   OF   ETHICS. 

these  ditferent  principles,  but  regarded  tliein 
rather  as  natural  allies,  and  as  each  su[)pie- 
inenting  the  other.  By  thus  widening  the 
basis,  morality,  as  he  supposed,  would  stand 
the  firmer,  all  discord  cease,  and  men  bo 
drawn  on  to  virtue  and  happiness  by  a  three- 
fold cord. 

16.  Dr.  Price*  lield  to  a  strictly  intuitive 
perception  of  right  and  wrong.  According  to 
his  view,  right  and  wrong  are  directly  per- 
ceived by  conscience,  and  are  dependent  upon 
nothing  but  the  faculty  by  wliich  we  perceive 
tliem.  They  arc  ideas  of  the  same  class  as 
our  ideas  of  space,  time,  causation,  and  tlie 
like,  of  wiiicli  we  can  give  no  account  except 
tliat  we  are  so  constituted  that  we  cannot  Init 
apprehend  them  as  we  do. 

17.  In  Paley,  on  the  contrary,  the  principle 
of  utility,  as  tlie  ground  of  right,  appears 
again.  He  defines  virtue  to  be  "  doing  good 
to  mankind,  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God, 
and    for   the    sake    of   everlasting    happiness.'- 

•  For  Bishop  Butler's  view,  see  page  72. 


SUPPLEMENT.  19^^ 

Thus  the  matter  of  virtue  is  made  to  consist 
exclusively  iu  doing  good  to  our  fellows,  tlic 
rule  of  virtue  in  the  will  of  God,  and  the  end 
of  virtue  in  the  attainment  of  everlasting  hap- 
piness. The  latter,  of  course,  as  the  motive 
to  action,  determines  its  character ;  and  lience 
virtue,  on  his  theory,  is  only  selfishness.  Still, 
as  the  right  can  but  lead  to  the  good,  the 
practical  rules  of  virtue  whicli  he  deduces 
from  his  theory  are  usually  sound  and  whole- 
some. A  comparison  of  his  practical  rules  of 
virtue  with  his  theoretical  principles  shows 
how  impossible  it  is  for  common  sense  to  be 
wholly  silenced  by  theory. 

18.  Jeremy  Bentham,  wlio  was  in  part  con- 
temporary with  Paley,  carried  out  the  princi- 
ple of  utility  as  the  ground  of  right  more 
systematically  than  it  had  been  by  any  of  his 
predecessors,  or,  indeed,  bv  any  other  writer 
whatever.  His  principle  of  right  is,  the 
iirreatest  good  of  the  greatest  number.  And  by 
good  he  means  happiness,  and,  in  the  hist 
analysis,   pleasure.      This   doctrine   lie   applies 


200  FIRST   PRINCIPLKS   OF   ETHICS. 

extensively  to  all  the  departments  of  liff;, 
building  upon  it  a  most  formidable  system  of 
individual,  social,  and  political  morality. 

19.  I  have  now  only  to  glance  at  a  few  of 
the  theories  of  morals  held  in  other  countries 
besides  England  to  complete  the  abstract  in- 
tended. And,  to  commence  with  Scotland,  I 
need  refer  here  only  to  the  theories  of  Adam 
Smith,  Dugald  Stewart,  and  Sir  James  Mack 
intosh.  Smith,  in  his  "  Theory  of  the  Moral 
Sentiments,"  makes  all  moral  distinctions  de- 
pend iipon  sympathy.  According  to  his  view, 
we  regard  acts  as  right  or  wrong  according 
as  we  sympathize,  or  fail  to  sympathize,  with 
the  views  and  feelings  which  actuate  the  agent 
in  their  performance.  In  like  manner,  also, 
we  approve  or  disapprove  our  own  acts  ac- 
cording as  we  judge  that  others  approve  or 
disapprove  them.  So,  too,  our  sense  of  our 
own  and  of  others'  merit,  arises  from  the 
sense  of  our  or  their  merit  supposed  to  be 
ont«>rtained  by  others. 

20.  Of  the  two  other  Scottish  moralists  just 


SUPPLEMENT.  201 

named,  Ste^vart  holds,  with  Dr.  Price,  to  an 
intuitive  perception  of  right  and  wrong  in 
acts,  but  recognizes  more  distinctly  the  senti 
ments  of  approbation  and  disapprobation,  or 
of  moral  beauty  and  deformity,  consequent 
upon  moral  perceptions.  Mackintosh,  on  the 
contrary,  holds  that  our  passions  and  affections 
generally,  and  even  our  sense  of  virtue  and 
duty,  are  derived  from  the  association  of  ideas. 
As  our  volitions  and  acts  are  usually  prompt- 
ed by  either  agreeable  or  disagreeable  feel- 
ings, these  acts  and  volitions,  in  turji,  become 
themselves,  by  association,  agreeable  or  disa- 
greeable to  us,  and  hence  the  direct  objects 
of  our  love  or  repugnance.  Acts  and  volitions, 
then,  which  are  agreeable  to  the  moral  sense, 
are  right,  while  those  which  are  repugnant  to 
the  moral  sense  arc  wrong. 

21.  In  Germany,  moral  questions  liave 
turned  almost  wholly  upon  the  freedom  of  the 
will.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Pantlicists  and 
Nihilists,  such  as  Spinoza  and  He^cl,  really 
deny  the  possibility  of  virtue    by  denying  per- 


202  FIRST   PRINCIPLES    OF   ETHICS. 

sonality,  and  consequently  all  freedom,  to  mah. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  Kant  and  his  more 
consistent  followers  make  the  absolute  freedom 
of  the  will,  in  the  pursuit  of  the  right,  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  man,  and  tlie 
condition  of  all  virtue.  With  Kant,  virtue  is 
obedience  to  the  law  of  duty,  enjoined  by  the 
will,  against  the  allurements  of  all  outward 
and  sensuous  influences.  Thus  his  fundamen- 
tal ethical  doctrine  is,  the  absolute  freadom 
or  autonomy  of  the  will.  This,  being  wholly 
spontaneous  and  self-determined  in  its  action, 
is  the  legislator  of  the  mind,  and  hence  enacts 
the  law  of  duty  for  life.  The  moral  law, 
then,  is  but  the  law  of  the  mind  ;  and  right, 
obligation,  duty,  are  all  internal,  and,  indeed, 
all  the  same. 

22.  Turning  now  to  France,  we  find  that 
ethics,  as  might  have  been  expected,  have  par- 
taken of  the  character  of  her  psychology,  and, 
till  of  late,  have  been  chiefly  of  the  selfish 
and  sensual  sort.  Thus  we  saw  that  Gassen- 
di  eagerly  embraced  the  ethical  principles  of 


SUPPLEMENT.  203 

Hobbes ;  and,  even  before  his  time.  La  Roche- 
foucauld, in  Ins  "  Moral  Ketiections  and  Max- 
ims," had  put  forth  a  similar  system,  basing 
all  morality  upon  self-love.  A  little  later, 
liowever,  the  devout  Malebranche  taught  a 
fuuch  loftier  and  purer  system  of  morals.  In 
his  own  words,  (quoted  by  Mackintosh,)  "  There 
is  one  parent  virtue,  the  universal  virtue,  the 
virtue  which  renders  us  just  and  perfect,  tlie 
virtue  which  will  one  day  render  us  happy. 
It  is  the  only  virtue.  It  is  the  love  of  the 
universal  order,  as  it  eternally  exists  in  the 
Divine  Reason,  where  every  created  reason 
contemplates  it.  This  order  is  composed  of 
practical,  as  well  as  of  speculative,  truth. 
Reason  perceives  the  moral  superiority  of  one 
being  over  another  as  immediately  as  the 
equality  of  the  radii  of  the  same  circle.  The 
relative  perfection  of  beings  is  that  part  of 
the  immovable  order  to  which  men  must  con- 
lorm  tneir  minds  and  their  conduct.  Tl\e 
\ove  of  order  is  ine  wnoie  ol  virtue,  and  con 
formity   to    order   constitutes    tlie    morality   ot 


204  FIRST    PRINCIPLRS    OF   ETHICS. 

actions."  Views  somewhat  similar  to  tlio^n 
have  recently  been  pnt  forth  by  Jonffroy, 
while  Cousin  has  risen  to  almost  Platonic 
loftiness  and  ideality  in  his  exhibition  of  the 
good  in  its  connections  with  the  beautiful  and 
the  true. 

23.  Coming,  finally,  to  our  own  country,  1 
need  refer  to  the  tlieories  of  only  a  few  of 
our  more  eminent  moralists.  President  Ed- 
wards regards  right  as  a  sort  of  moral  beauty 
in  acts,  and  virtue  as  ''  benevolence  to  being 
in  general."  Dr.  Wayland  makes  the  relations 
of  things,  and  Dr.  Haven  the  nature  of  things, 
the  ground  of  right,  though  some  expressions 
in  each  of  these  distinguished  moralists  seem 
more  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  an  intui- 
tive percopticn  of  right  and  wrong.  To  men- 
tion but  a  single  other  name,  Dr.  Hickok 
holds  the  somewhat  peculiar  view,  that  tiic 
right  of  an  action  consists  in  its  ivorthincss 
of  spiritual  approbation^  or  conformity  to  th" 
tjpirit's  own  infnnsu    f'xrptfpnre. 


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